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ABSTRACT
For two decades, Milton Friedman has contended that the monetary
theory of John Maynard Keynes is highly special, applicable only to
conditions of deep depression.

He continues to cite Keynes' dependence

on a condition of absolute liquidity preference, commonly called the
liquidity trap, as the theoretical basis for Keynes' unemployment
"equilibrium."

Friedman believes that Keynes' The General Theory was

based on this underlying premise, so that its results are correct only
in this special circumstance.

Therefore, Friedman contends that Keynes

regarded monetary policy as ineffective.

Additionally, Friedman

criticizes all economists in the Keynesian tradition because they adopt
a narrow "credit" view of monetary policy while his theory is based on a
broad "monetary" view.
This study investigates Friedman's charges in reference to Keynes'
The General Theory, and in the process a study is made of Keynes' and
Friedman's monetary theories.

The result is a presentation of the

fundamental differences of the two monetary theories.
Keynes' monetary policy prescriptions from

Additionally,

The General Theory are

discussed to investigate further any possible basis for Friedman's
criticisms.
The conclusions of the study are:

that Friedman is incorrect in

his charges that the liquidity trap is the basis for unemployment in
The General Theory, that Keynes' monetary theory is very similar to
the one which Friedman espouses, and that Keynes' monetary policy view
regards changes in the supply of money as a potent tool for maintaining
a high level of employment.
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CHAPTER I
INTMODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
This dissertation examines the divergent monetary theories of
Milton Friedman and John Maynard Keynes.

The major disagreement in

macroeconomics concerns the effectiveness, durability and desirability
of monetary and fiscal policy.

The basis for this divergence lies

beneath the empirical tests and the policy prescriptions, and consists
of differences in theoretical structure, including assumptions about the
behavior of agents and varying degrees of inclusion of institutional
factors.
Friedman has criticized Keynes' monetary theory and Keynes' theory
of the determination of real variables (output and employment).

In

particular, Friedman has made the following three charges (1970, p. 214;
1972, p. 943; 1982, pp. 41-42):

(1) the key feature of Keynes' monetary

theory is the "special twist" of absolute liquidity preference ( the
liquidity trap); (2) Keynes' "key proposition" that long-run full
employment equilibrium may not exist even if all prices are fiexible
relies on the existence of absolute liquidity preference; and (3)
Keynes' approach of regarding prices as an institutional datum for the
purpose of analyzing short-run employment fluctuations also relies on
absolute liquidity preference.

Friedman has concluded that, due to

these three features, Keynes"•
onto a wrong line

shunted the car of economic science

(1982 I P• 621) •
1

A.

Objectives and Method of Analysis

The chief objective of this study is to address and evaluate
Friedman's criticisms of Keynes as summarized in the above three
propositions.

To address these issues, however, it is necessary to

state the objectives in a somewhat different form:

(1) To determine

whether the liquidity trap is logically implied by Keynes' monetary
theory.

(2) To compare Keynes' and Friedman.' s monetary theories with

respect to (a) the range of assets in wealth-holders' portfolios
affected by changes in the quantity of money and (b) the monetary
transmission process--that is, the process by which a change in the
quantity of money affects other variables including real variables such
as output and employment. (3) To determine whether Keynes believed
monetary policy to be ineffective, as Friedman has charged.

Monetary

policy is defined as changes in the quantity of money brought about by
actions of the central bank.
The method of study is empirical, in the sense that the relevant
data are the writings of the two economists.

In particular, the method

involves tracing the implications of the formal theories of Keynes and
Friedman to their logical conclusions, without regard to "asides" and
peripheral observations, no matter how insightful they may be.

For as

Friedman (1972, pp. 918, 935) has noted, what an economist says and what
his formal theory logically implies may be quite different.
B.

The Liquidity Trap

One aspect of the controversy concerns the role of the liquidity
trap as a necessary condition for the non-market clearing outcome of
2

Keynes' The General Theory.

Friedman charges that logically the

unemployment outcome that Keynes claims to exist cannot do so without
the aid of rigidities (1982, p. 42), and in both the short run and the
long run, the liquidity trap is the basis for Keynes' theory.
The liquidity trap is a perfectly elastic demand for money at
some rate of interest.

If the demand for money is perfectly elastic,

wealth holders are willing to hold additional money balances that pay no
interest rather than trade for any asset with a positive yield.
Normally, wealth holders would be induced to hold additional money only
if the alternative yields on substitute stores of wealth fell.

But in

the case of absolute liquidity preference, these individuals will keep
additional money even if other yields remain the same.

Therefore, any

attempt by the central bank to lower interest rates by bidding up prices
of bonds or other assets will fail if there is a liquidity trap.

These

wealth holders will merely store as "wealth" any additional money that
the central bank creates.

They will not use it to purchase other stores

of wealth such as bonds or physical assets thus raising their prices and
lowering their yields.
Friedman has asserted that Keynes did not recognize the wealth
effect as an equilibrating force (1968, p. 2; 1982, p. 42) when prices
are flexible.

Thus, even if falling prices do not reduce interest

rates, real wealth will increase and spending accordingly will rise
until long-run equilibrium at full employment is restored (see Haberler,
1941, and Pigou, 1947).
One might dismiss this criticism of Keynes by Friedman by
contending that Keynes was, after all, mainly interested in a short-run
3

situation in which prices and wages do not move to clear labor and goods
markets rather than in a long run in which prices and wages are
flexible.

But Friedman goes further to state that even short run

disequilibrium in Keynes' theory is a result of the liquidity trap,
since its existence is "critical" for those propositions that he
attributes to The General Theory of prices being given for the short
run.

The precise way that the liquidity trap ensures rigid prices must

be inferred from Friedman's interpretation of Keynes' monetary
transmission mechaniS1D.

To dismiss these charges does not serve the

goal of illuminating the critical differences in monetary theory.
Friedman has elicited some response to his charges, especially
from those who defend Keynes' theoretical structure. Patinkin argues
that the liquidity trap is "in contrast with Keynes' own statement that
" it did not exist (1974, p. 130), and was only a "theoretical
possibility that had not yet been realized" (1976, p. 112).

He points

out that his own interpretation of Keynes in a disequilibrium setting
frees the theory "from any logical dependence on the existence of a
'liquidity trap'" (1974, p. 130).

Recently Patinkin stated that

11

the fact that this work does not assume the existence of a liquidity
trap already appears in macroeconomics textbooks" (1983, p. 48).
Other economists have expressed similar sentiments about
Friedman's insistence that the liquidity trap is even an issue.

Robert

E. Hall complains that Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary Trends devotes
an inordinate share of the volume to "a view that has no serious
adherents among professional economists.

Friedman and Schwartz are
(1982, p. 1552).

generals fighting an earlier war
4

Thomas Mayer

agrees that Friedman and Schwartz are "unconvincing" as they attempt to
persuade the reader that"•
preference

Keynes took absolute liquidity

• as the standard case" (1982, p. 1529).

Leijonhufvud (1968, footnote p. 202) finds that "Keynes explicitly
rejected the idea that the money-demand function would be perfectly
interest-inelastic within any range that we would possibly be interested
in."

Hahn states that, "Keynes did not build his revolution on the

liquidity trap" (1971, p. 59).

But, Friedman's question resurfaces:

what ultimately explains the existence of unemployment that Keynes
talked about in The General Theory (1936, p. 218)?

If Keynes based

his theory of short-run employment fluctuations on the existence of a
liquidity trap, as Friedman has charged, how could it be that Keynes
denied that the liquidity trap had ever existed?

If not the liquidity

trap, the theoretical justification for Keynes' position must be made
clear.

Friedman would have us accept that Keynes did not see his own

error in this matter.
Friedman has held this view for a long time, and he presents it at
every opportunity.

In 1956, in his "Restatement" paper, Friedman notes:

the Keynesian underemployment is based primarily on an assertion
with the form of [the demand for money]. The demand for money •
• is infinitely elastic at a "small" positive interest rate. At
this interest rate, which can be expected to prevail under
unemployment conditions, changes in the real supply of money,
whether produced by changes in prices or in the nominal stock of
money, have no effect on anything (1956, p. 17).
In a paper published in 1964, Friedman says that under conditions
of unemployment, people would be indifferent to holding money or bonds
in Keynes' theory (1969c, p. 70), and in 1966, he says that Keynes
considered liquidity preference absolute or "approximately so" (1969d,
5

p. 141).

Friedman considers the liquidity trap the "key novelty" of

The General Theory in his 1967 tribute to Henry Simons (1967, p. 7)
and similarly in 1968 in his presidential address.

In his presentation

of his "Theoretical Framework" in 1970 and the "Comments on the Critics"
in 1972, he devotes considerable space to and effort in explaining the
essence of the General Theory as he interprets it.
In my interpretation of Keynes, I put great emphasis on a highly
elastic liquidity preference cal ling this his "special twist" and
a "key element" in his proposition about long-run equilibrium
(1972, p. 928).
His great work in 1982, Monetary Trends with Anna Schwartz,
repeats his contentions that it is indeed a liquidity trap which
prevents full employment in the long run with flexible wages and prices.
He goes further to state that a liquidity trap in the short run is what
"allowed" Keynes to assume the existence of "rigid" wages and prices,
preventing monetary policy from operating in the short run and
justifying the neglect of the effects of wage and price changes (1982,
pp. 41-42).
Since Friedman has expended so much time and effort in presenting
his case, it certainly bears investigation, especially since other
economists do not seem to have considered it worth pursuing.
contention requires more than a flat denial or affirmation.

The
It is a

question which requires delving deeply into the monetary theory of
Keynes.
The complexity of Keynes' theory is evident.

Some of the

observations that he makes may be "asides" that clarify or hedge and are
not really a part of his formal theory, while others may serve as
elucidators or amplifiers.

Friedman warns that we must " ••• distinguish
6

between the logical implications of a theory and the statements about
observable phenomena

• " (1974, p. 143).

But, he says that Keynes'

theory was not describing a "normal" situation but a highly
idiosyncratic one based on conditions in the Great Depression (1982, p.
464).

An examination of Friedman's interpretation of Keynes will

disclose how Friedman sees Keynes as having a special theory tempered by
general asides.
There are only two possibilities for resolution of this argument
with respect to the long run:

(l) Friedman has not interpreted Keynes'·

theory correctly and it does not depend on the existence of a liquidity
trap for long run unemployment equilibrium, or does not claim to have a
long run unemployment equilibrium with flexible wages and prices; or (2)
Friedman is correct and Keynes' theory must be ex~mined in light of its
dependence on the liquidity trap as a basis for long run unemployment
equilibrium even with flexible wages and prices.

Our interest is mainly

the short run since it is the explanantion of short run fluctuations in
output and employment with which

Keynes was most concerned.

Similarly, there are only two possibilities for resolution of the
argument with respect to the short run:

(l) Friedman has not

interpreted Keynes' theory correctly and it does not-depend on the
existence of a liquidity trap to explain short-run employment
fluctuations; or (2) Friedman is correct and Keynes' approach of taking
goods' prices as given to analyze the short-run effects of changes in
aggregate demand (1936, chapters l - 7) relies on the existence of a
liquidity trap.

If this study finds that Keynes' theory logically

implies (2), it must be the case that Keynes' theory is applicable only
7

to a very special case, for virtually no economist contends that, as an
empirical matter, absolute liquidity preference characterizes an actual
economy.
C.

The Range of Assets and the Transmission Process

The sucess of monetary policy depends upon the absence of absolute
liquidity preference or a highly elastic demand for money.

If Friedman

is correct that Keynes relied on absolute liquidity preference, then
Keynes' monetary transmission mechanism must be shown to demonstrate
that monetary policy would be unable to lower the rate of interest.
This would be the case even if flexible wages and prices had ~•used the
real money supply to increase.

Friedman would be ~orrect in asserting

that Keynes considered monetary policy ineffective.

The existence of a

liquidity trap would prevent an increase in the supply of money from
lowering the interest rate and affecting aggregate demand.
The method by which monetary policy may affect real variables
differs between Friedman and Keynes.

Friedman and Schwartz interpret

the major difference between his theory and the

11

Keynesians 11 as the

range of assets that properly belong in the portfolio (1982, p. 58).
Assets are important because they are the forms in which persons store
their wealth, and the transmission process impacts the switching or
substitution of one asset for another.

If, as Friedman and Schwartz

believe is proper, all goods and financial instruments qualify equally
as assets, then the transmission process affects virtually all prices of
goods, services and bonds through substitution (1982, pp. 57-58).

New

money recipients must choose among these forms according to which offers
8

the highest "yield."

Prices of currently produced goods are thus

affected directly by the transmission process, as wealth holders bid up
prices in their effort to substitute goods for financial assets with
lowered yields.
If the transmission process incorporates a narrow range of assets,
then only financial instruments (money and interest-bearing securities)
figure into the portfolio substitution process, and a change in the
quantity of money impacts only their prices.

As wealth holders try to

dispose of their excess money by purchasing securities, prices of all
remaining financial securities rise and their respective yields fall.
This fall in yields, then, encourages borrowing for investment and
consumption spending and thus a rise in effective demand.
It is clear that the definition of assets is crucial for a theory
of the monetary transmission mechanism.

A broad definition puts

emphasis on relative price changes, while the narrow definition requires
only the prices of financial assets to change instead of the prices of
goods or services.

The narrow definition acordingly emphasizes the cost

of credit as the mechanism whereby money affects aggregate demand.
Friedman interprets the Keynesians as espousing the narrow
definition of assets.

Our concern in this paper however is with Keynes

and not with the Keynesians, so the proposition that Keynes himself
took this view will be examined since this view would be an alternative
to the broad range of assets or to the liquidity trap.

Differences in

the range of assets is an important issue for the transmission process
in explaining how a change in the quantity of money is realized in
different outcomes among the theories.
9

If a narrow range is a hallmark

for Keynes' monetary transmission process, then he limited his portfolio
to bonds and money.

If not he may have allowed durable goods as well.

We do not address here whether or not "Keynesians" have preserved
Keynes' monetary theory but endeavor to present the actual

■onetary

theory contained in The General Theory, so that the reader may judge
the validity of Friedman's complaints against it.
Friedman and Schwartz take "different assumptions about price" as
the central distinction in the different transmission mechanisms (1982,
p. 58).

They say that Keynes' followers, in rejecting the liquidity

trap, admitted flexible interest rates to their theories but retained
the fixed price assumption of Keynes.

The assumption of fixed prices

forces the narrow transmission channel so that changes in the quantity
of money affect only bond prices (1982, p. 58).
The legitimacy of this approach is challenged by Friedman and
Schwartz who reject the narrow channel and the segregation of the bond
and goods markets.
a "pure number,"

They see the rate of interest not as a price but as
a ratio with a temporal dimension (1982, p. 527).

It

relates the "price of services to the value of the source yie.lding those
services" (1963 1 p. 218). An interest rate is implied in the prices of
all goods, though not necessarily explicitly stated as it is for bonds
(1982 1 P• 58).
There is an inverse relationship of bond interest rates to bond
prices and the same relationship of the rate of return on goods to the
prices of goods.

Friedman criticizes the removal of this "rate" from

goods' prices and the special treatment of the bond market as the only
legitimate vehicle of monetary policy.
10

The isolation of the bond market

from the goods market, implied by the narrow channel, is illegitimate
according to Friedman, and he brings this up as a crucial issue, yet
Davidson and Tobin, who defend the narrow channel, see no violation of
economic logic.
How far may an economist go in segregating markets in
macroeconomics?

ls it legitimate for one to theorize clearing in the

bond market while excess supply exists in the market for goods?

Are

bond prices and goods prices of the same nature so that we have one
"asset" price due to substitution? or may they be treated separately?
Friedman's interpretation of Keynes' theory that the liquidity
trap causes short run price rigidity differs from his interpretation of
the Keynesians' theories that rigid prices force the narrow transmission
channel.

Does this mean that he believes that Keynes did not espouse

the narrow channel?

Or does he believe that Keynes' liquidity trap

completely shut off any monetary effects, so that the range of assets
became unimportant, the only relevant asset being money?
There are some economists who do not recognize these different
transmission processes as significant for explaining different outcomes
from a change in the supply of money.
Economics text, finds that"

Harris, in his Monetary

• monetarists and Keynesian& adopt

broadly similar portfolio models for analyzing the effects of monetary
policy" ( 1981, p. 436).

Ste in agrees that "Whatever differences there

are between monetarists and the neo-Keynesians are not due to the nature
of the transmission mechanism" (1976, p. 8).

How is it that Stein and

Harris, among other economists, do not see this as an issue?

Tobin

sees Friedman's version of the transmission process as supporting
11

Keynesian conclusions:

"The puzzle is how Friedman could think

that his account of the transmission mechanism supports monetarist
conclusions" (1974, pp. 88-89).

But a typical monetarist response from

Brunner and Meltzer concludes on the contrary that "[t]he difference in
implications reflects differences in the transmission or adjustment
process" (1976, p. 98).
How producers are signalled to increase output is another point of
contention.

Particularly, do agents respond only to relative price

signals or are there other quantity signals which either replace or
complement the price signals?

This critical issue is cloudy as the

terms "aggregate demand" used by Friedman and "effective demand" used by
Keynes may be miles apart.

Price signals, which hold center stage in

eliciting output changes in Friedman's model, seem redundant in
producing changes in effective demand for Keynes' model.
role of price changes in Keynes' model is unclear.

The actual

If prices play an

insignificant role in Keynes' model, how are changes in demand conveyed
to producers?
The implications of the liquidity trap, the relevant range of
assets, the monetary transmission process, and the characteristics of
the demand for money are important in the theoretical war between
Friedman and Keynes, yet their main differences have been underplayed,
dismissed or ignored in the literature.

Friedman's call for

clarification on these issues has not elicited the response it deserves.
Since Friedman is undaunted by denials of his charges, this issue
deserves an examination of the possible relation of the liquidity trap
to Keynes' monetary theory and his theory of output fluctuations.
12

Friedman's crusade to put Keynes' theory in its proper perspective as a
"highly special" theory applicable to "idiosyncratic" conditions has had
an effect on current economic thought.

If Friedman is correct, his

contention should be conclusively proved; if he is incorrect, he should
be shown his error.

Therefore, it is to the uncovering of the

fundamental propositions in the monetary theories of Friedman and Keynes
that this dissertation is addressed.

Friedman has characterized Keynes

as regarding monetary policy as ineffective (1982, p. 48).

Yet, The

General Theory is replete with descriptions of exactly how changes in
the quantity of money may result in output changes.

Though Keynes

qualifies many of his statements and policy prescriptions, the question
of whether Keynes really disclaimed monetary policy, and if so to what
degree, is still alive.

The issues surrounding Keynes' monetary policy

center upon the qualifications he presents and whether he meant for
these to be generally applicable or extraordinary.
D.

Plan of the Study

To accomplish the task, this study is divided into five remaining
chapters.

Each chapter uses a similar framework for analyzing the

monetary theory of Friedman and Keynes for purposes of comparison.
The second chapter examines the monetary theory of Milton Friedman as
presented in his series of articles and as summarized in his Monetary
Trends work with A. J. Schwartz.

Though he has advanced his theory on

several levels as it deals with employment, inflation, the monetary
transmission mechanism, the consumption function or the demand for
money, in no place has he brought together his entire theory so that
13

the parts form a whole.

Although this study focuses primarily on

monetary theory, it appeals to Friedman's other theories for
clarification of terms and more detailed descriptions of processes or
behavior of agents.

Friedman's model of a monetary economy is presented

as to how money influences economic activity and variables.
The next chapter addresses the criticism leveled by Friedman
against the "unemployment" outcome of The General Theory.

The charges

are listed and analyzed with reference to both short run fluctuations
and long run equilibrium.

The logic behind these accusations and the

critical nature of the charges for market clearing are revealed.

The

discussion on the narrow range of assets that Friedman attributes to the
"Keynesians" is also analyzed.
The fourth chapter interprets and analyzes ~eynes' monetary theory
as presented in The General Theory.

The analysis parallels the one

for Friedman above so that the reader may draw comparisons.

Keynes'

model of monetary transmission is specified also.
Since Friedman says that Keynes considered monetary policy
"ineffective," the fifth chapter attempts to refute this allegation by
citations from The General Theory which this writer considers evidence
to the contrary.

Since this section deals with "policy" rather than

theory, there is an attempt to reconcile the evidence with Keynes'
theory.
Finally, the last chapter will put forth major conclusions reached
by this study.

The similarities and differences in the theories will be

stated, and whatever assumptions required by the theory will be
specified.

Then, an evaluation of Friedman's contentions will be
14

offered along with an alternative interpretation of the major
conclusions of The General Theory.

15

CHAPTER II
FRIEDMAN'S MONETARY THEORY
A.

The Role of Money

Friedman's theory of how money affects real variables in the short
run and the long run depends on his view of individual behavior, price
flexibility, and the transmission process of money.

Spending decisions

by agents are undertaken in view of a utility function which they seek
to maximize over time by providing for present and fut·ure consumption.
This utility functi~n determines the tendency for individua~s .. to
"consume" or "save" and the forms in which this consumption and saving
take place.

If money is one form in which agents hold accumulated

savings, then the demand for money would be a subset of this model.
The conditions under which agents alter their money holdings form
the basis for monetary theory.

Motives for "spending" on assets or

trading monetary assets for real assets must be consistent with the
demand for money function.

Changes in the quantity of money affect real

variables through changes in spending.
The transmission process is a spelling out of exactly how output
may be affected by changes in monetary aggregates.

The outcome of the

transmission process depends upon the assumptions made with respect to
the demand for money, price flexibility, and the behavior of producers.
Milton Friedman has been widely recognized as an innovator and
student of monetary theory.

His transmission process incorporates

certain assumptions and definitions which are crucial to the outcome of
his theory.

This chapter will attempt to describe his model of a
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monetary economy and to pinpoint those crucial definitions and
assumptions that he makes which allow his theory to reach its stated
conclusions.
First, Friedman's demand for money function is specified along
with his definition of interest rates and how they are determined in the
long and short run.

Friedman's view of long run equilibrium for the

economy is described, and the model that he has envisioned for the long
run is specified.

In this connection, it is shown how a departure from

long run equilibrium results in the economy eventually moving back to
its former long run, position.

This long-run equilibrium path, however,

is resumed only after a cyclical change in output.

Thus the next step

is to examine Friedman's theory of short run fluctuations, especially
his view of how money affects spending decisions of agents, prices, and
real output via the transmission process.

The range of assets that

Friedman sees as relevant for his transmission process is specified.
Anticipations, perceptions of agents, and price flexibility play major
roles in Friedman's model.

These roles are described and examined.

Friedman's explanations of recession, expansion, short term interest
rate movements, and price inflation are included in his monetary
transmission mechanism.

Finally, the implications of his theory for

policy prescriptions are traced.
B.

The Demand for Money

If money is primarily a form of wealth, money possesses a yield,
has a price, and the demand for money would depend on factors which
affect its qualities as an asset.

Money's function as the medium of

exchange provides the qualities which make it useful as an asset.
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These

are the "services" that money provides.

If money were not the medium of

exchange, it would have no use in a portfolio for it would provide no
services.

Friedman considers this departure from Keynes' division of

the function of money into separable motives to be significant.

He also

sees it as a departure from the earlier quantity theory in which money
had but one purpose, facilitating transactions.
According to the earlier view of money as primarily a medium of
exchange • • • it was fairly natural to think of a short link
between changes in the stock of money and changes in expenditure
and to think of the effects of changes in the stock of money as
occuring very promptly. •
• according to more recent emphasis,
money is something more basic than a medium of transactions; it is
something which enables people to separate the act of purchase
from the act of sale. From this point of view, the role of money
is to seive as a temporary ·sbode of purchasing power. It is this
view that is fostered by considering money as an asset or as part
of wealth (1969c, p. 74).
The cash-balances approach • • • leads to emphasis on variables
affecting the usefulness of money as an asset: the costs and
returns from holding money instead of other assets, the
uncertainty of the future, • • • essentially, that is to emphasis
on the role of cash in a portfolio. (1982, p. 25)
The temporary abode of purchasing power is the fundamental quality
of money and that which permits its use as an asset, even though its
nominal yield may be zero.

Rather than separated from its role as an

asset, as Keynes suggested, it is an integral part of it.
There are two reasons that a person may "hold" money: (1) To
maintain a temporary abode of purchasing power.

"The separation of the

act of sale from the act of purchase is the fundamental productive
function of money.

It gives rise to the 'transactions' motive stressed

in the literature" (1969e, p. 3).
emergencies.

(2) To provide a reserve for future

"This reason corresponds to the 'asset' motive for holding

money" ( 1969e, p. 3).

Both reasons depend critically on the character

of the economy in which individuals are subject to uncertainty and
change.
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Each of these categories of money-holders can be said to demand
money partly from "transactions" motives and partly from
"speculative" motives, but dollars of money are not distinguished
according as they are held for one or the other purpose. Rather,
each dollar is • • • regarded as rendering a variety of services,
and the holder of money as altering his money holdings until the
value to him of the addition to the total flow of services
produced by adding a dollar to his money stock is equal to the
reduction in the flow of services produced by subtracting a dollar
from each of the other forms in which he holds assets (1956, p.
14).

The demand for money depends on those variables which affect the
utility of money as an "asset."

Since the transactions services of

money are an integral part of its yield, then variables affecting its
usefulness in transactions would be important for the demand _,unction.
The Yield on Money
Since the nominal yield on money ''may be zero," the demand for
money is a function of uncertainty.

Otherwise,

• • • no one would hold money instead of an interest-bearing
asset if he were certain he would not have to draw on it for a
very long time. Yet he may hold money even though there is a
sizable possibility that he may not have to draw on it for a very
long time. Whether he will do so depends on the return available
from assets held for long periods (1982, p. 260).
Since money is an asset in the portfolio (1982, p. 37), the wealth
holder calculates the return on holding money in the same way as for
other assets.

Therefore, just as any other commodity, there is a demand

for money whose determinants may be specified (1982, p. 26).

The demand

and supply of money determine the price of money and, concurrently, the
general price level (1982, p. 36).
The yield on money comes from the services it renders, since
money's return is not measured by a stated yield but depends on its
purchasing power (1982, p. 26).

Just as any other asset, money has a

rate of return implicit in holding it.
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This rate is the "value of the

service flow from a unit of money [compared] with the price of money"
(1982, pp. 26-27).

Therefore, the "rate of return" implicit in holding

a unit of money is equal to the value of the service of a unit of money
divided by the price of a unit of money.

It is this return which wealth

holders consider in their decisions to hold money.
The return from holding money is a function of the real quantity
of money (M/P) rather than just the actual "pieces of paper" in
existence.

This real quantity of money corresponds to a certain command

over real goods and services.

When the price level rises, the real

return to a unit of money falls, but the total yield on the stock of
money is dependent upon the volume of goods and services, and so
unless this volume changes the yield on the stock of money remains
constant (1982, p. 17).
It will simplify matters and entail no essential loss in
generality to suppose that money yields its return solely in kind,
in the usual form of convenience, security, etc. The magnitude of
the return in "real" terms per nominal unit of money clearly
depends on the volume of goods that unit corresponds to, or on the
general price level • • • (1956, pp. 5-6) •
• • • this demand equation [for money] must be considered
independent in any essential way of the nominal units used to
measure the money variables (1956, p. 58).
The quantity theory of money takes it for granted first, that what
matters to holders of money is the real quantity rather than the
nominal quantity they hold and, second, that there is a fairly
definite real quantity of money that people wish to hold in any

given circumstances (1982, p. 18).
As the stock of money increases, given the existing level of output and
the price level, the return from holding an additional unit would be
zero since the existing stock is providing all the required services.
Friedman says that monetarists consider the price of money to be
1/P, the inverse of the general price level (1982, p. 26; 1976b, P•
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316), which is a direct consequence

of the stress placed on money's

asset qualities in which changes in the demand for money are a result of
a change in money's usefulness as an asset (1976b, p. 316).

There is a

tendency to confuse the price of money with the rate of interest which
is the "price of credit" (1982, p. 26).
Real balances are determined by the nominal money stock and the
price level.

By spending to affect the price level, holders of money

can make the nominal stock equal to any real stock that they desire
(1982, PP• 32, 36).
The stock of money differs from the other two categories [of
assets--human ~apital and goods) because _the productive services
rendered by money do not depend closely on the number of physical
units there are, but primarily on the existence of a stock (1976a,
P• 284).
The major return from holding money is the yield from its
liquidity-"the non-pecuniary services rendered by money" (1982, p.
260).

The major~ of holding money is the income foregone by not

holding an interest bearing asset or one which would appreciate in value
or yield services (1982, p. 261).

Factors affecting the demand for

money would be those which affected either the expected return from
money (via liquidity) or the expected costs of holding money.

The costs

of holding money are affected by the returns on alternative stores of
wealth, and to some degree, these can provide the same services as
money.

So, as the "costs" of holding money rise, "there will be a

greater incentive to

substitute other productive resources for

cash" (1969e, p. 14).
Friedman's formal model of the demand for money is as follows:
M/P • f(y, w; RM*, R8*, RE*• gp*; u), where y • the total wealth
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or permanent income of the individual, and where w • the fraction of
wealth held in non-human form.

These two variables determine the

level of desired wealth or the size of the portfolio;

thus they would

affect the demand for money since money is one of the assets considered.
If permanent income increases, the demand for money would increase due
to the increased demand for real balances for transactions purposes,
but, in principle, there could be a situation in which the demand for
money fell with an increase in permanent income if the money is a
"necessity like bread" rather than a "luxury like recreation" (1982, p.
38).
But it must be remembered that the demand for money "is adapted
not to measured income but to permanent income" (1959, p. 119).
Therefore, procyclical changes in velocity related to "measured" income
may not reflect changes in velocity when one uses "permanent" income.
In Friedman's description of his transmission mechanism, he hypothesizes
that demand for money is positively related to the level of output.

The

demand for money depends on how "large" a portfolio is required to
satisfy the "wealth" requirement--thus a positive function of permanent
income--but also reflects "how close" one is to achieving it--thus a
negative function of the fraction of wealth held in non-human form
{1976a, p. 64; 1957, p. 16).

When a person has a larger stock of

wealth, his savings declines, and so would his demand for money balances
since this is "one form" for storing wealth 0982, p. 37).
RM* • the expected nominal rate of return on money

{+)

RB* • the expected nominal rate of return on bonds

{-)

RE* • the expected nominal rate of return on equities {-)

22

gp* • the expected nominal rue of return on..phywcal aaaets which
includes the rate of price changes plus the acutal nominal yield or cost
(-).

The demand for money would vary directly with~• and inversely
with other nominal returns since they represent yields on substitutes
for money as an asset.

The symbol "u" represents whatever other

variables affect the utility of money services.

These could be

conditions of uncertainty or instability which would induce wealth
holders to assign an even higher yield to liquidity.

Friedman and

Schwartz say that ,this is one aspect of the demand for moi:iey that Keynes
neglected in his demand function (1982, p. 53).
Friedman's demand for money function seeks to define logically the
motives that one may have to hold cash while preserving the feature of
money that he considers the most important, the usefulness of money in
facilitating transactions.
On our approach, the average amount of money held per dollar of
transactions is itself to be regarded as a resultant of an
economic equilibrating process, not as a physical datum. If, for
whatever reason, it becomes more expensive to hold money, then it
is worth devoting more resources to effecting money transactions
in less expensive ways or to reducing the volume of transactions
per dollar of final output. In consequence, our ultimate demand
function for money in its most general form does not contain as a
variable the volume of transactions or of transactions per dollar
of final output; it contains rather those basic technical and cost
conditions that affect the costs of conserving money, by changing
the average amount of money held per dollar of transactions per
unit time or by changing the number of dollars of transactions per
dollar of final output (1956, p. 12).
The Rate of Interest
Friedman considers a broad range of interest rates, not only those
recorded rates on bonds and equities (1982, p. 486, 1963, p. 218).
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There are interest rates implicit in owning any asset;

these are

measured as the ratio of the value of the services that the asset
produces to the price of the asset itself (1963, pp. 218, 221).
Alternatively, the interest rate of an asset is the "price of a source
of services in terms of the service flow" Cl976a, p. 285). Therefore,
the rate on a bond would be the coupon value in relation to the price of
the bond itself.
The interest rate is a "pure number" not measured in the dimension
of dollars and independent of the level of prices.

If the level of

prices doubl~s, the final rate of interest will be unchanged after
agents have accomodated the change (1982, pp. 527, 530).
Whenever the price of the source (the asset itself) rises
independently of the price of its services, the yield on the asset has
fallen, so one may say that the interest rate on the asset has fallen.
In the short run, monetary changes which affect some prices sooner than
others will cause a short run change in the interest rate implicit in
some assets and explicit in those assets which have recorded rates.
Monetary changes ~ffect interest rates through changes in relative
prices, but this is a short run phenomenon (1982, p. 482).

Any change

in the measured interest rate (to be distinguished from changes in the
real rate) must be accomplished by relative price changes.

Non-monetary

induced changes, though, are caused by real changes in supply and demand
(1982, p. 584).

These changes in the rate of interest persist.

A rise in the demand for "capital" will raise the equilibrium
interest rate (1982, pp. 63, 583), and this demand will be met by
"higher savings called forth by the higher interest rates" (1982, p.
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498).

The higher rate may not persist if velocity increases to

accomodate the higher level of output, which suggests that Friedman and
Schwartz see some monetary influence on the long run rate of interest.
In Friedman's earlier description of the determination of interest
rates, money plays no role in real changes, except that of setting a
"floor" to the market rate since the costs of holding money as an asset
are zero (1976a, p. 316).

The nominal rate is determined by the

equilibrium between the supply of the services of assets and the demand
for them.

Savers supply services; firms or borrowers demand them.

Savers "sell" these services according to the price of th~. in relation
to the price of the source.

Borrowers buy them according to the

productivity of them in relation to their price.

If the real yield of

capital increases, borrowers will demand more services of capital while
sellers will supply more only at a higher price (1982, p. 583).

Thus

the capital market has a mechanism by which supply and demand determine
the equilibrium nominal rate of interest.
Monetary disturbances may disturb this mechanism as it distorts
relative prices of services and their sources temporarily.

In the long

run, it is only price changes "arising from other sources" which affect
the interest rate permanently (1982, p. 584).

Therefore:

The long-term effect of money on interest rates can therefore be
analyzed best by considering the effect of money on prices
and then of prices on interest rates (1982, p. 574).
The effect of monetary change on prices is a major channel through
which monetary change affects interest rates (1982, p. 631).
The difference between the nominal rate and the real rate of
interest concerns rates of price change.
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Since interest rates relate

the present to the future, they are necessarily temporal variables.
Therefore, if the price level changes over the same period, the real
yield is affected by this rate.

The real rate is the nominal rate minus

the rate of inflation or plus the rate of deflation (1982, P• 491;
1976a, p. 315).

Failure of agents to anticipate or allow for inflation

or deflation causes the real rate of interest to be higher or lower than
expected; the real rate can only be measured ex-post.

Therefore, for

decisions by agents it is the expected real yield that matters, or the
known nominal yield plus the expected rate of price change (1982, p.
491).

C.

The Range of Assets

Total wealth, once the level is decided, "must be divided among
various forms of assets" ( 1982, p. 37).

Friedman and Schwartz put no

restrictions on the form that wealth may take, and they "insist" that
a wide range of assets be considered as relevant for storing wealth.
Any good which is capable of being stored and yielding "services" would
be eligible for the portfolio.
goods may serve as assets.

Consumer durables and stocks -of consumer

Houses, automobiles, furniture, food and

clothing are mentioned by Friedman and Schwartz as relevant assets.
Every asset has an implicit rate of return which may be
represented by the ratio of the price of the services to the price of
the asset itself (1982, PP• 26-27).

Even though this rate is not quoted

on organized markets, it "connects" the price of the services to the
price of the source so that it is this "yield" which is important in its
value as an asset (1963, p. 221).

The marketability of-an asset affects

the terms on which it may be traded.
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"It is necessary to regard households as themselves enterprises
holding physical assets which they use to produce services that they
consume themselves" (1963, p. 218).

Consumption is the purchase of the

"service" of an asset, while saving is the purchase of the asset itself,
the "source" of the service.

Goods could be considered "consumption" if

they were the product of some other asset, such as electricity or food
(1963, p. 218).
D.

Portfolio Balance

Agents maximize the "return" on their wealth by equating the
marginal return from each asset (including nominal balances) in their
wealth portfolio.

Therefore, the return to holding wealth in each form

is equal to the return to each other form and to any alternative use,
such as consumption, for each individual.
Agents may alter their spending/saving behavior if there is an
imbalance in their portfolios.

That is, if the returns from holding one

type of asset either increase or decrease, the agent will trade assets
in the portfolio to restore the balance.

If agents are in long run

equilibrium, they will recognize any relative price changes as
reflecting real changes in returns on various assets ~hey may hold.
They trade to maximize returns on their portfolios or to increase wealth
without sacrificing consumption.
An individual in equilibrium receives an income or services from
his assets which he may consume or with which he may purchase assets or
money.

Individuals calculate the interest rate implicit in the asset

which would discount the sum of the future stream of income from
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purchasing one more unit of the asset.

This rate measures the marginal

return per dollar's worth of the asset.

Similarly, they calculate the

marginal return from purchasing one more dollar's worth
"service" that the asset yields.

of the

If the marginal return from owning the

asset is higher, they will purchase the asset.

Otherwise they will

purchase the service (1963, p. 220).
One special problem to which recent work in monetary theory has
called attention is whether to hold wealth in money or in other
forms. This is merely an extension of the marginal principle--the
proportions of different resources held should be such as to
equalize the marginal returns in all directions (1976a, p, 285).
Changes in t~e price of some assets relative to the value of
services will cause wealth holders to attempt to convert one form to
another.

If the price of an asset rises compared to the price of the

services it yields, wealth holders will sell the asset and purchase only
the services from it.

An example is the purchase of a house versus

rental of a house (1963, p. 219).
Even though money may be desired as an asset itself in some
quantity, persons will exchange other assets for it, not to hold the
money permanently, but to profit from "attractive selling opportunities"
while searching for "at tractive buying opportunities."

Money may serve

as "a temporary abode of purchasing power," and indeed this is "the
major function of money and the basic source of its social utility"
(1963, p. 219).

Wealth holders consider this yield when holding money

versus other assets.
When a portfolio is in equilibrium all marginal yields are
equated.

A wealth-holder will trade asset A0 for asset Ai only if

the marginal yield r 0 is greater than the marginal yield r 1 •
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The

rate at which the wealth-holder is able to trade is of course the
relative price of the assets.
Wealth can be held in numerous forms, and the ultimate
wealth-owning unit is to be regarded as dividing his wealth among
them • • • so as to maximize "utility" • • • subject to whatever
restrictions affect the possibility of converting one form of
wealth to another • • • • As usual, this implies that he will
seek an apportionment of his wealth such that the rate at which he
can substitute one form of wealtft for another is just equal to
the rate at which he is just willing to do so (1956, p. 5).
This analysis requires that the marginal yield on assets falls as
more are acquired;

otherwise no equilibrium could be established.

In

equilibrium, MR O/MR 1 • pO/p 1 for every asset including money.
It is the marginal return on any asset that is important for the
wealth holder in trading decisions.

The decision to spend an extra

dollar must mean that the marginal return from owning the asset or
consuming the service is greater than the return from holding the extra
dollar in cash.
Assuming that he is able to purchase the service of the asset on
the market, or to sell the asset on the market, then he has a choice
which is governed by his ability to make the trade (relative prices.)
Of course some services of assets are not for sale at any price, so that
one would have to own the asset to get the services~
not disposable at any price.

some assets are

These considerations affect the ability to

trade, but they do not alter the basis of utility maximization.I

1 Since existing balances already provide desired services,
then there would be no reason to "hold" the new money as an asset.
There could be a time period in which they held the new money as a
"temporary abode" of purchasing power, but only for the duration of
their decision period. Otherwise, the real level of money balances
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E.

The Transmission Process

As a "preliminary step in sketching a theory of the short run
adjustment process" (1972, p. 924),

Friedman starts his analysis of a

change in money from long run equilibrium in which all expectations are
realized and anticipated values are equal to their permanent values.
The precise method of changing the money supply is unimportant in
Friedman's model.

He describes several ways it could be accomplished:

a helicopter drop (or a furnace which consumes money) that occurs with
or without distribution effects (1969e), open market operations (1982),
government expenditures financed by issuing money (1982), and gold
discoveries (1982). The method of introduction is not critical to the
outcome since the first round effects are short-lived while the ultimate
effects last indefinitely.

The new money is soon indistinguishable from

the old, and the first use to which it is put has no effect on the
outcome of the process (1982, p. 30).

demanded remains a fairly constant percentage of real income.
Demand for money is affected by expectations of inflation or
deflation causing agents to conserve or expand real balances. Either
situation imposes "costs" to society since real balances are a
productive resource, and there is an optimum level which is most
efficient (1969e, p. 17; 1982, p. 492).
Friedman considers the return on other assets as an argument in
the demand for money function, but it seems that he admits no alteration
in desired real balances for this reason in the transmission process.
If wealth holders were induced to hold higher real balances by the short
term fall in "interest rates," then they would reduce their spending on
other assets. As interest rates begin to fall, they would revise their
demand for real balances and consequently would not spend as much on
consumption due to the relative price differential: the yield on money
would be rising, and the level of real balances would be higher. The
fact that interest rates are returned to their long run values requires
that wealth holders spend until this is accomplished. If they had
modified their demand for real balances, the interest rates would have
been permanently lowered, and an equilibrium (MS• Md) would have
been achieved with higher real balances. The constant d"emand for money
in real terms causes the return to long run equilibrium. Similarly,
the demand for money specifies that as permanent income rises the demand
for real balances will rise; however, the transmission process predicts
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An Increase in the Quantity of Money
If the money supply is increased through open market operations,
agents are induced by higher bond prices to sell their bonds for cash.
Any process, however, by which nominal balances are increased will have
the same effect.
Recipients of the new money have several options:
assets, purchasing services, or holding cash.

purchasing

Another possibility is

that the recipient of the money will use it to discharge debt, but in
this case it is only transferred to another who will attempt to replace
his former asset ( the debt) with another a_sset or consumption service.
The actual form that the spending takes matters only for the first
round.

If it is spent for services, then the price of services will be

bid up first; if it is spent on goods or assets, then their prices will

that as the level of output rises temporarily, the demand for money
will increase (1982, pp. 18-19).
If interest rates do not affect the demand for money, there can be
an income elasticity of changes in money equal to one in the long run.
Velocity could be nearly constant. This situation could exist even if
money were considered primarily an asset rather than an exchange medium.
A feature of Friedman's theory which distinguishes it from the
earlier quantity theory is that money is considered an asset. As
explained earlier, it qualifies under the assumption that assets provide
some "income" or "services," and the services of money are its liquidity
services. Friedman calls this approach a "way stat1on" between the
simple quantity theory and the Cambridge cash balances approach (1982,
P• 24).

Given that an effect of Friedman's theory is a short run lowering
of recorded interest rates, it is required that cash be considered an
asset, even if only temporarily, for this to be accomplished. The
reason is that savers use the extra cash in the first round primarily to
purchase assets or "sources" rather than con,umption services. If they
replace lower-yielding cash with another asset, it is necessary for cash
and other assets to be considered substitutes by the wealth holders.
Otherwise, if wealth holders considered cash to be only generalized
purchasing power, they would not spend on sources any more than they
spend on services, and there would be no method by which the interest
rates could be lowered (if a broad range of assets is relevant.)
Otherwise, there would be only a price level rise.
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be bid up first (1982, p. 30).

After the first round of spending, the

new money mingles with the old, and its specific effects are not
identifiable.
If cash were the only form of wealth and if the individual "finds"

excess cash in his portfolio, his equilibrium position described above
has been disturbed.

At this point,

• • • he will want to raise his consumption and reduce his cash
balances until they are back at the former level. Only at that
level is the sacrifice of consuming at a lower rate just balanced
by the gain from holding correspondingly higher cash balances
(1969e, p. 5).
If assets other than cash exist, the individual will try to
replace cash with other existing assets (1982, p. 482; 1963, p. 218),
because the ratio of the marginal return from holding money to the price
of money is not equal to the marginal return from some other asset to
its price.

"The first thing people will do is to try to purchase other

assets" (1969c, p. 75).

There is a profitable trading opportunity.

Persons who have received the new money in the first round either
as new money balances or as an increase in income, consider "cash" to be
an asset, as above, so they are more likely to adjust their portfolios
by replacing the new cash with some other asset with a higher MR/P
ratio.

It is the purchase of alternative existing assets due to the

stimulus of excess cash balances which raises asset prices and lowers
their yields.
The attempt by holders of money to restore_or attain a desired
balance sheet after an unexpected increase in the quantity of
money will tend to raise the prices of assets and reduce interest
rates • • • (1982, p. 58) •
• • • holders of cash will try to adjust the portfolios by
replacing cash with other assets (including both securities and
physical assets.) In the process they will bid up the price of
other assets and drive down the rate of interest (1982, p. 482).
32

The interest rate on physical assets is usually not recorded or stated,
so that the change in this rate is an unrecognized effect of the
transmission process.

The change in the rate on securities, though,

will be a noticeable effect of the change in the quantity of money.
The lowering of the rate of interest on a broad range of assets
has the effect of raising
the prices of the sources of the service flows relative to the
prices of service flows themselves, which leads to an increase in
spending on both the service flows and the production of new
sources of service flows (1982, p. 486).
Spending on assets is increased due to the existence of excess cash in
the portfolio.

The spending rate change is manifested in relative price

changes which has two effects:

1) agents modify their spending to take

into account the effects of an altered ratio between the prices of
assets versus the prices of their services (a change in interest rates);
and 2) producers, in their attempt to maximize profit, may increase
production of those goods whose prices have risen.
Thus the short run result of an increase in the quantity of money
is a short run lowering of all rates of interest (implicit and explicit)

due to higher prices for "goods" and other assets; a second effect is an
increase in spending for services (consumption) since the price of these
has not yet risen •
• • reported interest rates are only a few of the large set of
rates of interest, many implicit and unobservable, that are
affected by the changed rate of monetary growth (1982, P• 486) •
• • • monetary disturbances will produce systematic patterns in
the reaction of such components of output as construction, other
investment, and so on (1982, p. 620).
Whether output will be increased depends upon whether the increase
in Mis anticipated or unanticipated.
the chapter.
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This issue is treated later in

F.

The Adjustment Process

The preceding sections of this chapter have emphasized Friedman's
monetary theory and the transmission process by which a change in the
quantity of money affects nominal spending in the aggregate economy
through a process of asset substitution.

In the remainder of the

chapter, we analyze Friedman's theory of (a) the short-run division of a
change in nominal income between prices and output, (b) the long-run
adjustment to a new equilibrium, and (c) the transition between the
short-run deviation and the long run equilibrium.

The central ide~ that

Friedman uses is th,e distinction between actual and antici~a~ed
magnitudes.

Long Run Equilibrium
Friedman identifies a theoretical long run equilibrium position in
the economy.

Long run equilibrium is characterized by the situation in

which anticipated values are equal to their measured values:

the actual

rate of growth of prices is equal to the anticipated rate of growth; the
actual rate of increase of nominal income is equal to the anticipated
increase; and as a consequence, the actual rate of growth of real income
is equal to the anticipated permanent growth rate of real income (1982,
pp. 59-60).

This situation results in agents not being hindered by

misperceptions caused by measured values differing from anticipations.
In long run equilibrium, all measured changes in output are the result
of changes in real (not monetary) conditions of supply or demand.
Therefore, agents may fully respond in confidence that what they
perceive is reality.

This allows them to maximize utility and firms to
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maximize profit, making any necessary adjustments without hesitation.
The long-run equilibrium
• • • is not a state which is ever assumed to be attained in
practice. It is a logical construct that defines the norm or
trend from which the actual world is always deviating but to which
it is tending to return or about which it tends to fluctuate
(1972, p. 925).
At this equilibrium position, the interest rate is determined by
"whatever variables other than money growth affect the interest rate"
(1982, p. 490); output is determined by real variables in the economy,
that which would be "ground out" by the Walrasian general equilibrium
equations (1982, pp. 60, 413);

the price level is determined by the

equilibrium between the demand for real balances and the supply of
nominal balances (1982, pp. 25, 36).
Long run changes in output, employment and the real rate of
interest are not caused by monetary factors but by real ones.

These

real factors include the real supply of resources, the real demand for
goods and services based on equalization of the marginal utility-price
ratio, technological conditions of production, and institutional factors
(1982, p. 413).

The long run growth rate of output is "independent of

anticipated changes in nominal magnitudes except as they affect real
magnitudes

[such as] the real interest rate or the real quantity

of money" (1982, p. 413).
In this state of long-run equilibrium, individuals are maximizing
utility over their lifetime horizon.

To accomplish this, they seek to

maintain a rate of consumption that corresponds to their estimation of
permanent income.

Actual measured income may vary, but, in long run

equilibrium, agents have allowed for this event by providing for
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themselves a stock of wealth which provides "income" and aids in
smoothing out consumption (1957, p. 16; 1976a, p. 62).

Therefore, this

desired stock of wealth is one which ensures the level of permanent
income that the agent desires given the disutility of labor in acquiring
it and the foregoing of immediate consumption (1957, p. 16).

In a broad

view, this permanent income may be regarded as a return on the stock of
wealth, both for the individual and for society.
In equilibrium, the agent has achieved that stock of wealth which
he desires insofar as the return corresponds to the level of permanent
income he desires given his personal constraints.

Agents build this

stock of wealth by saving out of income; consumption is the consumption
of the services of the source of wealth.

Equilibrium, then, is a

situation in which saving is zero (1976a, p. 297).
If the individual does not have that [equilibrium] stock of
wealth, he will move toward it. There will be an equilibrium rate
at which he will want to move toward it that will depend on how
far he is from his desired wealth and on what his current wealth
is (1976a, p. 64).
There is some stock of wealth and some rate of interest which
equilibrates the desires of the suppliers of wealth with those of the
demanders of wealth.

At this equilibrium, aggregate net savings and

investment would be zero, and the stock of wealth would be that optimum
stock that the economy desired (1976a, pp. 295, 307).
replenish or diminish their stock as conditions change:

But, agents may
their

estimation of permanent income may change; or the value of their wealth
in relation to permanent income may change; or there may be an
opportunity to increase wealth by making a favorable trade without the
necessity of foregoing consumption due to a change in the relative
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prices of assets.

Additionally, the size of the stock of wealth does

not affect the "value attached to the flow of services from that stock"
(1976a, p. 297).
Friedman's model of individual behavior may be stated as follows:
Let U • utility; U(t) • utility at time t.
labor; G(t) • disutility at time t.
consumption af time= t.
wealth at time• t.

Let

Let G • the disutility of

Let C • consumption; C(t) •

Let W • the stock of desired wealth; W(t) •

p

= the internal rate of discount which relates

wealth to future consumption (the trade-off.)

Let r • the interest rate

or actual trade ratio for present to future consumption.
Max. U • U[C(t)] + G[C(t)J; U'

> O,

G'

Then,

< O;

U(to> - J.Tu[C(t)]e-ptdt
W(t 0 ) • J~Ct)e-rtdt

0957)

0

A situation that Friedman often describes is one in which the
money supply is growing at a rate of 3% per year, output is growing at
3% per year, and prices are stable (only relative price changes occur to
reflect real alterations in supply and demand)

(1982, pp. 66, 480).

Agents expect this situation to continue, for they form their
anticipations on the basis of past events.

Their anticipations are of

the level of prices, nominal income, and real income. (Note that agents,
given only two of these variables, may deduce the third.)

Since the

rate of growth of the money supply cannot be directly observed, agents
form no expectations of this variable but observe only its effects.
These anticipations or expectations form a part of the information set
as agents evaluate their actual position in relation to their desired
position.

If long run equilibrium exists, agents will make no errors in
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their actions.

Each decision will serve to increase utility (or profit

in the case of firms.)
Assume the long run equilibrium situation sketched above in which

agents expect no inflation.

(Note: expectations of inflation may be

incorporated into a long run equilibrium; in that case agents discount
price changes by the expected rate of inflation.)

Assume some event

occurs which disturbs the composition of portfolios.

If the initial

disturbance involves an asset other than money, agents will respond by
attempting to trade the asset which is in excess supply, or by
attempting to acquire the asset that is deficient.

This attempt will

alter the relative price ratio between that asset and all others, but
the price level of output itself will not be changed.

An increase in

relative price of an asset will encourage producers of that asset to
increase production of it, and to decrease production of other assets.
Since there has been no increase in aggregate demand, only a change in
demand for some goods relative to others, total production will not
change if agents are fully informed of relative prices.
Wealth holders will be back in equilibrium when their portfolios
have been restored to their former balance, and this will have been
accomplished by changes in relative prices and by increased production
of some goods and decreased production of others.

The level of prices

will not have been changed, and nominal incomes will not have risen, and
the economy continues in long run equilibrium.
If the change in "wealth" had occurred because of an unanticipated

change in the quantity of money that managed to get into the portfolios
of wealth holders, the story will be different.
38

Since the economy uses

money to denominate the values of assets, the attempt to trade money for
other assets will have the effect, not of changing the relative "price"
of money, but of changing prices of all other goods. An unanticipated
change in the quantity of money will throw agents out of long run
equilibrium since the price level will change as demand increases or
decreases for other assets when wealth holders attempt to restore
portfolio balance.
Even though the stock of assets is unchanged at this point,
there will be a change in relative price of existing assets as agents
trade assets.

Output rates are altered due to perceived changes in

relative prices.

Since no real determinants of the output rate have

changed, the long run position of the economy is the same rate of growth
of output, but the transition may involve significant departures. "The
ripples produced by a monetary action may therefore take a rather long
time to reach the whole range of assets" (1969b, p. 256).
Short-Run Adjustment
For Friedman, a key question is

the process of adjustment

to a discrepancy between the nominal quantity of money demanded and the
nominal quantity supplied" (1970, p. 225).
arises from a change in the supply of money;

Assume that the discrepancy
Friedman states that "The

key insight of the quantity theory approach is that such a discrepancy
will be manifested primarily in attempted spending, thence in the rate
of change in nominal income" (1970, p. 225).

This manifestation was

described above in Friedman's transmission mechanism.
(1 )

8y =' d l~f Y • f [ (M} *,

~s, ~d,
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Ms , MJ

In general form,

where Ms• money supplied, Md• money demanded, Y • nominal income,
and an asterisk attached to a variable denotes the anticipated value of
that variable.

To illustrate, a particular version of (1) would be:

( 2 ) ly • By* +-y"(gMs

-

_gMd) + fClog Ms - log Md).

One of the features of Friedman's model is that agents build into
their information sets anticipations of rates of growth of the price
level as well as of income (nominal or real).

In this manner they

attempt to separate monetary events which do not indicate a change in
output rates from real events upon which they should act if prices
perform their task of transmitting information.

As rates of price

change increase or decrease over time, agents build in these
expectations to alter their behavior.

They come to "expect" inflation.

They also incorporate real variables (such as the rate of change in real
income) into their decision process.
Prices change because of alterations in spending behavior that
occur because of changes in the available returns from some form of
wealth or from consumption of services given anticipations of inflation.
Considering that agents are continually in the process of revising
expectations as they spend, the rate of change of prices will be a
positive function of the rapidity that they revise their expectations to
conform with actual rates of change.
Therefore:
(3) gp
+

/i

!:.

d log P • ~d log
dt
dt

9*

+c:Jl[dlogY-(d log
dt
dt

9~

[log Y - Clog y)* 1

where Y* • expected nominal income, P* • expected level of prices, and y
= the real level of output.
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Note if logy• (logy)*, the expected level of real income will be
equal to the actual level, and if
d log Y •
dt

d log Y*
dt

then the expected rate of growth of prices is equal to the actual rate
of growth of prices.

That is, inflation or deflation is fully

anticipated.
The rate of growth in real income may be altered whenever actual
nominal income and prices are not equal to their long run anticipated
values.

In this case, optimizing agents alter "real" output in response

to perceived profit opportunities.

Therefore, the change in the rate of

growth of real income becomes a function of the difference between
expected nominal and real income and their measured values.
(4)

d lof y • d log
d
dt

-(J [ log

Y*

+ ( I - cl) d log Y - d log Y*

dt

dt

y - (log y )*].

The divergence between expected nominal income and its measured
value is reflected in some part by output changes and in some part by
price changes.

The value of t:::J... determines the relationship.

If one

sums equations (3) and (4), the result is
(5)

d log P

dt

+

d logy
dt

•

d

log Y
dt

•

d log P* + d logy*
dt
dt

If prices fully reflect any changes in nominal income, then
and

f, • -,

and real output grows at its long term growth rate.

prices are rigid, then«.• O,

/3 • O,

If

and all of the change in nominal

income is in output.
The first case Friedman calls the extreme quantity theory
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ot• 1

assumption that prices bear all adjustment; the second case he calls the
extreme Keynesian assumption that quantity is the only variable that
adjusts.

Friedman's own theory of nominal income makes neither of these

assumptions. His assumption is that the anticipated values are revised
over time to conform with observed values, so that the difference
between them is continually diminished.

Anticipations are revised such

that the larger the discrepancy, the faster revisions of anticipations
of that variable are adjusted (1982, p. 65).
In Friedman's adaptive expectations model, the expected rate of
change in the price level at a point in time is some function of all
past rates of change up to that point.

T

T
(6)

d log P"r
dt

•

jf[log P(t)dt]

and

0

d log Y*
dt

• Jf[log Y(t)dt]
0

The rate of change of prices is determined by nominal income, real
income and the anticipated values of each, plus the expected rate of
price change.

The rate of change in real income is determined by

nominal and real income and the anticipated values, plus the expected
growth rate of real income.

Real income then is co-determined by "real"

factors and by expectations in the short run, providing a feedback to
agents who reform long run anticipations and alter current spending
behavior.

"The problem is to assure, at long run equilibrium, these two

values do not conflict" (1982, p. 66).
An Illustration:

An Increase in M

Assume that the economy starts from a position where gp •

o,

gy = 3%, gM • 3%, and gy • 3% (gp = rate of growth in the price
level, gy • rate of growth of nominal income, gy • rate of growth of
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real income,

8M •

the rate of growth in the money supply).

Since in

long run equilibrium, all anticipations are realized, then gp* •

o,

gy* = 3%, and gy* • 3% (gp* • expected growth of prices, gy* •
the expected growth of real income, gy*. the expected growth of
nominal income).

Let there be a change in the rate of money growth so

that gH • 8%, while gM* • 3%.
First, Friedman asks what the long-run equilibrium solution will
be.

After full adjustment, nominal income will be rising at 8 percent

per year.

Since the real determinants of output have not been affected,

prices will be rising at 5 percent per year and real output at the rate
of 3 percent per year. 2

But the long-run equilibrium outcome will be

one in which all anticipations are realized.

If the increase in 8Ms

is unanticipated then 8Kd would not immediately adjust in equation (2)
causing a discrepancy between 8y and gy*•

Now, this discrepancy

will be resolved by a change in gp (equation 3) and gy (equation 4),
and will continue until all actual measured values are equal to their
long run anticipated values.
An unanticipated change in the money supply is manifested in an
altered demand for particular products. The seller of a particular
product has no way of knowing whether this increase is an increase
relative to the demand for other products;

if it were, he would be

2 Friedman notes that, while g should be at its long-run rate
of growth, the equilibrium level of Xutput will not be unaffected by
the monetary change. If real output is measured so as to include the
"non-pecuniary services of money," y will be lower after the monetary
change because (1) the higher cost of holding real balances will lead
producers to substitute other resources for money, thereby lowering
efficiency, and (2) the flow of non-pecuniary services from money will
be lower (1970, p. 230).
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correct in expanding output of the product.

If he were certain that the

demand was merely a reflection of a change in flgeneral nominal demand,"
he would correctly respond by adjusting price.

At the outset of the

adjustment process, the seller has no way of knowing the correct
response so output changes are to be expected when there is a change in
nominal demand (1982, p. 415).
The short run is an adjustment toward a new nominal level of
income but away from the long run permanent growth trend of real income
and level of real interest rates.

The "misperceptions" of producers and

workers are caused by changes in the rate of growth of money, and fools
these agents into thinking that the price changes are due to a real
change in demand for their products or services.
In Friedman's analysis, he assumes that prices are "flexible."

He

considers a price to be flexible "in the sense that it can and does
change promptly to changes in demand and supply and that there are no
institutional obstacles to its changing.

." (1972, P• 925).

However, Friedman and Schwartz do not assume "perfectly" flexible
prices (1982, p. 58).

If prices were perfectly flexible, then there

could occur no cyclical reaction to a change in nominal demand--all the
adjustment would be in prices and none in output.

Friedman and

Schwartz maintain that a change in money is reflected in both Pandy
(1982, P• 57).
Therefore, if there is a change in supply or demand, prices will
reflect some of the adjustment and will respond promptly, although in
the early stages, much or most of the adjustment will be in output
(1968, p. 8; 1976a, p. 216; 1982, pp. 403, 414, 489, 498).
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Since there

is a "rate" of price change, it follows that agents act on the
information that the price signal provides before the full adjustment
has taken place.

Particularly, producers will adjust rates of output at

early signs of a price change to avoid losses or to capture a profit
opportunity.

It is this early reaction based on price misperceptions

which permits short-run output reactions to monetary stimuli.
In Friedman's short run analysis, the initial state is one of
full-equilibrium market-clearing.
due to a misperception.

Thus, the reaction by producers is

If they had known that monetary changes were

responsible for the change in prices (even if in some brief interval
there would have been a temporary relative price difference) they would
not have altered output levels (1976a, p. 223, 1982, p. 415).

Prices

are bid up as agents attempt to purchase a quantity of goods and
services which carry one nominal value with "spending" that carries a
higher nominal value.

Price or quantity or some combination of the two

must adjust to clear the market.

Agents will alter quantity supplied

only as a result of a perceived change in relative price.
If agents had been in long-run equilibrium before, then some rise
in the price level must occur in response to an increase in nominal
spending.

A monetary-induced change will change the price level if it

is accompanied by a higher rate of spending (dollars per time period)
causing gy to exceed gy,rr•

The economy always accomodates changes in

nominal demand by some combination of a rise in P or in the real
quantity of goods.

No increase in real supply is possible without some

perceived change in price, since producers were at an optimum level of
output previously.

Whatever price is the outcome of the process will

"clear" the market.
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Prices are flexible in both directions.

They fall if there is a

decline in nominal spending, causing either through a price change, a
quantity change, or some combination of both.

The lowered price clears

the market.
Adjustment in the Goods and Labor Markets
Friedman's analysis starts from long run equilibrium in which all
markets clear.

The money market relates the supply and demand for money

and the equilibrating variable which is the price level.

The market for

existing assets is related only to the price of existing assets, but the
market for new goods must be related to output prices, the nominal wage
rate, and the real wage.

Assume that MS is exogenous.

P • the general price level.
PA= the price of existing assets.
y = the quantity of newly-produced goods.
N • the level of employment.
r • the composite of the rates of interest.
u • uncertainty factor.
W • the money wage; W/P • the real wage.
Let MS increase as a result of open market operations:
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p

DM (y, r, u)

Nominal Money Supply

Figure 2.1.

I.

Friedman's market for nominal money balances.

Figure 2.1 shows that, in the long run, the price level is the

variable that equates the nominal demand for money with nominal balances
(1982, p. 36).

However, since the price level is changed only as a

result of spending which takes place through other markets, it does not
move immediately to restore equilibrium in this market.

Therefore, as

the level of nominal money balances increases from MO to M at
1'
PO, there is an excess supply of nominal (and real) money balances
(MO - M1)•

2.

In figure 2.2, demand for existing assets rises to D1 since there

is an excess supply of real balances, and money and existing assets are
substitutes.

There is a fixed stock of existing assets so that the

.
.
" t h"1s mar k et f rom pA to pA causing the yield on
price
rises
1n
O
1

existing assets to fall.
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Existing Assets

Figure 2.2.

p

Friedman's existing asset market.

y

Ys
1

p
y

p 0
y

Dl

y

Figure 2.3.

Friedman's market for new output.
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3.

As shown in figure 2.3, the process of substitution of assets in the

portfolio causes the demand for new assets to rise and thus the price of
new assets to increase.

In nominal terms, producers see an increased

demand for their products from D0 to o1 •

Th'1s causes py t o rise
·

to Pyland producers to increase output of new goods from

4.

Yo

to

At this point, (see figure 2.4) output has increased, prices of

assets are raised and yields are lowered.

Producers have increased

output because they saw a fall in the real wage rate from w/pe

p

0

to W/Pe p 1 due to prices of their output rising, and therefore
they perceive a rise in the supply of labor.

5.

Workers, however, supply more labor because they see a rise in the

real wage rate due to a perceived increase in the demand for labor.
Workers see their wage as rising from wO/pe

to wl/pe
W
W•
They see their nominal wage rising but do not notice that all prices are
rising.
In the Friedman scenario considered here, the actual real wage
rate does not change at all.

All prices and wages are rising in the

economy, price misperceptions occur on the part of both workers and
employers, and a short run cyclical expansion of output and employment
occur.

Workers eventually realize that they are providing more labor

for the same real wage, and prodcucers eventually realize their profits
are down because the real wage rate has not fallen.

And, money holders

realize that with the price rise, the level of real balances now puts
them in equilibrium.

So, producers and workers will revert to their old

levels of supply, and an automatic cyclical contraction of y and N will
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Friedma n's goods market as perceive d
by workers and firms

Friedma n's labor market as perceive d
by workers and firms
Figure 2.4.

Friedma n's labor and goods markets .
balances .

The effects of an increase in nominal money

(NB) 1

= supply of labor as perceive d by produce rs

(Nd) 1

= demand for labor as perceive d by workers

(yd) 1

= demand for output as perceive d by produce rs

(ys) 1

by workers
= supply of output (demand for labor) as perceive d

occur.

Interest rates will be restored since the price of the services

has caught up with the price of the sources.

w/pe w

= w*;

= 5%.

gy

= gy* = 8%;

gy

At the culmination:

= gy* = 3 %;

Therefore, the short-run fluctuation is linked to long-run

equilibrium.
A Decrease in the Quantity of Money
Assume now that, again starting from full equilibrium where gp =
gp*, gy

= gy*,

and gy

= gy*,

the monetary authority reduces

the rate of growth of the money supply.

The "initial deficiency" 1n the

quantity of money will cause individuals who have been induced to trade
money for other assets (government bonds) or who have otherwise suffered
a decline in their money balances to try to restore that level of real
balances which equates MR/P for their portfolios.

The transaction

raised the marginal return for a unit of money so that now it is
higher than for any other asset.
This group of affected wealth holders will attempt to sell more
goods and services than they are purchasing.
they cannot succeed:

On the whole, however,

"One man's expenditures are another man's

receipts" (1982, p. 18).

The aggregate attempt to do so will lead to

reduced spending on assets and to falling prices of these assets (or a

fall in the rate of their price change) as agents attempt to trade them
for higher money balances (see figure 2.5).

In terms of equation (2), a

discrepancy is introduced into the second term in parentheses, and the
decline in gMs reduces gy.

This occurs because the fall in the rate

of change of prices of existing assets will discourage spending on newly
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p 0
A

---

p 1

--~-----

A

Existing Assets

Figure 2.5

Friedman's existing asset market.
nominal money balances.

produced assets.

Response to a decline in

Given Friedman's assumption that output prices are

flexible, producers of assets will notice that the rate of change in
prices of goods they are producing is falling.
Now assume that the decline in &Ms is unanticipated.

Producers

therefore perceive that the real wage rate in terms of the goods they
are producing is rising.

Accordingly,

~

<1

in equations (3) and (4),

and both gy and 8p will decline.
The decline in gp will reduce the demand for labor and cause the
nominal wage rate to be lower than it otherwise would have been.

On the

labor supply side, workers see the rate of change in the nominal wage
rate falling.

This fall occurs because the supply of workers at the

former nominal wage rate is greater than the demand.

Workers, though,

do not realize that the transmission process is causing the rate of
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change of prices of all goods and service s to fall, and they perceiv
e
that the fall in the rate of change of the nomina l wage 1s identic
al to
a fall in the real wage rate.

Theref ore, they will supply a smalle r

quantit y of labor at each actual real wage rate (see figure 2.6)
(1976a, p. 223; 1972, p. 930).

Even though the actual real wage rate may have been constan t over
the cycle, workers and firms have reduced their demand for and supply
of
labor in the interim , both perceiv ing a movement in the real wage
rate
due to misper ception s caused by changes in the rate of change in prices.
Agents ' anticip ations had been that the former rate of price change
would continu e.
Firms who reduced output 1n respons e to a fall in the rate of
change of prices did so because they perceiv ed that the price of their

W/P
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'

y

--- -~.,, >

'
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Figure 2.6 Friedm an's market for labor and goods.
decreas e in nomina l money balanc es.
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The effect of a

d

product had fallen relative to the prices of inputs, including labor
services (see figure 2.6).

Price signals were necessary to cause a

cutback in output, or recession.

A falling level of prices is not

necessary for recession, but it is necessary that agents' expectations
are not realized.

A recession is caused by the rate of actual price

change being lower than the expected rate of price change.
If all agents had had full information that the rates of all
prices would change eventually, or, in other words, if they had
anticipated the rate of change in prices, the recession would not have
occurred.

Firms would have lowered the rate of change in the nominal

wage to the extent that the real wage would have remained constant at

the previous level of output, since no changes in real magnitudes had
occurred.

Workers would have adjusted their supply of labor to conform

with the new rate of change in prices, thus supplying the same quantity
of labor as before, since the actual and perceived real wage would have
remained constant.
If a decrease in money caused output to fall, the recession in
output is not permanent.

As the rate of change in prices of assets are

lowered through the transmission process, the effect spreads to all
other prices in turn.

Since the rate of spending on assets has fallen,

the relative prices of assets are lower than that for consumption
services. This imbalance discourages spending for consumption which by
the same process lowers the prices of these goods and services.

The

lowered level of output causes the demand for real balances to fall and
the marginal return on a unit of money to be lowered.

Additionally,

real balances are restored on the supply side through the effect of aI
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falling price level which raises the price of money. At the new
equilibrium MR/P for money is equal to that for other assets (1982, pp.
18-19).
At this point, agents have adjusted their price expectations to
the different rate of price change.

They are then prepared to adjust

their output decisions to reflect their real long run optimal position.
Producers will realize that there will be a higher profit from the
former level of output.

Workers will realize that their real wage has

found its former level.

When anticipations adjust, there are no more

barriers to the optimum production level.
labor and goods markets return to point

o.

In terms of figure 2.6, the
In terms of growth rates,

gp* and &y* adjust downward so that Sp• Sp*, Sy• gy*, and
gy = &y*, and long-run equilibrium is restored.

Price Misperceptions
An unanticipated increase in the supply of money induces an
increase in spending on existing assets causing their prices to rise.
Individuals then react by increasing spending on new assets, and then on
new output in general.

The result is an increase in nominal demand (Y).

Due to price misperceptions, producers react by increasing output and
increasing the demand for labor.

The resulting rise in the nominal wage

rate induces workers to increase the quantity of labor supplied.

Firms

seek to increase production of those goods whose prices have risen, but
they do not recognize that all other prices have risen.
Therefore the sets of information are different to the two groups.
Firms that produce goods whose demand has fallen relative to other
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demands are unaware of the situation, since, to them, the prices of what
they sell have not changed.

Therefore, a misperception on the part of

firms of the behavior of prices is necessary for any cyclical increase
in output to occur.
An Anticipated Increase in the Quantity of Money

If agents were aware that the supply of money were being
increased, they would expect inflation.

But this expectation of

inflation does not interfere with their tendency to equate marginal
returns in their portfolios.

If agents expect inflation and they

received new money just equal percentage-wise to the increase in the
price level,

their long run best interest would be to hold the new

money rather than spend it (1982, p. 413; 1969e, p. 10).

But, in the

interim between the distribution of the new money and the full rise in
the price level, there is an opportunity for some agents to profit by
trading the cash for assets with higher yields.

If inflation is fully

expected, prices may rise before any actual spending changes.
Even if the recipients of the new money expect a one time price
rise due to the new money, they will spend their new balances to
capitalize on the short run profit opportunity.

As they attempt to

spend on goods and services, though, sellers of the goods and services
also expect a one time price rise, and, to protect their profits, they
will sell only at prices that reflect the expected price rise.

Thus, if

the quantity of money is fully anticipated, suppliers of output and
labor will not be subject to price misperceptions and there will be no
increase in output and employment (1977, p. 464).
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At an anticipated 20 percent per year inflation,

would have some real effects by altering desired cash balances,
for example, but • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • it need not change
the natural rate of unemployment (1977, p. 464).
In this case, there is no opportunity for a change in the real rate of
interest, since if the prices of services and their sources rise by the
same percentage, the ratio will remain constant (1982, pp. 527-530).
This process will occur rapidly due to the expectations adjustment so
that there will be no perceptible change in the interest rate, and real
balances will remain constant, while prices will reflect fully the
change in the nominal stock of money (1982, p. 483).

"In our example,

prices rise, though markets are continuously cleared, because everybody
knows that they will" (1969e, p. 10).
Return to Long-Run Equilibrium
When a monetary-induced expansion has taken place and prices of
assets have risen, agents see a relative price difference between them

and their services due to the lowered interest rates.

During the

adjustment process of getting rid of excess balances, they switch
spending to consumption services thus driving up their prices.

As

producers increase output in response to the rise in the prices of
assets, demand for real balances increases.

At the same time, the

rising price level is reducing the real supply of money.
The initial excess of nominal balances will therefore tend to be
eliminated • • • by either a reduction in the real quantity
available to hold through price rises, or an increase in the real
quantity desired through output increases (1982 1 pp. 18-19).
Since nominal income changes only when there is a "discrepancy
between the nominal quantity of money demanded and the nominal quantity
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supplied" (1982, p. 62), then, when this discrepancy is eliminated,
agents are back in long run equilibrium.

The adjustment will bring the

interest rate "back to its initial position," since the prices of the
sources and services are back in alignment (1982, p. 490), and "[r]eal
balances and the real supply of and demand for loanable funds would be
at their initial level" (1982, p. 488).
Producers or sellers who increased output in expectation of higher
profits due to higher relative prices, find that all other prices have
adjusted and that the increased output level is not the profit
maximizing level.

They find they had confused a general increase in

nominal demand with an increase for their particular product (1982, p.
415).
At the culmination of this process, the marginal returns in the
portfolio again are equalized, since with the higher price level, wealth
holders desire a larger stock of nominal balances to maintain their
stock of real balances.

The MR/P ratio of money will be temporarily

higher than for other assets, and individuals who had traded money for
other assets will increase their nominal balances after the price level
rises.
If, as we have argued, demand for money is related to permanent
income, the liquidity preference curve • • • will initially shift
to the right in lesser proportion than the rise in • • • nominal
income, though ultimately it will have to shift in full proportion
(1982, pp. 488-489).
The impact [lower rates of interest] and the intermediate [higher
nominal income] effects together would, by themselves, ultimately
produce a return to the initial rate of interest (1982, p. 487).
However, the adjustment process takes a long time, and involves
relative price changes in the meanwhile.
A swing produced by monetary disturbance can.
• be expected to
take a considerable time • • • and to display a consistent pattern
of reaction of both nominal and real magnitudes (1982, P. 260).
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The deviation from the long run trend in output growth is
manifested as a cyclical recession or expansion, and in Friedman's
"personal judgment,"
•• the initial effects of a higher and unanticipated rate of
inflation last for something like two to five years • • • a full
adjustment takes
say, a couple of decades (1968 1 p. 11).
I
The higher or lower rate of output, though significant in strength and
duration, was not permanent since it occurred due to a misperception on
the part of producers.

These misperceptions will be corrected in the

course of the full adjustment:
The transition between the short-run adjustment process and
long-run equilibrium is produced by a revision _in anticipated
values in response to measured values in such a way that • • • a
single disturbance sets up discrepancies that are in the course of
time eliminated. (1982, p. 64)
Discrepancies between the rates of price and output change and
their permanent values.
produce revisions in the
anticipated values that • • • after a cyclical reaction process,
eliminate the discrepancies between measured and permanent values.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • [We assume ] an

anticipated value is revised at a rate proportional to the
discrepancy between actual and anticipated values (1982, p. 65).
Thus the increase in output will automatically be reversed as employers
discover that the real wage has not fallen and workers discover that the
real wage has not risen.
Effects on the Nominal Rate of Interest
Friedman and Schwartz see real and nominal interest rates lowered
in the short run as prices of the sources are bid up relative to the
prices of the services.

Nominal rates will be lowered for a time until

the "effects" of the new money begin to reverse themselves.
occur "in something less than a year" (1968 1 p. 6).
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This should

The real portion of

the interest rate will revert to its permanent value in the course of
the long run adjustment process since wealth holders will attempt to
equate marginal returns in their portfolios.
The key feature of this process is that it tends to raise the
prices of sources
•• relative to the prices of the services
themselves • • • • But these reactions in their turn tend to
raise the prices of services relative to the prices of sources,
this is, to undo the initial effects on interest rates (1969b, pp.
255-256).
There may be a lasting effect on the nominal rate if wealth holders
permanently incorporate inflation anticipations.

There would be a

"price anticipation" premium on the real rate of interest which would
make the nominal rate and real rates unequal (1982, pp. 490-491).

There

could theoretically be effects on the real rate itself due to
anticipation of inflation, since this would cause savers to economize on
cash balances and prefer other forms of wealth which may be less
"productive."

But, Friedman and Schwartz "conclude that

the real

rate [can be] regarded as unaffected by anticipated inflation" (1982,
P• 494).
Once anticipations catch up with the new price level, real rates
of interest will depend only on changes in real conditions in the
economy mentioned above.

The prices of services will be in the same

proportion to the prices of the sources as before.
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CHAPTER III
FRIEDMAN'S INTERPRETATION AND CRITICISM OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT
OUTCOME OF THE GENERAL THEORY
A.

Friedman's Interpretation of The General Theory

Friedman criticizes Keynes' unemployment "equilibrium" in The
General Theory as "explained by rigidities or imperfections, not as the
natural outcome of a fully operative market process"

(1968, p. 3).

Keynes, according to Friedman, is guilty of incorporating a liquidity
trap to prevent full employment in the long run and to insure rigid
prices in the short run.

Additionally, Keynes failed to recognize the

wealth effect which would have assured the existence of a full
employment equilibrium even in the event of a liquidity trap.
According to Friedman, a fully operative market process would work
to eliminate deviations from equilibrium by changes in the price level.
Unemployment is a characteristic of a short run departure from long run
equilibrium which tends to be corrected by market forces.

If

involuntary unemployment existed, unemployed workers would have a
tendency to "offer their labor services at a slightly lower real wage
• " (1976a, p. 214).
(1976a, p. 214).

Friedman asks, "How is this force contained?"

Institutional factors may be responsible for "delaying

the adjustment," but cannot be responsible for "enforcing a long run
stable equilibrium position at less than full employment" (1976a, P•
215).

In Friedman's interpretation of Keynes' theory, he identifies
three propositions on which he says Keynes relied:
1. As a purely theoretical matter, a long run equilibrium
position characterized by "full employment" of resources need not
exist, even if all prices are flexible.
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2. As an empirical matter, prices can be regarded as rigid--an
institutional datum--for short-run economic fluctuations; that
is, the distinction between real and nominal magnitudes that is at
the heart of the quantity theory is not important for such
fluctuations.
3. The demand for money has a particular empirical form
--corresponding to absolute liquidity preference--that makes
velocity highly unstable much of the time, so that • • • changes
in the quantity of money produce offsetting changes in V. This
proposition is critical for the other two • • • • Absolute
liquidity preference at an interest rate approaching zero is a
necessary though not a sufficient condition for proposition 1.
Absolute liquidity preference at the "conventional" interest rate
explains why Keynes regarded the quantity equation. •
as
largely useless for policy or for predicting short-run
fluctuations in nominal and real income (identical by proposition
2) (1982, PP• 41-42).
The Liquidity Trap
It seems that Friedman's interpretation of The General Theory
places the blame for a level of output at which there is unemployment on
the existence of a liquidity trap at the existing level of rand Y.

The

liquidity trap enforces a long-run unemployment equilibrium even if all
prices are flexible.
Keynes described the demand for money as separable into various
"motives."

Demand for money from the speculative motive in real terms

is a decreasing function of the rate of interest.

If there is an

increase in the supply of money, wealth owners will hold it as an asset
only if the rate of interest falls.

In order for the rate of interest

to be lowered, recipients of the new money balances must "bid up" prices
of assets and securities and thus lower their yields.

Therefore the

rate of interest (or price of bonds) which equates the purchases and
sales of bonds or assets will be the new equilibrium rate of interest.
Wealth owners are holding more cash, and the rate of interest is
lowered.
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The liquidity trap is a perfectly elastic demand for money balances, in
which persons would rather "hold" additions to the money stock rather
than purchase an interest bearing asset at such a low rate of interest.
It is characterized by a perfectly elastic range in the demand for money
"curve."

Normally, as the rate of interest falls, wealth holders will

desire more cash to hold for future profit opportunities.

If a

liquidity trap exists, the demand for money becomes infinite at some low
rate of interest.

In this case, all wealth owners desire liquidity at

that rate because they believe that the future rate of interest will be
higher.

An increase in the supply of money would have no effect on the

prices and yields of bonds and other assets because the wealth holders
would not spend it to purchase bonds or other assets, thus prices would
not rise and the yields would not fall.

Wealth holders are waiting for

the prices of assets to fall (yields to increase) and are holding
"liquid" assets (money) in the interim.

Wealth holders are willing to

sell an infinite quantity of bonds, but are willing to buy none at
this low rate.
If there were a liquidity trap, the LM curve would have a flat
portion where the demand for money is perfectly elastic (see figure
3.1).

Therefore, shifts in the LM curve (from LM0 to LM 1 ) due to an

increase in the quantity of money would not lower the interest rate or
affect nominal income.

The LM curve represents the loci at which rand

Y are in equilibrium in the assets market.

Since r • r 0 represents

the lowest market rate that can exist, then an increase in the quantity
of money would be nugatory.

Real income (y) (or nominal income) could

not be raised by increases in the money supply since the interest rate
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would not fall in response to an increase in the quantity of money.
Additionally, a fall in the price level which would increase the supply
of real balances would have no effect either since it also must operate
through a shift in the LM curve.

The level of output y 0 may not be

changed by any monetary means if there exists a liquidity trap.

r

y

Figure 3.1.

B.

An IS-LM representation of the Liquidity Trap.

The Long Run with Flexible Wages and Prices

If wages and prices were perfectly flexible, as Friedman and
others believe is necessary for a long run view, the price level would
adjust to restore that level of real balances which would provide full
employment.

However, a falling price level would be deprived of its

beneficial effects in the case of absolute liquidity preference.
Friedman maintains that the liquidity trap is Keynes' ultimate
barrier to full employment.
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If liquidity preference were absolute, or nearly so,--as Keynes
believed likely in times of heavy unemployment--interest rates
cannot be lowered by monetary measures. If investment and
consumption are little affected by interest rates, • • • lower
interest rates, even if they could be achieved, would do little
good (1968, p. 2).
Time and time again when Keynes must face up to precisely what it
is that prevents a full-employment equilibrium, his final line of
defense is absolute liquidity preference (1972, p. 942).
I do not see how anyone can • • • come to any other conclusion
than that his 'special twist' was highly elastic liquidity
preference and that 'this was a key element in Keynes'
proposition' about the possibility that there might not be a
full-employment equilibrium even with flexible prices (1972, p.
942).
Friedman and Friedman and Schwartz have charged that the existence
of a liquidity trap is "necessary" and a "key element" for long run
unemployment equilibrium if all prices are flexible.
If all prices are flexible, then any output level requiring less
than full employment can never be stable because as long as at least one
person is involuntarily unemployed, it would be in his best interest to
offer his labor services at a lower "price" thereby putting additional
downward pressure on the general price level.

Keynes' model, according

to Friedman, recognizes this automatic adjustment, but relies on an
extraneous force (the liquidity trap) to prevent it from operating.
Using an IS-LM framework to describe the automatic adjustment
process in figure 3.2, let y • real output, Y • nominal income, M •
nominal money balances, N • the level of employment, P • the level of
prices, r • the rate of interest.

Now, assume the economy is in

full-employment equilibrium at y • Yf, with employment No• Nf•
The nominal money supply is M0 , the price level Po, and the interest
rate r 0 •

Let some decline in aggregate demand resulting in a decline
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in spending so that the IS curve shifts to the left, causing the new
equilibrium level of output to be y 1 •

r

y

Figure 3.2.

An IS-LM representation of a decline in demand.

In figure 3.3, the output and labor market for the firm is shown.
Firms have a production function y • f(N) such that F'(N) • MPN

< O,

where the quantity of labor demanded is a function only of the marginal
product of labor.
maintain sales.

If price~ are flexible, then Pis bid down to P1 to
Therefore, the demand for labor will fall to D1 •

HPN*P 1 and employment will fall to N1 •
This situation is unstable.
bid the nominal wage to

w2

Unemployed workers will immediately

to secure employment.

Because of pure

competition in the labor market, the equilibrium wage rate for all
workers will fall from

w0

to

w2 •

Firms will rehire the workers at
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Adjustmen t of the output market and labor market to a decline in demand.

N

W2 because at this lower wage, the marginal product of the worker is
equal to the wage rate at the same level of employment.

But, aggregate

spending is lower since the total wage income has fallen

Cw2 * No)

so if the prices of goods and services fall enough to bring about a
price level of P2 , then the market will clear.

Real output is

restored to its former level yf• employment is at Nf' but prices and
wages have fallen to P2 and

w2 •

Through the lowered price level,

the LM curve will shift to the right tp LM 1(p 2 ) in figure 3.4, and
spending will be restored in real terms.

r

Figure 3.4. Return to full employment via an increase in real balances
through falling prices.
The real quantity of money balances has increased at the lower
price level.

At the same time that the product market is finding its

new equilibrium level of output, ~hanges in the real money supply are
operating to lower interest rates and increase investment spending,
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which hastens the return to full employment.
is at LM0 •

At M0 /p 01 the LM curve

But, the fall in P shifts the LM curve to LM 1 which

corresponds to M0 /p 2 (see figure 3.4).

If this were the only effect

of lowered prices, it would be capable of restoring full employment at
(Yf, r 2 ), even if the IS curve did not shift back to
the pressure on wages, but remained at

1s01 due to

1s 1 • In figure 3.5, the supply

of labor curve shifts to the right to reflect the lowered price level.
Therefore, the labor market is also at full employment equilibrium.

w

MPN*P

0

MPN*P 2
N

Figure 3.5. Restoration of full employment in the
labor market due to the effect of falling prices.

As long as there continues to be pressure on prices to fall due to
the existence of unemployment, the LM curve will shift to the right
until full employment is restored at a lower rate of interest.
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If, however, a liquidity trap exists, the interest rate will not
be lowered and output cannot be increased by falling wages and prices
augmenting the real supply of money.

Thus Friedman contends that the

liquidity trap is critical for Keynes' proposition (1).
Friedman and Schwartz discredit totally proposition (1) from a
theoretical standpoint, stating that this proposition "has been
demonstrated to be false" (1982, p. 42).

They point out that "Keynes's

error consisted of neglecting the role of wealth in the consumption
function

(1982, p. 42).

Keynes "recognized in his asides that

wealth has an effect on consumption," but failed to incorporate this
mechanism in his formal theory (1982, p. 45).

Friedman considers the

wealth effect theoretically pervasive:
There always exists, with a fixed nominal quantity of money, a
rate of price decline sufficiently great to reconcile at full
employment the desires of producing enterprises to invest and of
wealth holders to save, no matter how stubborn both are (1976a, p.
320).

The wealth effect would operate to offset the power of the liquidity
trap to prevent full employment since it affects the IS curve only.
The wealth effect derives from the lowered price level and
operates on the value of "savings" held in the form of fixed money
assets.

Holders of this wealth experience an increase in the real value

of this wealth as the price level falls.

Of course, fixed money assets

are two sided--for every debtor there is a creditor.

But, it has been

theorized that if the debtor is the government, then this debt may be
imperfectly acknowledged by the citizens whose liability it is.
Therefore, a fall in the price level would increase the wealth of debt
holders but would not increase the perceived liablility of the taxpayers
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who are responsible for the debt.

In the case of currency, or outside

money, the holder generally recognizes no liability whatsoever.
Wealth changes operate on the willingness to spend and save.

If

wealth holders realize an increase in their wealth, they will spend more
from a given level of current income, thus raising the aggregate level
of spending.

Therefore, when the price level falls, the IS curve will

shift to the right, since with the increased wealth, less saving would
occur at each value of y, and the product market would be in equilibrium
at combinations of greater values of randy.

If no other effects were

forthcoming from the fall in prices (no change in the LM curve) given
the wealth effect on spending, prices would eventually fall enough to
restore equilibrium through shifting the IS curve.
Through the wealth effect of falling prices, the IS curve will
shift back to IS 0 to restore equilibrium at full employment.

At full

employment, the rate of interest which prevails would equate the desires
of savers and investors.

As shown in figure 3.6, any level less than

Yf will result in pressure on prices to fall further.
Thus there are two forces operating to restore full employment in
the long run, but they both depend on the fall in the wage and price
level.

If one mechanism fails, there is another to back it up.

If

Keynes did neglect the role of a desired level of wealth, an important
effect of falling prices would be that households would spend more and
save less thus shifting the IS curve to the right.

This effect would

take place even if a liquidity trap existed because it does not depend
on a fall in the interest rate.
In the long run, all expectations are realized so that the
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Wealth effect with a liquidit y trap
Figure 3.6.

The Wealth Effect of falling prices.

y

Wealth effect in the absence of a liquidit y trap

equilibrium interest rate is the expected rate of interest.

At a very

low rate, the return gained from holding other assets would not be
enough to compensate for the additional risk involved.
liquidity preference becomes absolute.

Therefore,

Friedman says that Keynes

believed that this minimum rate set a "floor" to the market rate when
the equilibrium rate would have to be lower to clear the market at full
employment (1982, p. 55).
Friedman and Schwartz see a "fallacy" in this argument since they
say that the existence of money would force these two rates to be the
same.

The equilibrium rate would be adjusted through a flexible price

level so as to introduce a floor to the equilibrium rate making it
identical to the market rate.

This is another way to look at the

"wealth effect" that Keynes missed in his theory, even though in his
"asides" he recognized that it existed (1982, p. 55).
Even with a liquidity trap, the market rate could be the
equilibrium rate if the price level fell enough so that consumption were
stimulated to the extent that full employment were restored.
this is Keynes' fatal "error."

Therefore,

Even though he acknowledged its

existence, he failed to realize its key role in long run adjustment.

No

unemployment equilibrium is possible with flexible wages and prices.
Thus proposition (1) has been demonstrated to be "false," and even some
of Keynes' most noted disciples have acknowledged this fact. 1

1 James Tobin stated that, "[he[ did not establish an underemployment equilibrium" (1975, p. 201). Also, Don Patinkin feels that Keynes
only demonstrated a short run disequilibrium, not an unemployment
equilibrium (1965, p. 337). But, Patinkin thinks too much attention has
been paid to this question since the focus on "equilibrium" has caused
an undue emp~asis on rigid money wages or a liquidity trap. Patinkin
himself considers Keynes' theory in view of a disequilibrium setting.
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C.

Short Run Price Rigidity

Friedman and Schwartz analyze short run price rigidity in the
General Theory as having the
trap.

necessary condition of the liquidity

Existence of a perfectly elastic demand for money is the root

cause of short run price rigidity.
Keynes, they say, "assumed" rigid wages because there was a "lack
of concordance between observed phenomena and the implications of a
literal application of Marshall's assumption to aggregate magnitudes"
(1982, p. 47).

Therefore, Keynes reversed the roles that Marshall had

assigned to price and quantity variables: quantity adjusts quickly while
price adjusts slowly "at least downward" (1982, p. 46).

The

"idiosyncratic" period between World War I and the writing of the
General Theory influenced Keynes to abandon his former quantity theory
leanings and fit a new theory to the empirical observances (1982, p.
621).

But, say Friedman and Schwartz, he carried it to the "extreme,

all adjustment in quantity, none in price" (1982, p. 48).
Friedman and Schwartz say that Keynes "rationalized" his
assumption of wage rigidity on two levels: on the surface, he relied on
institutional variables such as trade unions and money illusion; at a
deeper level, he relied on proposition (1)--there could be no
equilibrium price level if there were no equilibrium.

Wage rigidity,

they say, was crucial to Keynes' model to "fix the price level" and lend
stability to the system (1982, p. 47).
It was Keynes' "erroneous interpretation" of the Great Depression
which led him to regard monetary policy as "ineffective in stemming a
decline" (1982, p. 48)

Due to his assumption about prices, the quantity
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theory equation could be rewritten as:
money balances, P

= the

price level, k

M/P

= the

demand for real balances), y = real income.

= ky,

where M = nominal

inverse of velocity (the
If the quantity of money

were increased, and if Pis assumed constant, then all adjustment would
have to take place on the right side of the equation.

Even at this

point, say Friedman and Schwartz, Keynes' theory could be consistent
with a monetary interpretation of changes in output.

But at this point

he introduces absolute liquidity preference.
If elastic liquidity preference exists, adjustment would take

place mostly through changes ink.

The demand for money would be highly

elastic so as to absorb the almost the entire change in the money
supply.

In Keynes' "most extreme, and we are tempted to say purest"

form of his theory (1982, p. 48), all changes are ink; liquidity
preference is absolute; there are no possible effects on y.
Keynes' rationale for this position, according to Friedman and
Schwartz, is the demand for money function he specifies in which the
speculative demand is highly sensitive to changes in the rate of
interest.

Since the interest rate is a "price"--the price of credit

(1982, pp. 26, 48), then by assumption this price is "slow to adjust".
The variable that must adjust is "the real quantity of money people
desire to hold" (1982, p. 48).2

An infinitesimal change in the

2 In another discussion of the relation between the liquidity trap
and rigid prices, Friedman and Schwartz say that in the event of a
change in the quantity of money "Keynes supposes that the whole of the
adjustment will be ink. And
this result can also be regarded
as a direct consequence of his assumption about the relative speed of
adjustment of price and quantity." (1982, p. 48) In this case there is
a reversal of the previous causation. Since the adjustment ink is
the liquidity trap, Friedman and Schwartz are saying that sticky prices
cause a liquidity trap (or that if Keynes' model is to have sticky
prices, it must logically have absolute liquidity preference.)
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interest rate would cause an infinite change in the quantity of money
demanded.
Friedman and Schwartz's conclusions from this analysis are that
absolute liquidity preference and rigid prices (including interest
rates) go hand in hand.

Otherwise, a change in the quantity of money

would affect interest rates.

A change in interest rates implies that

there has been a change in the price of assets (or in their returns),
and this would mean that a change in the quantity of money affected
prices.

Keynes' theory did not admit this possibility according to

Friedman and Schwartz.

With absolute liquidity preference, nothing is

affected by a change in the supply of money except a change in the
demand for real balances in the same proportion.

Changes in the supply

of money do not affect prices of assets, interest rates, the level of
output, or the price level of output.

Therefore, a theory that

incorporates rigid prices must have some theoretical cause--in Keynes'
theory it was absolute liquidity preference.
As Friedman and Schwartz point out, this is really not the same
thing as asserting that prices and wages are "constant."

It only means

that Keynes' theory provided for no effects on prices or wages as a
result of a change in the quantity of money (1982, p. 49).

There are

"forces" which determine the wage level, but these are not part of the
"theory in question," but are affected by forces "abstracted from in the
theory," and a result of "ad hoc relations" (1982, p. 49).

It was not

enough for Keynes to admit that wage and price changes occur; they were
not a direct consequence of his monetary theory, so his formal theory
"has nothing to say about what determines the absolute price or wage
level

"(1982, p. 50).
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Friedman says Keynes theorized that the interest rate could not be
changed by any monetary means in the short run because at "low" interest
rates a liquidity trap would exist, but at higher rates there would be
an "unstable" demand for money in which velocity would change to offset
any change in the money supply by the banking authority (1972, p. 908).
This unstable demand for money would be caused by speculators who would
move quickly to offset any change in banking policy.

These speculators

have expectations that the "conventional" interest rate will persist in
the future, thus they will frustrate any attempt of the monetary
authority to affect the rate of interest by buying and selling bonds.
If the central bank tried to increase the money supply and lower
the rate of interest by purchasing bonds, these speculators would sell
an infinite supply of bonds at the going price.

Wealth holders who

would have been induced to sell at the higher prices find that these
speculators flooded the market thus driving down the price to the former
level.

The slightest rise in the price of bonds would encourage them to

sell their bonds and effectively frustrate the attempt of the monetary
authority to raise bond prices.
A similar situation would exist when the monetary authority
attempted to lower bond prices and raise yields.

These same speculators

would buy an infinite quantity of bonds at the slightest lowering of
bond prices, in order to profit when the price rose again.

If these

speculators exist, then the monetary authority is blocked in its efforts
to lower or raise the rate of interest.

Its actions merely change the

quantity of money balances held by these speculators (1982, pp. 53-54).
A feature of this phenomenon is that nominal income becomes
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independent of the quantity of money.

If nominal income increases (for

some reason other than a monetary inducement) which requires an increase
in transactions balances, then holders of these speculative balances
will provide them at no increase in interest rates.

Conversely, these

speculators will absorb all excess balances made available by a fall in
nominal income, even if the rate of interest does not fall.
The conclusion is that in circumstances of absolute liquidity
preference, income can change without a change in Mor in
interest rates and M can change without a change in income or in
interest rates. The holders of money are in metastable
equilibrium, like a tumbler on its side on a flat surface; they
will be satisfied with whatever the amount of money happens to be
(1982, p. 54).
.
Friedman and Schwartz conclude that Keynes saw absolute liquidity
preference at the conventional rate of interest in the short run, so
that money changes are unimportant in explaining changes in prices,
output, or rates of interest.

They say that Keynes did qualify this

assertion by applying it only to conditions of unemployment, and that at
high levels of employment the demand for money is "unstable."

At full

employment, they say, he conceded that increases in the supply of money
would affect prices, and in fact it would only affect prices.

This

qualification, though, is unimportant, since Keynes paid only "lip
service" to the possibility that it could happen, so it would do his
theory no injustice to neglect it (1982, p. 49).
Implications of the Liquidity Trap
Friedman and Schwartz see a difference between a long run and a
short run liquidity trap which they say that Keynes and his followers
"tended to merge" (1982, p. 55).

As a consequence, the important

effects of the expected interest rates in the demand for money were
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omitted.

The theoretical distinction between the long and short run

liquidity traps is necessary to point out consequences of long run or
short run liquidity preference.

The long run liquidity trap is caused

by the expected rate of interest R* being so low that "the extra return
from holding non-money assets would only just compensate for the extra
risks involved" (1982, p. 54).

This long run liquidity trap involves

the risk factors of investing long term rather than activity by
speculators.

The liquidity trap in the long run may occur only at an

interest rate approaching zero, while in the short run it may occur at
the "conventional" rate due to the activity of speculators.
Friedman's Interpretation of Keynes' Demand for Money
Keynes' system "emphasized the relation between nominal income and
investment or autonomous expenditures rather than the relation between
nominal income and the stock of money" (1982, p. 41).

Therefore his

monetary theory was more of an appendage to his basic income-expenditure
approach.

Even though Keynes recognized a spectrum of interest rates,

his "interest rate" corresponded to that on long term government
securities.

This was a result of Keynes' definition of "money" as any

short term liquid asset, cash and deposits, so that any distinction made
between money and bonds in Keynes' model would be misleading (1982, P•
52).
Keynes' liquidity preference function (demand for money) specifies
the quantity of nominal balances demanded as a function of "the" rate of
interest.

Friedman and Schwartz note several problems with it.

First,

the demand function should be specified as a function of the difference
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between the rate of interest and the rate paid on "money," but due to
the "simplification" Keynes made above, they say, this was not
necessary.

Second, Keynes failed to distinguish between nominal and

real money balances in his demand function.

Again, this is due to his

assumption that "prices could be taken as rigid" and that nominal and
real income were identical (1982, p. 481).
Friedman and Schwartz specify a formalized version of Keynes'
demand for money function.

It is separable into two components, the

transactions demand and the speculative demand, and each depend on
different variables (1982, p. 52).
M/P • M1 /P + M2 /P • kly + f(R - R*, R*), where kl•
velocity of transactions and R • the current rate of interest, R* • the
expected rate of interest, y • real output, M1 • money held for the
transactions motive, M2 • money held for the speculative motive, M •
the supply of nominal balances, and P • the price level.

In practice,

Keynes and his followers have treated the demand for money as a function
of current interest rates, even though they considered the effect of
expectations in developing the demand for speculative balances.

This

omission was due to their concentration on the short run (1982, P• 53).
D.

The Keynesians:

the Narrow Range of Assets

Criticism of the "Keynesians"
hardly an economist today accepts

It is not surprising that

Keynes's conclusion about the strictly passive character of~, or the
accompanying conclusion that

• money does not matter" (1982, p. 49).

Even so, Keynesian economists are identifiable by their tendencies to
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adopt Keynes' assumptions about the relative speed of adjustment of
price and quantity (1982, p. 49).

If they reject absolute liquidity

preference, then they must offer some other explanation of sticky
prices.
Friedman and Schwartz see a ''more subtle difference between the
approach of economists in the Keynesian tradition and the approach we
have adopted" (1982, p. 57), and that difference concerns the effects of
the range of assets considered for the transmission process.

The

transmission mechanism by which changes in the quantity of money operate
to change real variables such as output, employment and the rate of
interest, forms the basis for monetary theory.

Any differences that are

apparent in monetary theories must find their origin in the transmission
process.
Friedman and Meiselman distinguish between two views of the
transmission process, one of which focuses on "credit" effects and the
other on "monetary" effects.

The "credit" view concentrates "on a

narrow and well-defined range of capital assets and a correspondingly
narrow range of associated expenditures" 0963, p. 217).

The yields

from these assets can be sunnnarized by "a" rate of interest, which
becomes the focus of the analysis to the exclusion of other effects.
The "credit" view recognizes that investment expenditures are
financed generally by debts and equities, and there is a close link
between the prices and yields on these assets and the Keynesian
income-expenditure explanation of movements in output.

Since investment

spending is sensitive to changes in the rate of interest, as monetary
policy affects "the" rate of interest, it allows for increases in
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investment spending.
changes in investment.

Income is affected as the multiplier operates on
Therefore, for those who adopt this "credit"

view, "the important thing about money

is how it affects this

class of expenditures" (1963, p. 217).
The "monetary" view on the other hand is a ''much different, and
broader view" (1963, p. 218).

Adopting this perspective, households

possess a stock of "capital" which provides services that they consume.
So, at any time, the whole stock of unconsumed goods, including physical
capital which they may hold in the form of claims on enterprises, real
estate, personal consumer durables (including clothes and food), and
human capital, represents the range of assets considered for the
monetary view.

There is an interest rate implicit in all "assets" which

measures the yield or services provided by the good, so monetary policy
affects the prices and yields of all goods.
Friedman and Meiselman argue that the "monetary" view is "more
useful" than the credit view.

They maintain that it has been

empirically demonstrated that changes in money affect more than interest
rates on a narrow class of financial assets.

Money affects "a much

broader range of assets" and therefore the rates implicit in them 0963,
pp. 221-222).

Friedman and Schwartz contend that the broader range of

assets is theoretically necessary for tracing changes in the quantity of
money.

The narrow channel (corresponding to the credit view) does not

take into account the full impact that changes in money have on
expenditures for goods, their prices, and on implicit rates of interest,
so that they "insist that a far wider range of assets and interest
rates must be taken into account" (1982, p. 58).
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Friedman and Schwartz pinpoint the major difference in monetary
theory as dependent upon the range of assets
portfolio (1982 1 p. 58).

considered for the

They contend that the narrow range adopted by

the Keynesian& provides the underpinning for a model in which the price
level cannot be affected by monetary policy.

If the range of assets is

"extremely narrow," then the only "price" that is affected by changes in
the quantity of money would be the prices of those particular assets in
the savers' portfolios and their accompanying rates of interest.
Therefore, "r" can vary in response to monetary changes, but prices of
other existing assets (such as real estate and durables) and of current
output will not be affected and thus can remain stable.

Monetary

changes would have no direct link to the general price level.

Those

economists who adopt the "credit" view of the transmission process can
assume away effects of changes in the quantity of money on the price
level in their theories.

These economists, then, see money as affecting

only "the" rate of interest which is the "market rate on a fairly narrow
class of financial liabilities" (1982 1 p. 57), whose effect depends on
the interest elasticity of investment expenditure.

Therefore, they can

theorize that changes in money affect spending on current output
indirectly and sometimes weakly.
E.

Conclusions about Keynes' Monetary Theory

Friedman and Schwartz contend that it is the empirical data which
have discredited Keynes' theory, and of course the data were unavailable
to him at the time (1982 1 pp. 621-622).

Others have "expressed" the

view that Keynes' theory is highly special, but they have not been able
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to document it with evidence as fully as Friedman and Schwartz feel they
have been able to do (p. 622).
Friedman attributes the liquidity trap to Keynes as an explanation
of the cause of rigid prices while he attributes the narrow range of
assets to the Keynesians as their rationale for the same phenomenon.
The result is that price level changes, which are critical for the
automatic adjustment that Friedman sees as operational, do not occur.
In the case of the Keynesians, monetary policy has "more significance"
(1982, p. 49), but he sees Keynes as considering expansionary monetary
policy as "ineffective in stemming a decline"

(1982, p. 48).

By rejecting the liquidity trap, the Keynesians had to find some
other way to explain price rigidity, so they focused on the narrow
transmission channel.

The fact that they allow prices to change is of

no consequence, since their formal theories have no mechanism by which
prices are affected by changes in aggregate demand.
If Keynes did adopt the liquidity trap as an explanation of
unemployment equilibrium, then he had no monetary transmission
mechanism.

Money would not matter at all.

would reduce to only one--that being money.

Keynes' range of assets
The LM curve would be

perfectly flat in the range of absolute liquidity preference:

the

demand for money would be infinite; the demand for bonds would be zero.
Friedman and Schwartz do not classify Keynes as embracing a narrow
range of assets as they do the Keynesians.

In fact, they say Keynes saw

no distinction among any assets "whether these be bonds, equities or
physical assets" because he assumed the price level to be rigid (1982,
p. 54), and if prices were rigid, the rates of return on these assets
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would be "fixed" for the short run.

Therefore, whether or not a person

might hold these assets is immaterial--the liquidity trap completely
negates the transmission mechanism and renders the definition of
"assets" unimportant.

Money remains the only asset relevant to Keynes'

monetary theory.
Sticky wages and prices "forced the transmission process to go
through an extremely narrow channel" for the Keynesians, while flexible
prices allow Friedman and Schwartz to consider a broad range (1982, p.
58).

Therefore, if Keynes' monetary theory encompassed a liquidity trap

which rendered prices rigid, then he could not also have a "broad" range
of assets, which would require flexible prices.
The conclusion is that Keynes considered monetary policy
ineffective and that ''money does not matter."

Though Friedman qualifies

his statement with the condition of "in times of heavy unemployment"
(1968, p. 2), he also states that in Keynes' theory, no monetary-induced
price changes occur until full employment (1982, p. 623).

This would

imply that monetary policy is never effective in restoring full
employment if it was instituted at a time of unemployment.
The implication of Friedman's criticism is that, without the
liquidity trap, Keynes would have been forced to adopt a flexible price
model where changes in the supply of money affect prices of assets, both
existing and newly-produced, and therefore rates of interest.

As

pointed out earlier, Friedman's definition of a "flexible" price is one
that responds promptly to changes in supply or demand (1972, P• 925).
Since Friedman's own model incorporates this mechanism, the liquidity
trap is the barrier to Keynes' admission that his own model is a
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"version" of the quantity theory with highly "special assumptions."

The

only cause for short-run output fluctuations then would be
misperceptions of agents as they adjust to price signals.

In

particular, there would be no justification for Keynes' model of
short-run fluctuations to be characterized by price stickiness if
liquidity preference were not absolute.

(A possible justification would

be the "narrow range of assets," but recall that Keynes himself did not
appeal to this justification;
this approach.)

only his followers, the "Keynesians" took

If Friedman can discredit the Keynes' theory by showing

its dependence on the liquidity trap for sticky prices, he has built a
case against a theory in which unemployment may exist unaided by
rigidities or not "fully operative" market processes.

Thus there is no

barrier to full employment in the long run, since flexible prices would
constantly work to restore full employment by one or the other
mechanism.
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CHAPTER IV
KEYNES' MONETARY THEORY
A.

The Role of Money

In The General Theory, Keynes considered money to have a key
role in economic decisions of agents (1936, p. 32).

One of his major

criticisms of the classical school was that no account of money was
allowed in their theories of employment and determination of output even
though they purported to be, concerned with a monetary economy (1936, pp.
19-20, 189).

Indeed, Keynes presents a theory of money and its

influence on employment, interest rates, output, and prices.

Keynes'

monetary theory is bound to his theory of the macro economy so closely
that he states that it is illegitimate to try to separate monetary
economics from the study of how output is determined as a whole, so we
"require the complete theory of a Monetary Economy" 0936, p. 293).
To spell out Keynes' monetary transmission mechanism, two
preliminary tasks must be accomplished.

First, the rationale behind the

behavior of agents must be specified to conform with principles of
maximization:

the purpose of holding money or purchasing assets, and

the inducements to alter the composition of the portfolio;

the range of

assets that an individual may hold for the purpose of storing wealth;

the demand for money as a possible asset in the portfolio, especially
the role of other variables such as interest rates, prices, and real
income in determining the demand for money.
Second, it is necessary to describe a long run position for the
economy, the "equilibrium."

The stability of long run equilibrium is
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important for monetary theory and policy implications, and it serves as
a basis for describing short run fluctuations or deviations.

How the

interest rate, the level of output and employment, and the price level
are determined at a long run equilibrium, and what effect the level of
money balances has upon this state, give insight into features of his
theory that may differ from other monetary theories.

It is the

differences in monetary theory that we are interested in, and if
conditions of long run equilibrium are different, the desirability and
effectiveness of monetary policy is at stake.
Keynes' transmission mechanism specifies how a change in the
supply of money may affect real variables in the short run.

The

mechanism is subject to the assumptions and conditions of individual
behavior specified in the long run model.

The specific path that

adjustment follows in the short run depends on the range of assets, the
demand for money, and the consumption function.

The short run

adjustment and its duration is critical for the difference in outcome of
monetary theory.
This chapter will examine Keynes' monetary theory with reference
to Friedman's criticisms.

It will specify Keynes' range of assets, his

demand for money and possible conditions of the long run state of the
economy.

Then, it will describe the short run adjustment to a change in

the quantity of money, and what impact the change has on real and
nominal variables--the level of output and employment, interest rates,
and prices--and whether this impact may carry over into the long run.
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B.

The Range of Assets

Friedman and Schwartz have contended that a major difference between
their approach and that of Keynesians

is in the transmission

mechanism that is assumed to connect a change in the quantity of money
with a change in total nominal income(• total spending)" (1982, p. 57).
In particular,
The difference between us and the Keynesians [the followers of
Keynes] is less in the nature of the process than in the range of
assets considered. The Keynesians tend to concentrate on a narrow
range of marketable assets and recorded interest rates. We insist
that a far wider range of assets and interest rates must be taken
into account--such assets as durable and semi-durable consumer
goods, structures, and other real property. As a result, we
regard the market rates stressed by the Keynesians as only a small
part of the total spectrum of rates that are relevant (1982, p.

58).
The adoption of the narrow range of assets means that Keynesian&
can reject absolute liquidity preference and allow interest rates on a
narrow range of assets to be flexible, while simultaneously continuing
to regard price of other assets (houses, automobiles, furniture,
clothes, etc.) as an institutional datum.

Thus the Keynesians felt free

to develop a short-run theory in which output prices and wages are not
flexible.

Friedman, on the other hand, has been led to interpret the

transmission process in terms of relative price adjustment over a broad
range of assets.
Observe that Friedman has criticized only Keynes' followers (and
not Keynes himself) on the issue of the range of assets.
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Indeed, to my

knowledge, Friedman has not discussed Keynes' views on this issue.

But,

is it not possible that Keynes himself relied on a transmission
mechanism impinging on a narrow range of assets (rather than on absolute
liquidity preference) to justify his short-run theory of sticky wages
and prices?

This is the issue addressed in this section.

A desire for wealth is the motivation behind saving for the
individual.

"Wealth" is merely the "potentiality for consuming an

unspecified article at an unspecified time" (1936, p. 211), and the
ultimate goal of all economic activity is consumption (1936, p. 104)
which is the "only raison d'etre of employment" (1936, p. 211).

So

the act of saving is important for portfolio theory because saving is
the act of building the portfolio itself.

It may not be the saver's

desire to achieve some rational predetermined goal, but saving could be
more of a psychological tendency (1936, pp. 107-108), and "this is where
the trouble arises" (1936, p. 211).

If there has been an increase in

individual wealth, then saving has occurred since "•

• when an

individual saves he increases his own wealth" 0936, p. 83).
What motivates the wealth-owner to choose one asset over another
in which to store his wealth is its relative yield or return compared to
that for other assets.

Keynes says that some believe a wealth-owner

desires "a capital-asset as such, whereas what he really desires is
its prospective yield"

(1936, p. 212).

The potential owner of an

asset calculates the difference between the expected present value of
the yield provided by the asset in the form of a stream of returns and
the current replacement cost of that asset to arrive at the marginal
efficiency of that asset (MEC) (1936, p. 135).
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The wealth holder will

choose that asset having the highest marginal efficiency, whether it is
newly produced or an already existing asset.
The task at hand is not to determine the inducements to make new
investments but to determine the inducements to trade assets within a
portfolio the size of which is given.

Once the level of savings is

established, a person must make his or her portfolio choice.

Keynes

says that "it is in respect to the stock of accumulated savings
that the individual can exercise his choice between liquidity and
illiquidity" (1936_, p. 194).
But this decision having been made [of how much to consume or
save], there is a further decision which awaits him, namely in
what form he will hold his command over future consumption which
he hasreserved, whether out of his current income or from
previous savings. Does he want to hold it in the form of
immediate, liquid command (i.e., money or its equivalent)? Or is
he prepared to part with immediate command for a specified or
indefinite period, leaving it to future market conditions to
determine on what terms he can, if necessary, convert deferred
command over specific goods into immediate command over goods in
general? (1936, p. 166).
A person has a choice as to the degree of liquidity he will accept
in his wealth holding.

Money is of course the ultimate in liquidity,

but other assets rival money in their liquidity premiums (bonds and
government securities).

This liquidity premium will be a factor in the

demand for specific forms of wealth.

The choice, though, is for the

entire range of assets Keynes considered--cash, debts and capital goods
(19 36, p. 8 l ) •
Keynes identified many non-financial "goods" that wealth owners
may store in their portfolios.

If his purpose for mentioning these

goods was merely to establish their unsuitability for storing wealth,
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then a narrow-range interpretation could be correct.

Another

possibility is that Keynes gave lip service to the ability of certain
goods to serve as assets but did not incorporate them into his formal
theory.

Keynes' transmission process must directly impact the prices of

those assets he considers for the transmission process for them
legitimately to be in his range of assets.
This section will establish that Keynes' range of assets was broad
and that his transmission process operates on the relative prices of
assets as related to portfolio decisions by individuals.

Capital goods

comprise a broad category whose limits are subject to discussion, but as
long as one is consistent in his limits, any reasonable distinction will
suffice (1936, p. 61).
Keynes identifies three attributes that assets possess in
different degrees:
(i) Some assets produce a yield or output~
•• by
assisting some process of production or supplying services to a
consumer.
(ii) Most assets, except money, suffer some wastage or
involve some cost through the mere passage of time • •• ; i.e.,
they involve a carrying cost.£ measured in terms of themselves •
•
(iii) • • • • The amount • • • which they are willing to pay
for the potential convenience or security given by this power of
disposal • • • we shall call its liquidity premium 1.
It follows that the total return expected from the ownership
of an asset over a period is equal to its yield minus its
carrying cost plus its liquidity premium, i.e., q - c + 1 (1936,
PP• 225-226).
There is an additional yield that Keynes recognized, and that is
the "appreciation premium" which is the expected appreciation of the
asset in terms of the standard of value (1936, pp. 224, 227).

Keynes

denotes this component of an asset's yield by "a."
According to this definition of assets, it is clear that any good,
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financial instrument or cash possesses some of these attributes in
varying degrees.

Consumer durables would qualify since they supply

services to a consumer.

Capital goods used in production would assist

the process of production.

It is not necessary for goods to possess a

high liquidity premium to be considered an asset for the purpose of
storing wealth, and it is not necessary that the yields be measurable in
terms of output, for they could just as easily be subjective yields in
terms of particular consumer goods.
negative, that is a+ q - c + 1
for that particular person.

< O,

If the yield on some good were
that good would not be an "asset"

This could be the case for some

non-durables whose combined yield from the other factors was less than
the carrying-cost.
not qualify.

Since services cannot be owned or stored, they would

The particular definition was not of great importance to

Keynes, who agreed to "any reasonable line" (1936, p. 61).
Keynes also attributes a "scarcity premium" to assets which
represents the ability of these goods to offer services which have a
higher present value than their current replacement cost or "supply
price" (1936, p. 213).

As the production of these assets increases, the

scarcity premium falls, thus dragging down the total return from the
asset.
Since the value of a house depends on its utility,
every house which is built serves to diminish the
prospective rents obtainable from further
house-building and therefore lessens the attraction
of further similar investment unless the rate of
interest is falling pari passu (1936, p. 130).
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Yields on Assets
The yields on assets as described above result from the
interaction of the scarcity premium and the yields already identified.
Maximization of utility operates to equate all "net" yields (having
adjusted for risk) on the assets involved in the portfolio.

Trading

among assets will occur until no further trades can be made for profit.
If agents see an opportunity for profit, they will trade, affecting
asset prices, until all prices of assets will be such that that they are
in the same relation to their yields as before (1936, p. 227).

Even

though there may be a difference in stated yields, the real yields on
these assets (measured as above with implicit premiums accounted for)
will be equalized due to the differences in liquidity, scarcity,
appreciation potential and carrying costs.
Keynes' example addresses the yields on physical assets and money.
His use of money and physical goods is to demonstrate that though money
and financial instruments are clearly substitutes, it is less obvious
that money and goods are just as substitutable.

In fact, the

wealth-holder will seek a "balancing of advantages" in holding cash
versus other assets (1936, p. 174).

Keynes uses the following notation:

a 1 • expected appreciation of houses (assume> 0)

ql = yield from owning houses (assume> 0)
c 1 = carrying cost of owning houses (assume• 0)
11 • liquidity premium of houses (assume• 0)
a2
q2
c2
12

•
•
•
•

expected appreciation of wheat (assume> 0)
yield from owning wheat (assume= 0)
carrying cost of owning wheat (assume> 0)
liquidity premium of wheat (assume• 0)

a3
q3
c3
13

•
•
•
•

expected appreciation of money (assume• 0)
yield from holding money (assume• 0)
carrying cost of holding money (assume• 0)
liquidity premium of money (assume> 0)
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Thus in equilibrium the demand-prices of houses and wheat in
terms of money will be such that there is nothing to choose in the
way of advantage between the alternatives;--i.e., a 1 + q 1 ,
a 2 - c 2 , and 1 1 will be equal. The choice of a standard
will 1111:ke no difference to the result (1936, pp. 227-228).
With this notation it is easy to see that the demand of
wealth-owners will be directed to houses, wheat or to money
according as a 1 + q 1 or a 2 - c 2 or 1 3 is greatest (1936,
P• 227).
Equalization of yields implies that wealth holders substitute
various forms of assets in the portfolio to gain the best yield
available.

The yields that are affected represent those on assets which

would be in a saver's portfolio.

The fact that their yields are

impacted in this manner means that they must be included in the range of
assets.

Therefore, the range must be broad enough to include such goods

as houses, wheat or money.
Keynes addresses the problem of liquidity by calculating the
liquidity premium into the real yield which the wealth owner considers
when making his choice.

A corporate bond, therefore, may have a lower

stated yield than a comparable physical asset; however, its implicit
liquidity yield may be very high.

"The owners of wealth will then weigh

the lack of 'liquidity' of differenct capital equipments

• as a

medium in which to hold wealth against the best available actuarial
estimate of their prospective yields allowing for risk" (1936, p. 240).
Physical assets may not have the appeal of financial securities as
long term stores of wealth due to carrying costs and low liquidity
premiums.
In the case of a commodity other than money, a modest stock of it
may offer some convenience to users of the commodity. But even
though a larger stock might have some attractions as representing
a store of stable wealth, this would be offset by its carrying
costs in the shape of storage, wastage, etc. (1936, p. 233).
But, even so, the yield is calculated on the total return (a+ q 95

c + 1).

If the price of debts were bid up by the central bank, lowering

the yield, then the return on the physical commodity which was
previously equal to the return on short term debt would appear more
attractive to wealth-owners since carrying costs are already calculated
into the yield on the asset.

Equalization of yields on all assets,

including goods and financial assets, is proof that Keynes' range of
assets was broad and not limited to a narrow range of financial
securities.

If yields are equalized on assets, financial securities and

money, then relative prices must change through subsititution among
assets, and this must be the mechanism that restores equilibrium.
Keynes points to the existence of organized markets as enhancing
the liquidity premiums of certain assets, especially debts and equities
(See Appendix C).

Without the organized markets, those who desired a

high degree of liquidity would have no choice except to hold money.
"For in the absence of an organised market, liquidity preference due to
the precautionary motive would be greatly increased; whereas the
existence of an organised market gives an opportunity for wide
fluctuations in liquidity-preference due to the speculative motive"
(1936, pp. 170-171). This market in effect releases precautionary
balances into the speculative pool. Given the existence of these
organized markets and a degree of uncertainty, then "any.one who differs
from the predominant opinion

• may have a good reason for keeping
(19 36 , p. 169 ) •

liquid resources in order to profit

Keynes recognizes that organized commodity markets, spot and
future, may enhance liquidity premiums of certain "stocks of
commodities" (1936, pp. 223-224).

Therefore, holding these commodities
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as assets must be on a par with holding debts or other securities.

It

is interesting to question whether a non-traded item such as a
refrigerator could be considered a potential asset for the portfolio.
Assets of this type for which there are no markets still yield
"services," even though their liquidity premiums would be zero.

But

Keynes did not require assets to possess positive liquidity premiums.
An asset is characterized by the fact that it has a yield which is the
composite of the factors listed above.

Goods that yield "services to

consumers" are assets, and thus their yields stand in equality with all
others.

If the present value of the refrigerator fell below its selling

price, it would be traded and another asset purchased.

Even though the

nominal yield on money is "nil" (1936, p. 226), it still competes with
other assets because of the liquidity service that it provides (1936, p.
231).
Keynes mentions no psychological aversion to long term debt, but
he does point out that
there is a risk of loss being incurred in purchasing a long term
debt, •
• [therefore] The actuarial profit or mathematical
expectation of gain calculated in accordance with the existing
probabilities • • • must be sufficient to compensate for the risk
of disappointment (1936, p. 169).
The "mass psychology" aspect of expectations of future rates of
interest operate to affect current rates of interest.

The person who

believes that long term rates will be higher in the future will keep
cash in order to profit from his expectation.

The one who believes it

will be lower in the future will borrow "for short periods in order to
purchase debts of longer term" (1936, p. 170).

This speculative

substitution should bring the prices of debts of varying maturities into
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line with each other according to their risks.

If inflation were

expected by wealth holders, they would choose real assets over financial
assets such as bonds or money.
A third source of risk might be added, namely, a possible adverse
I
change on the value of the monetary standard which renders a
money-loan to this extent less secure than a real asset; though
all or most of this should already be reflected, and therefore
absorbed, in the price of durable real assets (1936 1 p. 144).
It is possible that prices of short term debts could be bid up so
far that no one believed that prices of long term debts could fall
enough to cover the risk differential.

In this case, the central bank

could only affect prices of short term debts.

"The short-term rate of

interest is easily controlled by the monetary authority
long-term rate may be more recalcitrant.

But the

." (1936, p. 202-203).

With yields being equalized in equilibrium, it is necesssary that
a process of asset substitution exists, so that wealth holders trade
until prices and yields are equalized.

This requires a broad range of

assets for the transmission process and the prices of assets such as
durable goods to be affected by changes in the prices of other assets.
The Marginal Efficiency of Capital
Aggregate investment is the addition to the physical capital stock
after allowing for depreciation--the purchase of!!!!! capital-assets
(1936 1 p. 75).

Therefore, an individual "invests" when he adds to his

stock of physical assets by purchasing a newly produced asset.

These

purchases will be made only if the return from doing so exceeds the
return from any other activity.

If the return available from new assets

falls below the rate of interest (or any other alternative return), no
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further investment will occur (1936, p. 236).

Since the return from

purchasing new assets varies inversely with the price of the asset, then
low prices of new assets relative to other existing assets encourage
investment.

So, "there is no sense in building up an enterprise at a

cost greater than at which an existing one can be purchased
(1936, p. 151).
Entrepreneurs who "invest" do so after calculating the marginal
efficiency of the asset they purchase.

The marginal efficiency is the

difference between the present value of the expected yield and the
"supply price" of the asset in question--the cost of purchasing it.
This calculation gives the return on investment which is compared to
other returns available.

Therefore, a wealth holder or entrepreneur

will purchase a new asset only if its marginal efficiency is greater
than the rate of interest •
• • • the marginal efficiency of capital is here defined in terms
of the expectation of yield and of the current supply price of
the capital asset. It depends on the rate of return expected to be
obtainable on money if it were invested in a newly produced
asset
(1936, p. 136).
Keynes reasons that"•

for every durable commodity we have a rate of

interest in terms of itself

." (1936, p. 223).

This rate of

interest corresponds to the marginal efficiency of the asset.
Therefore,

it may be that it is the greatest of the own rates

of interest

that the marginal efficiency must attain if it is to

be newly-produced

• " (1936, p. 223).

The wealth holders seek out the greatest returns available when
deciding in what form to store their wealth.

There would be no

incentive for a wealth holder to purchase new units of capital assets
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unless their yields were greater than any currently available asset.

If

the marginal efficiency of a new asset is greater than the rate of
interest, the investment purchase will be made.

Since the marginal

efficiency is based on expectations of yield, it will change as
expectations do.

But, it is its relation to the rate of interest which

determines the volume of investment.
For the stimulus to output depends on the marginal efficiency of
capital rising relatively to the rate of interest (1936, p.
142).
When investment in new assets takes place, the marginal efficiency of
all assets of that type falls.
occurs for two reasons:

The fall in the marginal efficiency

one is that the prospective yield due to the

scarcity premium falls; another is that the supply price of the asset
will rise, due to "pressure on the facilities for producing that type of
capital" (1936, p. 136).

These events take place simultaneously

although "the second of these factors being usually more important in
the short run, but the longer the period in view the more does the first
factor take its place" (1936, p. 136).
This result is certain enough so that schedules for individual
assets can be established relating the marginal efficiency to the
quantity of new investment in that asset.

For the economy as a whole,

it is possible to construct a schedule of the relation of the rate of
investment to the marginal efficiency of capital in general.

As the

rate of investment increases, the marginal efficiency of capital in
general falls (1936, p. 136).

Another consequence of the rise in the

rate of investment is the increase of prices associated with the
increase in output due to the rise in the wage-unit and increasing
marginal cost (1936, p. 249).
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Keynes warns that"•

whilst a decline in the rate of interest

may be expected, cet. par., to increase the volume of investment, this
will not happen if the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital is
falling more rapidly than the rate of interest

(1936, P• 173).

Investment is undertaken by entrepreneurs who expect profits from
the activity.

They are the purchasers of the new capital.

Their main

concern is the marginal efficiency of the capital assets they seek to
purchase, or in other words the expected profitability of the investment
in relation to its price.

A ready alternative that could be gotten from

an existing asset or debt is given by the prevailing rate of interest.
These entrepreneurs are free to purchase existing assets as well as new
assets, so they will only purchase the new assets so long as no existing
asset offers a better return.

"The schedule of the marginal efficiency

of investment may be said to govern the terms of which loanable funds
are demanded for the purpose of new investment" (1936, p. 165).

c.

The Demand for Money

Money may be held as a store of wealth, since "cash" is one of the
possibilities of the assets that Keynes saw.

It is possible to hold

cash for spending and to keep cash as an asset.

Liquidity preference is

a function of the rate of interest, income, the price level and
expectations of interest rates and the price level.
Keynes saw three distinct motives for holding money which underlie
the individual's demand for money.

The demand for money is a "single

decision, though the composite result of different motives" (1936, p.
195).

The holders of cash may not segregate their demands into "three
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watertight compartments" since one may serve as a contingent reserve for
another (1936, p. 195).
The transactions motive, consisting of "income" and "business"
transactions balances, and the precautionary motive are affected by the
"cheapness and reliability of methods of obtaining cash"

and the

"relative cost of holding cash,"--the opportunity cost of holding cash.
But except in the case of "large changes in the cost of holding cash,"
it is a ''minor factor" in the demand for money for these motives.

The

largest effect on these components of demand for money is a result of
the "general activity of the economic system and of the level of money
income" (1936, p. 196).

Therefore as the level of income increases, the

demand for money increases.
The speculative motive has at its basis "the object of securing
profit from knowing better than the market what the future will bring
forth" (1936, p. 170).

The only reason for holding speculative cash

balances is for the purpose of increasing returns by purchasing an asset
later than immediately, especially if a person "believes that future
rates of interest will be above the rates assumed by the market" (1936,
p. 170).

This is a valid reason for keeping cash, and the "necessary

condition is the existence of uncertainty as to the future rate of
interest" (1936, p. 168).

Otherwise, with a positive rate of interest,

"it must always be more advantageous to purchase a debt rather than to
hold cash as a store of wealth" (1936, p. 169).
This speculative demand for money is highly sensitive to the rate
of interest.
As a rule, • • • the schedule of liquidity preference relating the

quantity of money to the rate of interest is given by a smooth
102

curve which shows the rate of interest falling as the quantity of
money is increased (1936, p. 171).
Since, "experience indicates that the aggregate demand for money
to satisfy the speculative-motive usually shows a continuous response to
gradual changes in the rate of interest

as given by the prices of

bonds and debts of various maturities" (1936, p. 197), the speculative
motive is the component of the demand for money which is "particularly
important in transmitting a change in the quantity of money" (1936, p.
196).
Therefore, if the rate of interest falls, the demand for money due
to the speculative motive would be increased.

The change in "r"

determines the change in M2 , given that expectations of the future are
constant (1936, pp. 199-200).

The speculative pool is a residual whose

size is dependent upon "the degree of its [the current rate of interest]
divergence from what is considered a fairly safe level of r" (1936, p.
201).
The demand for money is also a function of the price level (or the
wage-unit as Keynes describes it), indicating that demand is for real
rather than nominal balances.

If the price level is raised through the

rise in the "wage-unit," the demand for nominal balances increases
(1936, pp. 173, 249). Keynes' assumption early in The General Theory
of a constant wage-unit when he described liquidity preference did not
require him to specify this component of demand, but it is brought out
in later discussions.
The demand for money as an asset depends on the prices of other
assets which could serve as substitute stores of wealth.

Not only does

it depend on their current prices, but it is also sensitive to the
expectation of price c.hanges in the future.

The demand for money, or

the liquidity preference schedule, may shift due to changed expectations
concerning the future policy of the central bank (1936, pp. 202-203).
If this were the case, the rate of interest at which persons would be
content to hold a certain level of speculative balances could change
"without any market transactions being necessary" (1936, p. 198).
Expectations of changes in the value of money in the future reduce the
liquidity premium of money and therefore the demand for money (1936, pp.
231, 238, 241), since "money itself rapidly loses the attribute of
'liquidity' if its future supply is expected to undergo sharp changes"
(1936, footnote, p. 241).
The equilibrium rate of interest on money is determined by the
supply of money and liquidity preference (1936, p. 167).

If any of the

determinants of the demand for money change, it will change the
equilibrium rate of interest without the necessity of the supply of
money having to be altered.
Keynes' demand for money is actually the same demand as for other
assets, since money is a part of the portfolio.

However, since money

also facilitates transactions, variables affecting this component of
demand must be included.
is

M'1 •

Therefore, Keynes' demand for money function

Md(Y, r, P, P*, r*), where Y • the level of nominal

income(+), r • the complex of interest rates on debts and other assets
(-), P • the level of prices(+), P* • the expected future general price
level (the value of money)(-) (1936, pp. 142, 237), and r* • the
expected future rate of interest(+) (1936, pp. 142, 198).
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The shape of the demand function is a declining function of the
rate of interest given the levels of the other variables.

However, at

rates considered "unsafe" 0936, p. 203) or at rates so low that they
cannot cover the costs associated with risk (1936, p. 202), or the
expenses of lending (1936, p. 208), liquidity preference may become
absolute--demand will be infinite, ''M 2 may tend to increase almost
without limit in response to a reduction of r below a certain figure"
(1936, p. 203).
Since the rate of interest is "psychological" and "conventional,"
this minimum rate may not "be rooted in secure knowledge," so that it
"will not be always unduly resistant to a modest measure of persistence
and consistency of purpose by the monetary authority" (1936, p. 204).
The speculative demand for money is the cornerstone of Keynes'
transmission process for money.

Through this demand, wealth owners

allow for changes in their portfolios. The speculative balance is the
"fund" which finances trading.

It grows as the rate of interest falls

and shrinks as it rises, thus allowing changes in yields to spur asset
trading and to finance higher output levels.

If persons held no

speculative balances, purchases of assets would be possible only at the
expense of other expenditures, and yield differences would be
immediately erased as assets were traded for other assets allowing no
changes in output.

There would be no possiblility of lowering the rate

of interest for any length of time and therefore no stimulus to
investment expenditure.
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D.

Long Run Equilibrium

Recall that Friedman characterizes Keynes' basic challenge to the
quantity theory as being summarized in three propositions, one of which
is that a long-run full employment equilibrium need not exist even if
all prices are flexible.

Further, in Friedman's view, this proposition

depends on absolute liquidity preference.

In this section we examine

the long-run implications of Keynes' model in the light of Friedman's
criticism.
The long run position of the economy that Keynes describes as
"equilibrium" is one in which there is no automatic tendency to change.
Keynes says that there may be a "cyclical movement around this
equilibrium position," when the marginal efficiency of capital rises and
falls above zero (1936, p. 218), but the economy tends to return to this
state of affairs, thus giving it the status of "equilibrium."
Unlike Friedman's long run position in which all anticipations are
realized, Keynes sees a possibility of the existence of unemployment in
the long run, as an equilibrium state (1936, pp. 242-243).

If there

were unemployment, quantities demanded and supplied would not be
equated:

there would be excess supply of labor and an excess

(potential) supply of goods.
demand curves.

Workers would not be on their notional

As Keynes criticized the classical school, if one is

able to assume that conditions always exist which "force" the return to
full employment in the long run, theory may only describe the laws that
"govern the application and rewards of the commmunity's productive
resources," so that the "volume of output depends solely on the assumed
constant level of employment in conjunction with the current equipment
and technique" (1936, pp. 243-244).
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• • • even in the long period the volume of employment is not
necessarily full but is capable of varying, and • • • to every
banking policy there corresponds a different level of long-period
level of employment; so that there are a number of positions of
long-period equilibrium corresponding to different conceivable
interest policies on the part of the monetary authority (1936, P•
191).
Keynes identified three possible long run equilibrium positions:
1) that in which the level of capital (and rate of investment) is
constrained by an equilibrium interest rate too high for full
employment, and one in which the level of wages and prices do not fall
to lower this rate sufficiently for full employment;

2) that in which

due to perfectly flexible wages and prices there is full employment and
the rate of interest is equal to the real yield on capital; and 3) that
in which liquidity preference has become absolute at some level of
interest so that even if wages and prices are flexible and do raise the
real quantity of money, the rate of interest low enough for full
employment cannot be achieved.

The first case is the normal one; the

second two are extreme.
Even though Keynes identifies cases 2) and 3) as "limiting" and
"extreme" (1936, pp. 207, 191), Friedman bases his criticism on the
third one while not recognizing that 1) and 2) also exist, so it is
necessary to examine all cases of long run equilibrium in Keynes' theory
to judge whether Friedman has been faithful to The General Theory.
Long Run Unemployment Equilibrium
The yield on money though is not self-adjusting for several
reasons:

"money" is not produced in response to its price rising as

other assets are; no ready substitute exists for the "exchange value" of
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money; when money is produced, its liquidity premium does not fall
nearly so rapidly as the return on other assets falls (1936, pp. 229,
233); even though the real quantity of money may be increased by
perfectly flexible wages, this process has such a harmful effect on
stability and expectations, it should not be counted on to restore full
employment (1936, p. 269).
Thus with other commodities left to themselves, "natural forces,"
i.e. the ordinary forces of the market, would tend to bring their
rate of interest down until the emergence of full employment ••
• Thus in the absence of money • • • the rate of interest would
only reach equilibrium when there is full employment (1936, p.
235).
This unemployment "equilibrium" is the result of a long term
interest rate on money that does not respond to changes in conditions of
aggregate demand.

Rather than the interest rate adjusting in the long

run, it is output and employment that do.

Keynes says,

the

position of equilibrium, under conditions of laissez faire, will be
one in which employment is low enough and the standard of life
sufficiently miserable enough to bring savings to zero" (1936, p. 217).
The stock of capital must be constrained to that level where the
marginal efficiency of capital is equal to the rate of interest on
money.

Once this level is reached, new investment expenditure would

become zero, hence savings must also equal zero.
In the long run, other economists see no difficulty in the flexibility
of prices and wages causing a return to full employment due to the
increase in the real quantity of money which will reduce the rate of
interest.

Keynes agreed with this proposition in principle:

the fall

in the wage level could restore real balances thereby reducing the rate
of interest.

In fact, if wages were perfectly flexible so that they
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changed immediately with every change in aggregate demand, full
employment may be a more frequent long term position •
• • • though in the extreme case where money-wages were assumed to
fall without limit in face of involuntary unemployment • • • there
will • • • be only two possible long-period positions--full
employment and the level of employment corresponding to the rate
of interest at which liquidity preference becomes absolute
(19 36 , p. 191 ) •
Even a fixed quantity of money could not prevent the rate of
interest from falling and from increasing the level of output. Therefore
if wages and prices were "perfectly" flexible, the quantity of money
would be "nugatory" in the long run (1936, p. 191).

Keynes, however,

does not limit his long period analysis to one characterized by
perfectly flexible wages and prices, but considers the case in which
there is no tendency for prices to fall without limit, but to settle in
at a level which assures some measure of satisfaction with the status
quo.
In fact, an economy in which wages and prices were perfectly
flexible would be an "extreme case" in which no stability of values
would be possible and in which fluctuations in output would be so great
as to make futile all expectations and planning (1936, p. 269).

If the

long period equilibrium were at full employment, it would be marred by
an instability of values as the interim periods were characterized by
great swings in prices (1936, p. 253).
As it is, the rate of interest is not responsive to excess supply
of labor, that is, wages and prices are not sufficiently "flexible," so
• • • it may fluctuate for decades about a level which is
chronically too high for full employment;--particularly if it is
the prevailing opinion that the rate of interest is self-adjusting
• (1936, p. 204).
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This situation of long run equilibrium, like Friedman's, occurs
without interference by a monetary authority or central bank.

While in

Friedman's model there is no need for this interference, in Keynes'
description of long run equilibrium, there is no automatic return to
full employment.

There is a monetary constraint, and wages and prices

do not move to bring adjustment.

Even though this "mean position" is

"established by laws of necessity" and is descriptive of the present and
past states, "it is not a principle which cannot be changed" (1936, p.
254).

Absolute Liquidity Preference
As discussed earlier, Keynes saw a minimum interest rate
acceptable to wealth holders, for both psychological and practical
reasons, below which liquidity preference would be absolute.

This would

be another possible long run position.
In this case, output below the full-employment level could not be
increased by any method which depended on lowering the rate of interest.
If the propensity to consume were "given," no possible increases in
output would be possible, even if we rely on falling wages and prices to
reduce the demand for money.

Wages would have to fall to "zero," but

even this would be futile since the rate of interest is the critical
variable, "given" the propensity to consume (1936, p. 191).
Similarly, if the central bank attempted to lower the rate of interest
by increasing the money supply, the same situation would occur.

No

lowering of the rate of interest, and no raising of effective demand
would be possible through this means.

In this case, purely monetary

measures are indeed ineffective in stimulating output (1936, P• 233).
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As a position of long run equilibrium, however, Keynes considered
the liquidity trap unlikely.

Although Keynes perceived that it might be

"important in the future" (1936, p. 207), he saw no examples of it
hitherto; he did recognize that it could have existed in the past, 1
unknown to observers, since central banks have been unwilling to "deal
boldly in debts of long term."

If they had been willing, there would

have been a test of absolute liquidity preference.

Banks could have

purchased long term debt at constant prices, and there would have been
an unlimited supply of such debt.

Not only that, but the public

authority would have found that they could have borrowed "on an
unlimited scale at a nominal rate of interest" ( 1936, p. 207).
The minimum rate of interest acceptable to wealth holders must
exceed: "(1) the cost of bringing borrowers and lenders together, (2)
income and sur-taxes and (3) the allowance which the lender requires to
cover his risk and uncertainty

If the remaining net yield is

"infinitesimal," then "time-honoured methods may prove unavailing"
(1936, p. 309).

However, Keynes sees this as a possible limit to

monetary management in the long run.
Keynes was describing a situation that could occur in "highly
abnormal" circumstances (1936, p. 207).

Long run unemployment is normal

and must be caused by "normal" interactions, including the failure of
prices to adjust even in the long run.
Full Employment under Perfectly Flexible Wages and Prices
If prices and wages responded "perfectly" to every change in
aggregate demand and if no liquidity trap existed, then the real

1 Later in the dis·cussion, howeveT, Keynes· acknowledges- a
"flattening out" of liquidity preference in the U, S, durine the
Great Depression.
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quantity of money would be that which would restore the interest rate to
the full employment level.

Keynes said that the classical school

"assumed" certain "natural forces which caused the market rate to
satisfy one or the other of the above conditions" (1936, pp. 243-244).
The quantity of money could be changed by falling wages and prices
which would restore the level of real balances necessary to maintain
that rate of interest necessary for full employment.
If money-wages were to fall without limit whenever there was a
tendency for less than full employment • • • • there would be no
resting-place below full employment until either the rate of
interest was incapable of falling further or wages were zero"
(1936, PP• 303-304).
But if the quantity of money is virtually fixed, it is evident
that its quantity in terms of wage-units can be indefinitely
increased by a sufficient reduction in money-wages; and that its
quantity in proportion to incomes generally can be largely
increased • • • • We can, therefore, theoretically produce
precisely the same effects on the ra~e of interest by reducing
wages, that we can produce by increasing the quantity of money
whilst leaving the level of wages unchanged (1936, p. 266) •
• • • the Classical Theory has been accustomed to rest the
supposedly self-adjusting character of the economic system on the
fluidity of money-wages; • • •
A reduction in money-wages is
quite capable in certain circumstances of affording a stimulus to
output, as the classical theory supposes (1936, p. 257).
Though this case is an "extreme" (1936, p. 191), nevertheless it is
possible, and Keynes did recognize it as one long run outcome.

He

prefers though not to concentrate on those remote possibilities but to
recognize the real world facts which mitigate pure theory, and temper
the outcome.

The fact is that money wages do not fall without limit

whenever there is a change in demand, but they tend to fall less than
the decrease in demand due to worker resistance (1936, p. 303).

So, the

characterization of this case as extreme is "well founded in facts"
(1936, p. 303).
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Nevertheless, if we confine our attention to Friedman's precise
criticism of Keynes' long-run analysis (that absolute liquidity
preference is essential for the failure of long-run full employment
equilibrium to exist even if all prices are flexible), we must conclude
that Friedman is correct.

But, we conclude here that the analysis of a

long-run equilibrium in which all prices are flexible is not an issue
that was part of Keynes' "basic ~hallenge" to the reigning theory.
Rather, as noted above, Keynes considered flexible prices to be an
"extreme" case, and he considered the long-run analysis to be tangential
to his main concern:
Now "in the long run" this [quantity theory of money] is probably
true. • • • • • • •
•
But this long run is a misleading
guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead.
Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in
tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is
long past the ocean is flat again (1924, p. 88).
Thus we turn to Keynes' theory of short-run fluctuations of economic
activity and in particular to the role of money in such short-run
analysis.
E.

Keynes' Short Run Analysis

Price Behavior
The price level of output is a function of costs and of the scale of
output in Keynes' short run analysis (1936, p. 294).
one or the other of these determinants change.

Prices change as

There is no direct

"jump" from increases in the supply of money to increases in the price
level bypassing the effects of output changes.

Indeed, it is this

argument that Keynes makes throughout The General Theory.

It is only

through either a change in marginal costs (measured in money) due to a
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change in the real level of output or a "pure" price rise due to a
change in the wage-unit that prices can change.

Thus, Keynes apparently

has a model in which prices rise only as a result of a higher output
level.

Prices then are "sticky" in the sense that there exist forces

which inhibit a prompt response of output prices to a change in
demand.

2

Keynes' approach with respect to price behavior differs from

that of Friedman, who regards output prices as responding promptly to a
change in demand.

This implies that in Keynes' approach employers and

workers are willing to supply more output in the event of an increase in
demand, even in the absence of a price signal.
Keynes contends that output prices will tend to rise as output
rises for the following reasons:
1.

"Since resources are not homogeneous, there wil 1 be

diminishing, and not constant, returns as employment gradually
increases" (1936, p. 296).

That is, t.he marginal product of labor will

diminish and, if the real wage equals marginal product, it will be
necessary for the real wage to fall.

Output prices must rise to

accomplish the real wage decline.
2.

"Since resources are not interchangeable, some commodities

will reach a condition of inelastic supply whilst there are still
unemployed resources available for the production of other commodities"
(1936, p. 296).

In this situation, the economy will encounter

2 Keynes complains that it is a "great fault" of the quantity
theorists that they do not distinguish between a rise in prices due to
the rise in the wage-unit (caused by "bottlenecks") from a rise in
prices due to an increase in output (caused by increasing marginal cost)
(1936, p. 209).
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"bottlenecks" at high levels of output even though there is not yet
"full" employment.
3.

"The wage-unit wi 11 tend to rise before full employment is

reached" (1936, p. 296).

Workers are more successful at getting wage

increases during expansions, and so the nominal wage rate will rise.
In a later article (1939), Keynes eliminated the first reason for
rising prices.

In that article, he concluded that the real wage was

best regarded as constant during short-run fluctuations of output.

Thus

there is no necessity for a real wage reduction during expansion to be
achieved by a rise in prices.

However, the other two causes of rising

prices remain.
Thus as output rises, prices also rise.

As more and more

"bottlenecks" are encountered because of the nature of an interdependent
economy, price rises account for a larger share of the increase in
effective demand (1936, p. 301).

The limit is a situation of true

inflation at full employment in which the simple quantity theory of
money becomes operational (1936, p. 303).

Changes in the price level

depend on whether a change in effective demand operates more on
increasing employment or in increasing the "wage-unit."
There 1s an "extreme complexity" in the relationship between the
quantity of money and the price level.

3

If velocity is constant, then

effective demand will change in exact proportion to the change in the
quantity of money.

If prices change in full proportion to changes in

3 In the long run, 11 •
stability or instability of prices will
depend on the strength of the upward trend of the wage-unit
compared with the rate of increase in the efficiency of the productive
system" (1936, p. 309).
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effective demand, then output and employment are constant.

These are

the assumptions of the quantity theorists which Keynes seeks to deny

(1936, pp. 208-209).
The response of effective demand to changes in the quantity of
money (ed) is a function of liquidity preference and the variables
specified in the demand for money.

The response of money wages to

changes in effective demand 1s ew, and the response of employment and
output to changes in effective demand are e e an d e
0

•

The latter two

are determined by the physical elasticity of supply.
An approximation to the way in which money affects prices (denoted
bye) 1s as follows:
e = ed(l - e e e o + e e e ).
e o w
If e e e o = 1, there are constant output returns to increases 1n
employment; if ew = 1, money wages change in full proportion to
changes in effective demand (1936, pp. 304-305).

Keynes points out that

this is only a demonstration of the complexity involved in trying to
pinpoint the determination of prices, since several elasticities are
involved.

But, it can be seen that the price level at any given time

depends on the degree of capacity utilization, the demand for money, and
the readiness with which money wages change in accordance with the
change in effective demand. 4

4 The long run price level may be proportional to the quantity
of money if liquidity preference has stayed fairly constant. This,
however, is more an historical than a theoretical question (1936, P·
306). The trend has been upward, but that is easy to understand since
"
when money is relatively abundant, the wage-unit rises; and when
money is relatively scarce, some means is found to increase the
effective quantity of money" (1936, p. 307).
Historically, the stability of liquidity preference and increases
in productivity have provided a "fair measure of stability of prices"
(1936, p. 308). In the long run, nominal income (Keynes' price level)
is a function of liquidity preference and the quantity of money.
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The Transmission Process
Open market operations involve the purchase or sale of short term
government securities in the open market by the central bank.

If

securities are purchased, the result of this process will be that prices
of short term government securities are bid up, and the yields on these
securities, being the fixed coupon rate divided by the price, fall.
There is a fall in the yield on short term securities and an increase in
money balances which wealth holders have voluntarily have received in
exchange for the securities, due to the higher prices.
Keynes' analysis, as documented above, involves a broad range of
assets in portfolio decisions.

Therefore, his analysis implies that

wealth holders will now try to convert these new money balances into
higher yielding assets, including consumer durables, since yield is what
they desire.
asset.

The question may arise as to why money is not kept as an

Money in this and all cases is primarily a medium of exchange,

since the services that money provides come in the form of liquidity
services (1936, p. 231).

When the quantity of money increases, the

yield per unit of money falls somewhat (but not as much as for other
assets, 1936, pp. 229, 233), so that wealth owners desire to trade it
for more profitable investments.

At the same time the open market

operation has caused the yield on government securities to fall (because
of its price increase) so that yields on other assets are greater (1936,
PP• 200-201).

Part of the increased money will be stored as M2 (speculative)
balances due to the lowered rates of interest yielded by assets which
are alternatives to holding money.

Money's yield has also been lowered,
117

and at the completion of the entire process, all yields on assets will
stand in the same relation to each other as before.

Spending on

investment in new capital goods has been increased due to the relative
price differential seen by wealth holders. The opportunity cost of new
investment is lower in terms of alternatives and in terms of borrowing
funds to accomplish it.

The prevailing rate of interest has been

lowered since the prices of debts have risen.

Though Keynes uses the

term "interest rate" in different contexts, he defines it in his
"general discussions" as "the complex of various rates of interest
current for different periods of time, i.e., for debts of different
maturities" (1936, footnote, p. 167).
The other way for new money to be introduced into the economy is
through direct government expenditures.

In this case, nominal income

would increase directly as a consequence of the increase in money, since
the new money "accrues as someone's income" (1936, p. 200).

As

recipients of the new money spend it, they will choose to consume part
and save part so that
some portion of the money will seek an outlet in buying
securities or other assets until r has fallen so as to bring about
an increase in the magnitude of M2 and at the same time to
stimulate a rise in Y to such an extent that the new money is
absorbed in M1 and M2 (1936, p. 200).
Given the level of government spending and of taxes, the change in
Mis the change in spending in the first round of the monetary action,
and these recipients will allocate some of spending for consumption and
some for "saving."

The part that is saved causes the prices of

securities and other existing assets to be driven up, since the quantity
of these are fixed.

The lowered yield on assets and securities causes
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interest rates in general to be lower than if government bonds had been
issued and investment to be stimulated as above.

Equilibrium is

restored when all yields are in equilibrium and real yields are
equalized.
Thus incomes and such prices [of alternative stores of wealth]
necessarily change until the aggregate of the amounts of money
which individuals choose to hold at the new level of incomes and
prices thus brought about has come to equality with the amount of
money created by the banking system (1936, pp. 84-85).
The desire to spend on assets comes in this case from the
psychological desire to save, so that some portion of income will be
devoted to spending on assets whose prices are driven up.

If this were

not the case the effects of money would not operate through relative
prices.

In the first case, the desire was that of persons already

holding wealth to maximize returns on their savings.
A Model of Market Transmission
Keynes' channel by which open market operations affect spending
and real variables provides for transmission of effects from one market
to another.

It is clear that Keynes separates markets according to

special characteristics.

For example, he speaks of prices of existing

assets and the supply-price of newly produced assets (1936, pp. 142,
235, 248), and since he distinguishes between the prices of these
categories of goods they must be separate.

These markets are separate

yet related in that the interest rate established in one market is an
argument in the demand function for the other market.

The market for

consumer goods (non-durables and services) is yet another market.
Producers and demanders of durable goods face a different set of
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decisions than the participants in the consumer goods markets.

As

Keynes outlines these differences, it is clear that his model separates
these markets.
Assumptions that are made in developing Keynes' model are as
follows:

Individuals demand current consumption and future consumption.

Future consumption is provided for by saving, and savers attempt to
maximize yields on their assets.
The demand for a particular asset has the following arguments:
Ps • the price of substitute assets
y

• real income

q = the physical yield (either production or consumer services) of
the asset.
a• the appreciation premium
1 = the liquidity premium
c • the carrying cost
k • the rate of investment
K • the stock of capital-assets
s •

the scarcity premium; s • s(K)

The rate of investment is given by k • dK/dt.
negatively related to K.

The scarcity premium is

We may take demand for the asset to depend on

oA • DA(Ps, y, s(K), rA) where rA •(a+ q + 1 - c).

The process begins by an open market operation in which the
monetary authority purchases bonds for cash.
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Since the central bank does not engage in purchasing or selling
real capital assets or private securities, the first round effects would
be on the rates of return on government securities, as shown in figure
4.1, the effect on other assets coming later, as the sellers of bonds
trade their excess money for other assets.
One reason for supposing that there is a special connection arises
from the fact that •
• the banking system and the monetary
authority are dealers in debts and not in assets or consumables.
(p. 205)

The next step in the process is that wealth holders will recognize
the existence of other profit opportunities--that is, there are other
assets whose prices have not been affected.

They will increase demand

for these assets (DA 0 to oA 1 ) and attempt to purchase more of
these assets and in doing so drive up their prices (see figure 4.2).
These assets are "existing" assets, but since wealth owners care only

r

D

B(P ,y ,s)
s

Bonds

Figure 4.1.

Keynes' markets for government bonds and money.
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about the yield on the asset and not the form, this is irrelevant.

When

they drive up the prices of these assets from pA0 to pA 1 , they
have driven down their yields simultaneously.
Once all other assets have higher prices and lowered yields, it
becomes profitable to purchase (or order) new capital goods--either
consumer durables or production capital.

The prices of these goods are

still a bargain to potential investors or wealth holders.

So, the

increase in the prices of existing assets raises the demand for newly
produced assets.

Up to this point, Keynes' analysis bears a strong

resemblance to that of Friedman.
approaches depart.

However, at this point, the two

For we shall now argue that under certain conditions

(which Keynes considered to be quite common), the increase in demand for
newly produced assets will cause the output of these assets to be
increased but will do so without the necessity of an increase in their
prices or in the nominal wage-rates of workers employed in their
production.

Y, s)

DA0 (Ps , y, s )

Existing assets

Figure 4.2.

Keynes' market for existing assets.
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Excess Supply
Keynes in The General Theory attempted to build a model of an
economy characterized by excess supply of goods and labor.

The

existence of excess supply is due to deficient demand for goods, so that
a gap will occur between a community's actual and potential production.
In particular, producers set levels of production according to effective
demand but not exceeding that level where the real wage falls below the
marginal disutility of labor (1936, p. 26).

Effective demand is

determined by the amount expected to be spent on consumption at that
level of employment plus the amount expected to be spent on investment
purchases by the community (1936, pp. 25, 29).

Therefore, given the

propensity to consume, effective demand is a function of expected
investment expenditure (1936, p. 27).

Expected investment expenditure

is determined by the expectation of the "yield" on the purchase of a new
capital asset compared to its supply price.

If this yield is greater

than the highest rate of return from alternative uses, it will be
undertaken (1936, p. 137).

There is, then, an inverse relationship of

these highest yields to the volume of investment, and since the level of
output is determined by the level of investment when the propensity to
consume is given, the long run level of output is determined by the
schedule of "greatest yields" (1936, p. 136).
Employment is uniquely associated with the level of output at any
time given the state of art of industry (1936, p. 246). The level of
output is in equilibrium when employers have no incentive to change it
in order to profit further from the aggregate demand proceeds being
greater than the aggregate supply price (costs) (1936, pp. 25, 27).
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Following the line of reasoning, then, employment is also a function of
the schedule of "greatest yields."
To illustrate Keynes' idea of excess supply, we present a model of
an economy consisting of households and firms.

The households attempt

to maximize utility, which is given by:
U • U(N, cd', A/P +Aa), subject to
+ w*N + A/P • cd' + .4a, where

3U/3(A/P +Aa)

cW/aN

< O,

~u/acd'

> 0,

> O.

The firm attempts to maximize real profits which are given by
1'r • Y - w*Nd', subject to

y • F(N), F'

> O,

F''

< O.

Where N • quantity of labor
Cd' • effective demand for consumption goods and services.
A• nominal value of assets
P • price level
a• A/P, the real value of assets
1l' • the real value of profits

w • W/P, the real wage rate

Nd'• effective demand for labor
N8

•

notional supply of labor

Nd

• notional demand for labor

yd'= cd' + i • effective demand for output
yd

• notional demand for output

Y8

•

notional supply of output

y • real value of current output
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In this model, Ns is the quantity of labor supplied by
households if they are constrained only by the real wage and their time
endowments.

The actual level of employment, N, is determined by the

level of output firms can sell so that

That is, firms hire just that amount of labor necessary to produce the
amount of output they can sell, y (figure 4.3).

In turn, y is

determined by the effective demand for goods yd', so that y = y d'
Observe that, at K = Nd'
w1 ,

N

< Ns,

< Ns,

excess supply of labor exists; at

or, as Keynes stated it, " • • • the existing real

equivalent of these wages exceeds the marginal disutility of the
existing employment • • • " (1936, p. 14).

With respect to the behavior

<

of firms, Keynes specified in The General Theory that F''

0 and that

W/P

y

N

N

y

Figure 4.3. Keynes' labor and goods markets demonstrating excess
supply caused by a dual constraint.
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y

s

w •

3 y~~, so that the notional demand for labor (Nd) and the

notional supply of goods are negatively sloped.
Keynes attributes the above situation to deficient demand for both
investment and consumption goods.

Deficient demand in the investment

goods market comes about because of the competition that existing assets
provide for the purchase of newly produced capital goods.

As long as

there is an existing asset with a higher return, savers will choose that
asset over newly produced assets.
Now assume that the central bank increases the quantity of money
from Ml to H2 through open-market operations.

This action:

according to Keynes' transmission process, will increase the demand for
existing assets (figure 4.4), shifting the demand curve for these assets
from DA(M 1 ) to DA(M2 ).

The increase in the prices for existing

assets allows new investment to be made, since it is only in this
situation that savers will be willing to order a new capital good rather
than purchase an existing asset.
Now those assets of which the normal supply-price is less than the
demand-price will be newly produced; and these will be those
assets of which the marginal efficiency would be greater • • •
than the rate of interest • • • (1936, p. 228).
No further increase in the rate of investment is possible when the
greatest amongst the own-rates of own-interest of all available
assets is equal to the greatest amongst the marginal efficiencies
of all assets • • • (1936, p. 236).
When the price of existing assets increases, the demand curve for
newly-p~oduced assets shifts from D(PA1 ) to D(PA2 ).

Investment

increases from kl to k2, and the increase in output increases the
effective demand for labor, shifting the Nd' curve in figure 4.3.
Workers will be willing to supply more labor at the existing (or
even a lower) real wage rate.

Therefore, they do not require the
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Figure 4.4.

Stock of
existing assets

Effects of an increase in the quantity of money on the market for newly
produced assets and existing assets.

(PA )
2

Newly produced
assets

inducement of a higher nominal wage rate, and there will be no pressure
for W, the nominal wage rate, to rise.

In The General Theory, Keynes

contended that the marignal product of labor (3y/aN) would fall as
output rose, that w •oy/3N, and that therefore the real wage would have
to fall.

Keynes apparently was arguing that the real wage would fall as

a result of the increase in output (1936, p. 10).

Workers would not

resist
• • • reductions of real wages, which are associated with
increases in aggregate employment and leave relative money wages
unchanged, unless the reduction proceeds so far as to threaten a
reduction of the real wage below the marginal disutility of the
existing volume of employment (1936, pp. 14-15).
Thus, whereas workers would resist"• •• reductions of money-wages,
which are seldom if ever of an all-round character • • • "(1936, p.
14), they allow their real wage rate to fall as output prices tend to
rise.
But a question emerges:

If ffrms were located on their Nd and

yS curves (figures 4.3 and 4.4) prior to the increase in demand, how
could firms be characterized as having excess supply?

Keynes' evident

desire to build excess supply in the market for output into his model
was obscured by his incorporating the classical view of diminishing
8y/3N and the requirement that w • ly/3N into the analysis.

In a later

article (1939), he altered this portion of his analysis to allow for a
constant w during short-run fluctuations and a constant ay/3N over a
significant range of output fluctuations.
The effects of these alterations are shown in figures 4.5, 4.6,
and 4.7.

In figure 4.5, the monetary stimulus which raises pA shifts

the demand curve along a horizontal supply curve, so that there is no
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p

Quantity of newly produced
assets

figure 4,5.

Effects of an increase in demand when there is excess
supply in Keynes 1 market for new assets.

W/P

W/P

~--------)y/~N
A

B

N

y

s

y

N

Figure 4.6. Excess supply in Keynes 1
labor market with constant MPL.
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Figure 4.7. Exces~- supply in
Keynes·' goods -ma;rket with
constant -ma-rginal cost.

y

upward pressure·on price.

That is, so long as the producer of durable

goods can purchase inputs (including labor services) at constant prices,
his marginal cost curve will be horizontal.

And, as noted above,

workers will be willing to supply more labor at a constant nominal wage
rate, W, due to excess supply in the labor market.
Figure 4.6 follows Keynes (1939, p. 46) by introducing imperfect
competition into the model.

In this case, for the individual firm,

price will exceed marginal cost.

If marginal cost is constant as above,

the firm can increase output at a constant price.

But even with a

constant price, real profits will rise because of the difference between
the price and the marginal cost.

In terms of the demand for labor, the

firm will hire additional labor so long as w i (1 + l/ep)ay/3N,
where ep is the price elasticity of demand for output.
supply of goods clearly exists at point Bin figure 4.7.

Thus excess
An increase in

demand, which moves the firm to the output level of some point such as
A, can be achieved without the inducement of a lower real wage rate.
As the economy approaches the level of fully employed resources,
marginal cost is no longer constant.
A point must surely come, long before plant and labour are fully
employed, when less efficient plant and labour have to be brought
into commission • • • (1939, p. 44).
But the statistical phenomenon of the stability of labor's share of the
national product, and therefore a possible constant real wage over the
business cycle, might be explained by the degree of imperfection of
competition diminishing as output neared its capacity level in terms of
labor and existing plant.

Therefore, the notional demand for labor

would approach the marginal product of labor as the economy became more
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competitive due to a higher ratio of actual to capacity output (1939, p.
49).

It just may be, theorizes Keynes, that the "change in the degree

of the imperfection of the market is such as to offset the combined
effect of changes in marginal costs and of changes in the prices of
materials brought in from outside the system relatively to money wages"
(1939, p. 49).
A way that this mechanism could operate to keep the real wage
constant is that as output is increased from y0 to y 1 and the
effective demand for labor shifts from Nd' 0 to Nd' 1 , the
notional demand for labor curve would shift up to (1 + 1/elp.)ay/oN in
figure 4.8, as the price elasticity of demand has increased due to more
competitive conditions. While output has risen from y 0 to Y1, the
real wage has remained at w-tr.

Another increase in output would shift

the effective demand for labor to Nd' 2• and further raise ep
shifting the notional demand for labor to (1 + 1/e 2 P)ay/oN, until
finally at Yf (full employment of resources) the effective demand for
labor curve would cross the supply of labor curve where the notional
demand for labor equals the supply of labor so that both workers and
firms would have eliminated their excess supply.

Only under purely

competitive conditions would ep be equal to infinity, so (1 +
1/ep)ay/,N • ay/)N.

It is not necessary for the level of full

employment to dictate purely competitive conditions, although Keynes saw
competition improving as the ratio of actual to capacity output rose
and declining as the ratio fell.

Keynes only stipulated that full

employment would be a situation of diminishing marginal product of
resources.

At less than full employment, the resulting demand for labor
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W/P

Figure 4.8

Keynes' goods market with imperfect competition improving as
the economy nears capacity providing a constant real wage
rate.
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is perfectly elastic over the business cycle at IP'.

While diminishing

returns are present, the demand for labor curve is a result of a
combination of competitive conditions at high levels of output and of a
constant marginal product of labor at low levels of output.
In this analysis, Keynes has retained his hypothesis that the real
wage is always equal to the firm's demand for labor [either the marginal
product of labor, when ep • o-, or (1 + l/ep)ay/3N] so that the
worker may have an excess supply of labor.

But, in The General

Theory, the firm faces a declining marginal product of labor and there
is pure competition, the firm will not be in a position of excess
supply, bu would be maximizing profits.

The later development of the

1939 paper of a constant real wage, allows for firms to be in a
sub-optimal position also.

In this last case, made explicit by the 1939

article, Keynes shows a situation of excess supply of goods, and the
demand for labor is horizontal over some range.

Firms would like to

move to Yf, but are constrained by the level of effective demand.
Since the necessity of a declining real wage has been dispensed with,
"the good effect of an expansionist investment policy on employment ••
• [can be] due to the stimulant which it [gives] to effective demand"
(1939, p. 40), and "we can advance farther on the road towards full

employment than • • • previously supposed without seriously affecting
real hourly wages or the rate of profits per unit of output" (1939, p.

41).
Further Effects of the Transmission Process
At this point, there has been an increase in output and employment
in the market for newly produced assets.
133

During the expansion, the real

wage has remained constant, but labor income (w x N) has risen since
Nl

> N0 •

The increase in real income then produces further

increases in real income through the multiplier effect, as workers
increase their demand for consumption goods (cd') and additional
assets (A a).

The additional increase in effective demand raises firms'

demand for labor, which, if the economy is still at less than full
employment, results in yet another round of increased real income and
increased effective demand.

The extent of the increase in real income

that comes from the primary increase in the production of new "assets"
may be determined by the investment multiplier "k" (1936, pp. 114-116).
"Thus their effort to consume a part of their increased incomes will
stimulate output until the new level • • • of incomes provide a margin
of saving sufficient to correspond to the increased investment" (1936,
P• 117).

The market for consumption goods is stimulated by an increase in
the level of output economy-wide •
• • • increased employment for investment must necessarily
stimulate the industries producing for consumption and thus lead
to a total increase of employment which is a multiple of the
primary employment required by the investment itself (1936, p.
118).
The multiplier works to increase income for all markets, since there was
excess supply at the outset (1936, p. 248).
Full Employment in the Market for Investment Goods.
Assume again that the monetary authority purchases bonds in the
open market and, in doing so, raises the market price of these bonds and
drives down their yields.

Recipients of the new money, who have

voluntarily traded their bonds for cash, now look for more profitable
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investments for their wealth since the yield on short term governnent
bonds has fallen.

The demand for other existing assets increases.

Since the supply in this market is inelastic, prices of existing
(traded) assets increase.

Consequently, the demand for newly produced

assets of all types increases, since they are now a "bargain" to the
investor:

their MEC has risen relative to the rate of interest.

But now assume full employment in the market for newly produced
goods; producers will require a price increase in order to expand
production of these goods.

However, this price increase will be such as

to discourage increased purchases of these newly produced assets.

In

fact, if there is no excess capacity, the supply curve for these newly
produced assets will be vertical above full employment (see figure 4.4),
causing price to rise the full extent of the increase in demand (1936,
pp. 118-119).

At this point, the price rise of the newly produced

assets will reduce the MEC of those assets so that in relation to the
rate of interest, the previous equilibrium position is restored.

The

rate of investment will not rise, thus causing no increase in output and
no effect on the market for consumption goods through the MPC and the
multiplier.
Behavior of Producers of Capital Goods
A further complication exists with respect to newly produced asset
markets.

The constraint on clearing in these markets depends not only

on coordination with the labor market but also on the price level
established for existing assets.

This price level is a determinant of

demand in the market for newly produced goods.
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Prices in the newly produced goods markets rise only as as a
result of output increases not in response to demand changes, even if
there remains some unemployment in these industries:
• • • the wage-unit itself will tend to rise as employment
improves, and the increase in output will be accompanied by a rise
of prices (in terms of the wage-unit) owing to increasing cost in
the short period (1936, p. 249).
Thus instead of constant prices in conditions of unemployment, and
of prices rising in proportion to the quantity of money in full
employment, we have in fact a condition of prices rising gradually
as employment increases (1936, p. 296).
This [rising prices] is not a process that will have only begun
when full employment has been attained;--it will have been making
steady progress all the time that expenditure was increasing
(1936, p. 290) •
• • • supply price will increase as output from a given equipment
is increased. Thus increasing output will be associated with
rising prices • • • (1936, p. 300).
Therefore prices respond to an increase in the output of the good
due to increases in the wage-unit, bottlenecks, and increasing short run
costs.

Producers of the goods do not need an "up front" price signal to

increase production; they are willing to expand production at the market
price.
Prices of existing assets have risen, but prices of newly produced
goods rise only after output has begun to increase.

Therefore, a

consequence of the transmission process is that eventually there will be
an increase in the price level.

This increase is a consequence and not

a precondition of the increase in output.
without price

increases.

Output increases take place

If price signals were required, then these

investors would have had to recalculate the marginal efficiency of the
asset at the new price before purchasing it.

So, if the increase in

demand for investment goods results in an increase in output at constant
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prices due to the existence of excess supply, then what signals do
producers see to increase production and employment?
Producers of capital goods sell their products to the investors in
the model.

They rely on their estimates of effective demand when

deciding the scale of their operations, and in particular, they get
signals from the behavior of investors, who are their customers •
• in the case of durable goods, the producer's short-term
expectations are based on the current long-term expectations of
the investor • • • (1936, p. 51).
Thus the behaviour of each individual firm in deciding its daily
output will be determined by its short-term expectations as to
the cost of output • • • and as to the sale-proceeds of this
output; • • • in the case of additions to capital equipment • • •
these short-term expectations will depend on the long-term
expectations of other parties (1936, p. 47).
[Keynes is agreeing with Mr. Hawtrey's point that] • • • input and
employment are influenced by the accumulation of stocks before
prices have fallen • • • • For the accumulation of unsold stocks
(or decline in forward orders) is precisely the kind of event
which is most likely to cause input to differ from what the mere
statistics of the sale-proceeds would indicate • • • (1936, p. 51,
footnote 1) •
• • • I prefer • • • to emphasize the total change of effective
demand which reflects the increase or decrease of unsold stocks ••
• • Moreover, in the case of fixed capital, the increase or
decrease in unused capacity corresponds to the increase or
decrease in unsold stocks in its effect on decisions to produce •
• • (1936, p. 76).
Thus producers are induced to change output by a myriad of
signals, and price need not be one of them.

Since there is excess

supply in this market for newly produced assets, producers would be
willing to increase output at the going price if they perceived that the
output could be sold.

The increase in effective demand brought about by

the rise in prices of existing assets causes purchasers to increase
orders and producers to increase production without prices in this
market having to change.
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If wages fell "without limit" whenever there was unemployment, and
if prices of newly-produced assets also fell, the market would clear.
As long as there were workers willing to supply labor at a nominal wage
low enough to make production possible, excess supply of labor would not
develop in the market for newly produced assets.

But, in reality,

• • • a contraction of effective demand below the critical level
[full employment] will reduce its amounts measured in cost units;
whereas an expansion of effective demand beyond this level will
not, in general, have the effect of increasing its amount in terms
of cost units. This result follows from the assumption that the
factors of production, and in particular workers, are disposed to
resist a reduction in their money-rewards, and there is no
corresponding motive to resist an increase (1936, p. 303).
The cost unit that Keynes has referred to is the weighted average
of all costs entering into the production process.

So, as above, if

demand falls "measured in cost units," then demand has fallen more
than costs, so that the producer would have to maintain prices for his
output.

The condition that Keynes calls "true inflation" is one in

which any increase in effective demand results in an increase in the
cost unit fully proportional to the increase in effective demand, thus
allowing no margin for output increases.
The producer will cut his employment before he cuts his prices.
This is especially true when we consider that the "amount of employment,
both in each individual firm and industry and in the aggregate, depends
on the amount of the proceeds which the entrepreneurs expect to receive
from the corresponding output" (1936, p. 24).

The entrepreneurs realize

the gap between the supply price of their output and the expected
proceeds from the expenditure of consumers or investors.

Unless there

is an expectation of increased expenditure on investment goods, neither
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the producers of consumption goods nor the producers of investment goods
will increase output (1936, p. JO).
labor demand

Since employers construct their

according to the nature of supply and demand in other

industries, and "as to the amount of effective demand" (1936, p. 259),
then this area is out of their control.
When producers cut output, a necessary consequence is that the
marginal disutility of labor falls below the real wage.

Unfortunately,

there is "as a rule, no means of securing a simultaneous and equal
money-wage reduction in all industries," and "a movement by employers to
revise money wage bargains downward will be much more strongly resisted

...

II

{19J6, P• 264).

• • • the workers, though unconciously, are instinctively more
reasonable economists than the classical school, inasmuch as they
resist reductions of money-wages, which are seldom or never of an
all-round character, even though the existing real equivalent of
these wages exceeds the marginal disutility of the existing
employment • • • (1936, p. 14).
Therefore, Keynes sees an assymetry.

If the economy were at full

employment and demand rises, only prices would be affected.

But, if the

economy is at full employment and demand falls, output and employment
are affected, and money-wages and prices will tend to fall only after
output and employment have declined.

The reason lies in the inability

of workers to "insist on being offered work on a scale involving a real
wage which is not greater than the marginal disutility of that amount of
employment" (1936, p. 291).
If this were not the case, the classical economists would have
been correct in their assumption of continuous full employment at a wage
equal to the marginal disutility of labor.

Only if the real wage is

greater than the marginal disutility of labor will it be possible to
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increase employment by "increasing expenditure in terms of money" (1936,

p. 284).
The producers of consumption goods realize that they would not
profit by increasing output, since there would be some part of the
resulting increased income that was saved, and not spent on consumption
goods.

"Hence employers would make a loss if the whole of increased

employment were to be devoted to satisfying the increased demand for
immediate consumption" (p. 27).

Producers of goods watch not only their

own markets but other markets for signals as to the most profitable
course of action.

Since these producers have expectations as to what

total demand will be and realize that prices will not fall in areas they
cannot control, they are not in a position to lower price to gain a
greater share of the market.

Lowering prices on their output would

reduce their total revenues and cause them to suffer losses on each unit
of output they produced.

They have no choice but to reduce output.

If there is a decrease in the quantity of money causing a fall in
spending, producers will not lower prices unless they could be assured
that 1) lower prices on the goods they sell would induce their workers
to lower their wages, and their suppliers to lower prices; 2) other
firms would follow by lowering their prices so that there would be a
general price decline; 3) this general price decline would lead to a
lower interest rate through a reduction in the demand for money; and 4)
the lower rate of interest would induce new investment purchases and
fill in the gap between consumption expenditure and total output in
monetary terms.
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A Decrease in the Supply of Money
It may now be shown how a decline in the nominal money supply from
a position of full employment results in a fall in output and employment
at the same real wage rate, with money wages and prices remaining
"sticky."

A decrease in the supply of money caused by open-market sales

of securities by the central bank will produce the following sequence of
events:

1) it will lower the price and raise the yield of short term

government securities;

2) it will raise yields on all alternative forms

of wealth since an excess demand for money emerges causing wealth
holders to sell assets which have low yields, driving down the prices of
assets;

3) it will discourage investment in new assets due to the lower

prices on existing assets and thus cause a reduction in effective demand
in these durable goods industries;

4) the effects of reduced demand in

the investment goods market will not result in a lowering of prices due
to the reluctance of producers described above, and due to the
resistance of workers to lower money wages, output and employment in
these industries are affected primarily rather than prices;

5) lower

output in these industries impacts real incomes and profits and through
the multiplier lowers effective demand and thus income in the
consumption goods market;

5) producers in the consumption goods market

also will be reluctant to lower prices since prices of those goods and
labor which figure into their production decisions have not fallen.
So, a fall in the quantity of money will have effects the reverse
of those for an increase in the money supply.

The price decline of

existing assets is immediate (1936, p. 142); however, prices of newly
produced assets and goods do not follow.
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These markets have an

additional constraint of the attachment of an employment market.

If a

constant marginal product of labor exists, and if prices fall in these
markets, money wages would have to fall simultaneously.
In figure 4.9, if we start at point A where y • Yf and assume a
decline in the money supply as a result of an open market operation,
demand in the market for newly produced goods is affected through the
transmission process.

The decrease in the money supply raises the

interest rate on bonds as bond prices fall when the central bank sells a
larger quantity on the open market.

The return on other assets is lower

than the return on these bonds and money, so wealth holders will sell
other existing assets driving down their prices;

therefore PA falls.

Since investors compare prices of newly produced assets with the prices
of existing assets, the prices of new assets will now be higher than for
any other and they will substitute existing assets for new ones causing
a fall in the demand for new assets.

Lowered demand for new assets

causes Yd to fall toy d' , and the corresponding demand for labor to
fall to Nd'.

Since there were diminishing returns at Yf and Nf

(1939, p. 44), one might expect that a rise in the real wage would be
necessary if Keynes' assumption that the real wage corresponded to the
demand for labor.

But, if Keynes' later assumption of imperfect

competition at less than full employment is taken into account, it turns
out that the rise in the productivity of labor is offset by the
deterioration of competitive conditions in just that measure to produce
a constant real wage rate.
In figure 4.9, when effective demand for output falls to yd' 1
and the effective demand for labor falls to Nd' 1 , the real wage
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Labor market

Goods market

W/P

W/P

N
Figure 4.9.

The effects of a decrease in the quantity of money in Keynes' model.

y

remains at w-A' because ep falls just enough to offset the increase in
ay/3N caused by the decrease in output.

Thus the decline in output to

Y1 is matched by a shift downward and to the left of the notional
supply of output from ys(eop) to ys(e 1p) reflecting the
lower elasticity of demand caused by a lower level of competition, and
the labor market moves from A to B.
Similarly, as the decline in effective demand for goods shifts the
effective demand for labor to Nd', employment declines from Nf to
Nl•

But the fall in ep shifts the notional demand curve for labor

downward to Nd(e 1p ) ' and w remains at w-A' as the labor market moves
from A to B.

As demand declines further, yd' shifts to yd' 2 along

the horizontal segment of ys(e 1p), and the output market moves
from B to

c.

In the case of the labor market, the further decline int

he effective demand for labor shifts the Nd' curve along the horiontal
segment of Nd(e 1p) from B to

c.

There is excess supply of goods

since firms would prefer to be at A, where profits are maximized; there
is excess supply of labor, since workers would if unconstrained supply
more labor at w-A", (Nf), giving labor a larger real income.
Limits to the Transmission Process
The transmission process will be self-limiting as a new
equilibrium is reached between the marginal efficiency of capital and
the rate of interest.

"• •• the rate of investment will be pushed to

the point • • • where the marginal efficiency of capital in general is
equal to the market rate of interest" (1936, pp. 136-137).
again an increase in demand.

Consider

As investment in newly produced assets
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takes place, the marginal efficiency of capital in general falls.

The

scarcity premium will not rise as output increases since other assets
will be produced whose output is in competition with the output from the
asset.

The scarcity premium will fall.

Relative to other assets, the

supply price of a newly produced asset will rise since the increase in
output will raise prices in that industry.

The actual physical output

or "services" from the asset will not be affected by changes in its
supply, but its "yield" which is the total of all the other yields will
fall.

However, increases in the price level from increases in output

tend to offset this decline somewhat as investors revalue the stream of
prospective yields against the supply price of the asset 0936, pp.
141-142).
The increase in the price level will reduce the impact of the
initial increase in money by increasing demand for nominal balances, and
"• •• the effect of this on liquidity preference will be to increase
the quantity of money necessary to maintain a given rate of interest"
(1936, p. 173).
Therefore, unless the rate of money growth continues, the interest
rate will rise.

Eventually the decline in the MEC and the rise of the

interest rate will be such as to restore the purchase of new assets to
the former level, since the advantage of the higher rate of investment
will have vanished.

Prices of assets and rates of return will again

stand in such a relation to each other that there is no gain in trading
further.

This period of time "measured in years, is not very large"

(1936, p. 251).
There can be two outcomes to this process.
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One is that full

employment (in investment goods market) is achieved before the rates of
return come into equilibrium; then the rise in prices would accelerate
the realignment of the rates of return.

Another is that the rates of

return come into equilibrium before full employment.
Prices of newly produced assets may not fully adjust to prices of
existing assets, with the result that long term rates of interest may
not fully adjust to changes in the short term rates.

This

non-adjustment is a result of the conditions that cause excess supply in
the market for newly produced goods.

As the rate of investment

increases, the fall in the scarcity premium reduces the yield on all
assets of that type and lowers demand for those assets.

Prices on

existing assets respond immediately, but prices on newly produced assets
do not fall rapidly due to their labor market constraint.

Therefore, a

situation of excess supply will reestablish itself in the market for
investment goods.
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CHAPTER V
KEYNES' VIEWS ON MONETARY POLICY
Keynes' theory has been widely characterized as promoting fiscal
measures over monetary measures, and of particular interest in this
study is Friedman's position that Keynes did not favor monetary policy.
As documented in the introduction to this paper, Friedman has long
held the view that Keynes considered monetary policy "ineffective in
stemming a decline" (1982, p. 42).

Not only is monetary policy

ineffective, "money has no effect on anything"--neither prices nor
output (1956, P. 17).
Friedman believes that Keynes was led astray from his earlier
support of the quantity theory by the experience of the Great
Depression. (1982, pp. 47, 621; 1967, p. 87)

He wrongly interpreted

this period to have demonstrated the impotence of monetary measures,
whereas in Friedman's interpretation, having access to more
sophisticated data, the Great Depression was lengthened and made more
severe by an incorrect application of monetary policy.
Keynes carried his interpretation to the "extreme" and built a
theory to fit the facts as he saw them (1982, p. 48).

The resulting

theory is "highly specific," applicable only to conditions of deep
depression (1982, p. 464).
As a result of Keynes' convictions, he favored fiscal measures in

combatting unemployment, since monetary policy was of no use (1967, p.
87).

However, in the preceeding chapter it was made clear that Keynes

did recognize the potency of changes in the money supply.
14 7

While this

process has been recognized by interpreters of Keynes, it has been given
second billing to the warnings and qualifications that Keynes did make
concerning the limits to monetary policy.

This paper will not argue

that Keynes advocated a wholesale dependence on monetary policy to the
exclusion of other measures or that he considered monetary policy the
answer to unemployment.

It will present evidence that Keynes did not

consider monetary policy ineffective and that, under most normal
circumstances, it is useful and potent.
This chapter will provide support and clarification that Keynes'
views on monetary policy can be summarized as follows:
I.

Monetary measures should be the first choice of policy makers,

since monetary restrictions are capable alone of keeping the economy
at a less than full employment level of output.
2.

Keynes' theoretical framework implies that monetary policy is

effective and he believed that in practice the magnitude of its effects
was sufficiently large that it should be implemented in real world
circumstances in such a manner as to promote confidence in the system
and a stability in prices.
3.

There may be extreme circumstances in which monetary measures

do not result in increases in output.

In these cases, monetary policy

should not be abandoned but supplemented by other measures designed to
restore confidence in and a balance to the economic system.
4.

Monetary policy should precede and complement any other type

of economic policy.

A monetary policy that is effective will erase the

need for other policies which may be more difficult to implement.
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A.

The Importance of Monetary Policy in The General Theory

One of Keynes' major criticisms of Marshall and other classical
economists was that their theories took no account of the influence of
money on real variables in the economy (1936, pp. 183-184, 189).

He

also criticized the false division of the study of economics into the
Theory of Value and Distribution and the Theory of Money.

Money, he

argued, was an integral part of the determination of output as a whole,
so that a better division would be the study of individual decision
making when output was fixed, as one branch,

and the determination of

output and employment as a whole which requires "the complete theory of
a Monetary Economy" (1936, p. 293).
Keynes isolated three variables in the economy through which any
change in output must occur.

If one of these variables is not changed,

then there can be no change in output.

These are the rate of interest,

the marginal efficiency of capital and the propensity to consume (1936,
p. 245).

A necessary (but not sufficient 1 ) condition for a change

1n output is a change in one of these variables.
If, without any change in these factors, the entrepreneur were to
increase employment as a whole, their proceeds will necessarily
fall short of their supply-price (1936, p. 261).
Keynes advocates isolating those determinants which are
responsible for output changes, and among those concentrating on the
ones that a government is capable of affecting

(1936, p. 247).

The

rate of interest is one of those variables important for changes 1n
output and one over which the monetary authority has great influence.

1 The change is not sufficient unless all other variables remain
the same; interactions among variables may cause a reduced effect.
See pages 173 and 184 in Keynes, 1936.
149

This is the case since interest rates are determined by monetary factors
and not real ones (given the level of real income) (1936, pp. 165, 174,
183-184, 213).

The rate of interest can be influenced in the right

direction and the failure to do so results in output that is below a
full employment level.
The rate of interest is not self-adjusting at a level best suited
to the social advantage but constantly tends to rise too high, so
that a wise Government is concerned to curb it • • • (p. 351).
Since the rate of interest on money is one form of yield that a
wealth holder may earn, he always has the option of purchasing debts
rather than purchasing a capital asset.

Therefore the marginal

efficiency of capital must be greater than the rate of interest the
wealth holder could obtain by loaning his money •
• • • there is always an alternative to the ownership of real
capital-assets, namely the ownership of money and debts; so that
the prospective yield with which the producers of new investment
have to be content cannot fall below the standard set by the
current rate of interest (1936, p. 212) •
• • • the rate of interest on money plays a peculiar part in
setting a limit to the level of employment, since it sets a
standard to which the marginal efficiency of a capital-asset must
attain if it is to be newly-produced (1936, p. 222).
Since the marginal efficiency of assets falls as their stock
increases,
a point will come when it no longer pays to produce them, unless
the rate of interest falls pari passu. When there is no asset
of which the marginal efficiency reaches the rate of interest, the
further production of capital assets comes to a standstill (1936,
P• 228).
Keynes assumed a zero elasticity of production and substitution
for money (1936, pp. 230-231).

Money has no substitutes in transactions

and cannot be "produced" to accomodate the desires of wealth holders.
This unique combination of attributes serves to restrict the
self-adjusting nature of the economy:
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The money-rate of interest holds back investment in the production
of those other commodities without being capable of stimulating
investment for the production of money • • • (1936, p. 235).
The classical economists supposed that a rise in the rate of
interest due to an increase in the demand for capital assets would not
affect the level of output.

The rise in the rate of interest would call

forth additional saving to restore full employment equilibrium (1936, p.
274).

But, if saving is determined by the scale of investment,

which

is determined by the rate of interest, which in turn is a result of
liquidity preference and the supply of money, then the interest rate on
money cannot be determined by the real "yield" on capital and the supply
of "wealth. 11

Then

a rise in the rate of interest will diminish investment; hence a
rise in the rate of interest must have the effect of reducing
incomes to the level at which saving is decreased in the same
measure as investment (1936, pp. 110-111).
Therefore, a stimulus to output would depend on the "marginal
efficiency of capital rising relatively to the rate of interest"
(1936, p. 142).

Investment, a critical component of aggregate demand,

"is prompted by a low rate of interest •

...

Thus it is to our best

advantage to reduce the rate of interest to that point relatively to the
marginal efficiency of capital at which there is full employment"
(1936, p. 375).

Keynes admonishes that
The remedy for the boom is not a higher rate of interest but a
lower rate of interest!" (1936, p. 322).
The boom which is destined to end in a slump is caused • • • by
the combination of a rate of interest • • • too high for full
employment with a misguided state of expectation" (1936, p. 322).
Therefore,
The only relief [from unemployment]--apart from changes in the
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·marginal efficiency of capital--can come (so long as the
propensity to consume is unchanged) from an increase in the
quantity of money • • • " (1936 1 p. 234).
Thus, apart altogether from progress and an increasing population,
a gradually increasing stock of money has proved imperative
(1936 1 p. 340 1 footnote).
In Keynes' model, the rate of interest important for investment
and thus output is the rate of interest on money. However, this rate is
highly "psychological" since it depends on the interaction between the
supply of money and liquidity preference for the community
202).

(1936, p.

The only method by which the rate of interest can be altered is

by changing this equilibrium rate by either changing the supply of money
or by influencing liquidity preference. · The psychological incentives to
liquidity may be difficult to influence (1936 1 p. 309), so a more
reliable method would be to change the supply of money.
As noted earlier in this paper, the rate of interest is affected
by a change in the prices of assets relative to their returns.
price of bonds rises, the effective interest rate falls.

When the

Monetary

policy affects rates of interest by changing the price of the asset.

So

whether one considers monetary policy as operating through interest
rates "directly" or through the prices of assets "indirectly," the
results of monetary policy are the same.
(as a

Interest rates can only change

result of monetary policy) through changes in changes in asset

prices.

In Keynes' model, it was shown that a change in the prevailing

interest rate is necessary to restore equilibrium in the money market,
and in that sense interest rates might be considered to have a more
direct influence on the money market.

But the decision to invest

because the rate of interest has fallen is equivalent to the decision to
invest because the prices of new assets are "relatively" lower than
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existing ones.

In both cases, the wealth holder must decide on a set of

alternatives, and in both cases the opportunity cost of investing is
precisely the return that could be had either by holding money, by
purchasing an alternative store of wealth, by increasing consumption,or
by not borrowing.

Therefore no attention need be paid to whether

monetary policy operates through interest rates or through asset prices
if the range of assets is broad.
There are two methods by which the real supply of money may be
increased.

One method is the overt increase in nominal balances by the

central banking authority which Keynes described in his transmission
process.

The other occurs as a result of falling wages and prices.

In

the second instance, the real money supply is increased so that real
balances become sufficiently abundant in terms of the wage-unit "to
restore a level of full employment" (1936, p. 253).
The second method depends upon the flexibility and responsiveness
of prices and wages to changes in employment and output levels.

This

flexibility, while desirable isofar as it propels the system back to
full employment, results in fluctuations of the price level which
detract from a stability of values.

Every change in aggregate demand

would set up great movements in the price level which would find "no
resting-place below full employment" except at that point where
liquidity preference became absolute

(1936, pp. 303-304).

Therefore, a much more beneficial policy would be a program of
monetary management which would avoid great swings in the price level
and would promote stability and confidence (1936, pp. 270-271).

Stable

prices are desirable since they remove many of the harmful effects that
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expectations have on the level of output (1936, p. 88).

Even though

"analytically" they come to the same thing, Keynes advocated replacing
the "laissez faire" monetary policy of flexbile wages with one that was
intended to bring about the same results but avoiding the consequences
of price instability (1936, p. 267-268).
B.

Monetary Policy Implementation.

Keynes denied the simple quantity theory of money on the grounds
that it ignored the effect of interest rates on the demand for
speculative balances (1936, p. 196).

For, otherwise, he said, output

could be "assumed" to always be at full employment levels and prices
would always change in proportion to changes in the quantity of money.
This denial of the simple quantity theory does not constitute a denial
of monetary policy.

Rather, it is a recognition that monetary policy

operates on interest rates rather than on output prices in the short
run, and that the major thrust of monetary policy is the effect it
produces on interest rates (1936, p. 200-201).
Keynes' theory of how monetary policy affects the interest rate is
described in Chapter IV.

The effect of monetary policy on prices

comes as a result of the change in output.

As described in that

chapter, if the economy were at full employment, the simple quantity
theory would hold (1936, p. 209).

Otherwise, a change in money balances

usually has an effect on output through changes in the rate of
interest.
Accomodative monetary policy prevents the rate of interest from
rising too high.

If the demand for real balances rises as output
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increases and if money has no substitutes and cannot be produced, an
otherwise dynamic and healthy economy would be constrained by
insufficient real balances to maintain the rate of interest which would
result in full employment (1936, pp. 234-236).
A remedy for this situation is the production of money in just
that quantity which would maintain real balances:
• • • whereas if money could be grown like a crop or manufactured
like a motor-car, depressions would be avoided or mitigated
because, if the price of other assets was tending to fall in terms
of money, more labour would be diverted into the production of
money; • • • (1936, pp. 230-231).
Unemployment develops • • • because people want the moon;--men
cannot be employed when the object of their desire (i.e., money)
is something which cannot be readily produced and the demand for
which cannot be readily choked off. There is no remedy but to
persuade the public that green cheese is practically the same
thing and to have a green cheese factory (i.e., a central bank)
under public control (1936, p. 235).
Keynes described the normal or usual result of changes in the
quantity of money as a change in output.

It is helpful to consider the

transmission process in its "stages" of operation.

In the first stage,

rates of return on short-term government securities are lowered by a
bidding up of their prices by the banking authority •
• • • in normal circumstances the banking system is in fact always
able to purchase (or sell) bonds in exchange for cash by bidding
the price of bonds up (or down) in the market by a modest amount;
and the larger the quantity of cash which they seek to create (or
cancel) by purchasing (or selling) bonds and debts, the greater
must be the fall (or rise) in the rate of interest (1936, p. 197).
The second stage would come when individuals choose not to hold
the new cash after the bond purchase but to spend it on other "existing"
assets, thus raising their prices and lowering their yields.

In this

stage, "• •• some portion of the money will seek an outlet in buying
securities or other assets until r has fallen • • • "
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(1936, p. 200).

This!. would correspond to the rates (implicit or explicit) on
substitute assets, so that at the completion of this "stage," all rates
of return have been lowered, including the interest rate on money.
The last stage occurs when investment in new capital assets increases as
a result of the lowering of the interest rates.
expenditures cause output to rise.

New investment

At the same time, liquidity

preference rises due to a lowering of the rate of interest and a rise in
the level of income.

The excess money balances now find a home in the

portfolios of wealth holders, and equilibrium is once again restored.
Thus each increase in the quantity of money must raise the price
of bonds sufficiently to exceed the expectation of some "bull" and
so influence him to sell his bond for cash • • • (1936, p. 171).
The primary effect of a change in the quantity of money on the
quantity of effective demand is through its influence on the rate
of interest (1936, p. 298).
There will be a determinate amount of increase in the quantity of
effective demand which, after taking everything into account, will
correspond to and be in equilibrium with, the increase in the
quantity of money (1936, p. 299) •
• • • the grant of bank credit will set up three
tendencies--(!) for output to increase, • • • (1936,
p. 83).
Moreover, except in conditions of full employment, there will be
an increase in real income • • • (1936, p. 82) •
• • • employment, incomes and prices cannot help moving in such a
way that in the new situation, someone does choose to hold the
additional money (1936, p. 83).
Thus incomes and such prices [of assets] necessarily change until
the aggregate of the amounts of money which individuals choose to
hold at the new level of incomes and prices thus brought about has
come to equality with the amount of money created by the banking
system (1936, p. 84).
A change in M can be assumed to operate by changing r, and a
change in!. will lead to a new equilibrium partly by-changing
M2 and partly by changing Y • • • (1936, p. 200-201) •
• • • the terms on which the monetary authority will change the
quantity of money enters as a real determinant into the economic
scheme (1936, p. 191) •
• • • if the quantity of money beyond what is required in the
active circulation is in excess of this proportion of the national
income, there will be a tendency sooner or later for the rate of
interest to fall to the neighborhood of this minimum. The falling
rate of interest will then, cet. par., increase effective demand
• • • (1936, p. 306-307).
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Therefore, the classical theory is wrong when it claims that the
interest rate is self-adjusting without "grandmotherly care" (1936, p.
177).

C.

Monetary Policy Under Extreme Conditions

Unusual circumstances may exist in which reliance solely upon monetary
policy may be disappointing.

One example might be a situation in which

there had been a "collapse" of the marginal efficiency of capital, so
that investors would expect little or no returns from investment. If
these expectations are held universally, lowering the rate of interest
would be of little benefit.

Confidence in future returns from

investments would be low; therefore, any "practicable" reduction in the
rate of interest would not be enough to stimulate new investment (1936,
p. 316).

This condition could exist at "reasonable" levels of interest

rates, so it is not a liquidity trap.
There could be a situation in which the rate of interest on all
assets had been driven so low that savers uniformly expect that it
cannot be maintained at such a low level.

Therefore, in hopes of

getting a higher profit by waiting, they will hold cash or some other
extremely liquid asset in order to purchase assets at a later time.
This is the liquidity trap.

Since savers do not want to commit their

wealth to an illiquid, low-yielding investment to which they will be
tied for long periods, they will hold cash as a store of wealth for the
interim.

Therefore, at these low rates, liquidity preference is

perfectly elastic, and the monetary authority has reached a limit below
which the interest rate may not be pushed.
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If open market operations were conducted in conditions of a
liquidity trap, rates on short term government securities would fall.
However, recipients of the new cash would not immediately try to convert
it into other assets but would hold it until rates rose again.

Thus,

the substitution effect, upon which successful monetary policy depends,
would not occur.

The interpretation presented by Friedman that

speculators would prevent a rise in the rate of interest is not apparent
from Keynes' discussion of activity by speculators (see Appendix C.)

If

this discussion is the source of Friedman's views, it seems that it
serves only to document the preferences of investors for short term,
highly liquid assets.
Keynes introduced the possibility of a liquidity trap as a limit
to monetary policy in extreme cases.

He never discusses it as a normal

case, but only under highly unusual circumstances.

It is a warning to

those who would rely on manipulating the money supply as a remedy to
unemployment under any circumstances.

These statements are an expected

adjunct to the policies of one who encourages and even mandates the use
of monetary policy as a matter of course.

Keynes, who was a student of

money, foresaw the dangers of placing so potent a tool into the hands of
those who were not duly warned.

To those who sought a simple answer for

the problems of unemployment:
The object of our analysis is, not to provide a machine, or method
of blind manipulation, which will furnish an infallible answer,
but to provide ourselves with an organised and orderly method of
thinking out particular problems • • • (1936, p. 297).
One danger in "formalising a system" is that we lose track of "the
necessary reserves and qualifications and adjustments which we shall
have to make later on" (19 36, p. 29 7).
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A major topic in Keynes' qualifications is the effect of
expectations on the behavior of agents.

Expectations affect the rate of

interest by shifting liquidity preference and by changing the elasticity
of demand for money, so that in one instance monetary policy works
satisfactorily, while in other seemingly identical circumstances the
result is not intended.
Keynes warned against large changes in the money supply which may
cause uncertainty and therefore increase liquidity preference (1936, p.
172).

Also, expectations are "catching," so that a small change in the

rate of interest may cause a "mass movement into cash" (1936, p. 172).
Thus a monetary policy which strikes public opinion as being
experimental in character or easily liable to change may fail in
its objective of greatly reducing the long-term rate of interest,
because M2 may tend to increase almost without limit in response
to a reduction of r below a certain figure. The same policy, on
the other hand, may prove easily successful if it appeals to
public opinion as being reasonable and practicable and in the
public interest, rooted in strong conviction, and promoted by an
authority unlikely to be superseded (1936, p. 203).
Changes in the quantity of money may increase output, and that
sets up changes in other variables which tend to negate the increase in
money.

If the increase in output causes prices to rise substantially

(due to inelastic supply), liquidity preference will rise.

For

independent reasons, the MEC may be falling, or the MPC may be falling
(1936, p. 173).

It is not that monetary policy does not work, it is

that one must consider "complicating factors" and their "possible
interaction" when "thinking out particular problems" (1936, p. 297).
Monetary policy directly affects rates on short term government
securities, but depends on substitution effects to change rates on long
term debts and other assets 0936, p. 207).
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A "slip" may occur,

diminishing these effects because of response time or reluctance on the
part of agents due to expectations.
absolute, or it may be zero.

Liquidity preference may be

Keynes described the liquidity trap as a

"limiting case" of which he knew no examples, but he does provide
examples of a "flattening out" of liquidity preferences in both
directions.

He cites two cases, one in Europe and another in the United

States, but he refers to these situations as "very abnormal
circumstances" ( 1936, p. 207).
An additional problem with the rate of interest being driven to a
very low level is that it may not be enough to cover the real costs of
risk and uncertainty associated with the asset.

This cost is magnified

as the term of the ownership of the asset is increased (1936, p. 202).
Therefore, savers will not choose to hold their wealth in forms that
provide a negative return (1936, p. 219).
While high interest rates retard output and employment by limiting
profitable investment, very low rates are equally dangerous for other
reasons.

Very low interest rates afford no room for manipulation of the

money supply, since there is a minimum rate that will be acceptable to
wealth holders for the reasons cited above.

This minimum rate has

proved the "most stable and the least easily shifted" (1936, p. 309).
Therefore, "a long-term interest rate of (say) 2 per cent. leaves more
to fear than to hope • • • " (1936, p. 202).
These possibilities force Keynes to qualify his statements on
monetary policy.

However, it must be noted that he never abandons

monetary prescriptions but advocates combining them with other methods
in circumstances that require "more."
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A complete breakdown of the

system, situations in which "confidence" is gone, or a level of output
very far below average are situations in which monetary measures may
need some help.

"Merely" (meaning only) monetary measures may be

inadequate.
If a tolerable level of employment requires a rate of interest
much below the average rates, • • • it is most doubtful whether it
can be achieved by merely manipulating the quantity of money
(19 36, p. 309) •
• • • the collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital may be so
complete that no practicable reduction in the rate of interest
wi 11 be enough.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .

This is the aspect of the slump • • • which the economists who
have put their faith in a "purely monetary" remedy have
underestimated {1936, p. 316).
A real problem with dependence on monetary policy alone is that
fluctuations in the marginal efficiency of capital may be so great that
changes in the money supply cannot keep the pace {1936, p. 320).

The

volatility of expectations, rather than the impotence of money, is the
cause of this problem

{1936, pp. 164, 219-220, 315, 319).

Some of the

problems of rendering monetary policy more effective can be solved if
monetary measures are combined with other policies.
D.

Monetary Policy Combined with Fiscal Policy

In spite of the qualifications he presents, Keynes does advocate
reliance on monetary policy in normal times, and in this case monetary
measures are crucial to the ongoing stability of output levels and price
levels.

But, "it seems unlikely that the influence of banking policy on

the rate of interest will be sufficient by itself to determine an
optimum rate of investment" {1936, p. 378).
To mitigate some of the complicating factors, Keynes proposes
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redistribution measures to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy:
If the rentier is less prone to spend than the entrepreneur, the
gradual withdrawal of real income from the former will mean that
full employment will be reached with a smaller increase in the
quantity of money and a smaller reduction in the rate of interest
(1936, P• 290).
[If the boom has proceeded to the point where the economy is
saturated with capital goods (MEC • 0), then] The remedy would lie
in various measures designed to increase the propensity to consume
by the redistribution of incomes or otherwise; so that a given
level of employment would require a smaller amount of investment
to support it (1936, p. 324).
These redistributions are necessary only when monetary measures to
increase investment have failed because of the above-mentioned factors.
The major tool to be used on investment is monetary policy.

But where

investment is "unplanned and uncontrolled" (1936, p. 324), then "there
is no means of securing a higher level of employment except by
increasing consumption" (1936, p. 325).
Keynes says the "under-consumption" theorists have laid "a little
too much emphasis on increased consumption at a time when there is still
much social advantage to be obtained from increased investment" (1936,
p. 325).

So, to cover the event that the return from capital is

secularly declining, Keynes advises that the "wisest course is to
advance on both fronts at once" (1936, p. 325).
therefore, for both policies to operate together
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"There is room,
"(1936, P• 325).

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
A.

Major Differences in the Monetary Theories
of Friedman and Keynes

As a result of this investigation, some apparent conclusions may
be stated.

While it is useful to examine the monetary theory of an

economist, it is more revealing to compare his theory with another on
specific points.

This chapter will make a comparison of Friedman and

Keynes, especially in light of Friedman's criticisms.
Friedman's model is characterized by a situation of agents
adjusting to a change in the nominal supply of money, nominal income,
and the level of prices.

If price anticipations are less than perfectly

accurate, agents will alter spending in real terms until the
discrepancies are eliminated.
resolved:

1)

There are two ways the discprepancies are

agents adjust their anticipations to the new nominal

values and readjust their spending; and 2) prices will move so as to
restore real values to their original levels.

These occur

simultaneously since they are interdependent.
In the interim period, however, a change 1n the rate of spending
causes a change in the rate of growth of prices.

Because producers do

not anticipate this change, they mistakenly perceive it as a relative
price signal, and they alter their output levels to adjust to a new
situation.

If there had been an unexpected rise in prices, producers

would perceive that the real wage had fallen and that they could
profitably increase output.

If there had been an unexpected fall 1n the
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rate of change in prices, producers would see this as a price decrease,
relative to their costs and other prices in the economy.
they would decrease the level of output.
been no relative price change at all.

In this case

Of course, there had really

All prices in the economy had

risen or fallen in concert, and because the producers were not aware of
this, they mistakenly changed the level of output from the profit
maximizing level.
A similar story applies to workers in the economy.

They offer

more labor when their nominal wage is higher than the expected nominal
wage, and conversely they offer less labor when their nominal wage is
lower than expected.

However, they overestimate their real wage in the

first case and underestimate it in the second since they do not realize
that all other prices in the economy had been moving together.

They

were fooled by unanticipated inflation or disinflation.
Therefore, if all agents had been informed of the exact movement
of the price level, monetary changes could not have influenced the level
of output and employment.

There is no reason for agents to depart from

that level of profit-maximizing output or utility-maximizing employment,
so they must have done so as a result of an error in their calculations.
The previous state of long-run equilibrium requires that agents
receive a price signal to alter their level of output or labor supplied.
The initial result of increased spending is to raise prices, and as a
result of the price increase output levels will be increased.

This must

be so since output cannot be increased if the economy is at its
"natural" level of full employment without some price signal to agents.
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If there is no "excess supply," agents are constrained by their marginal
costs (for producers) and the marginal disutility of labor (for
workers), and they must have an increase in price relative to their
costs to raise output.

If both voluntarily alter employment in the same

direction, then the only explanation is that they must have perceived a
change in the real wage, and since they require the real wage to move

10

opposite directions, then at least one or both must have made an error
as to the exact nature of the real wage. Friedman explains this by
appealing to different sets of information available to workers and
firms.

Money affects output levels only if there are misperceptions and

confusion of agents as to what is or is not a change in relative prices.
Friedman says that his model incorporates flexible prices but not
"perfectly" flexible prices.

Perfectly flexible prices would prevail

whenever agents fully anticipated changes in the price level (1976a, p.
223; 1982, p. 415).

In this case, monetary changes would be fully

reflected in the price level and agents would not misperceive price
level changes to be relative price changes.

If prices are not perfectly

flexible, it must be due to an information deficiency in the economy.
In Friedman's theory, all prices, including the price of existing
assets, the price of newly produced goods, and the money wage rate of
labor, are flexible in the sense that they respond promptly to changes
in the demand and supply.

As prices begin to rise due to an increase in

spending, agents take the rise 1n their price to be a real increase in
demand for their "service," so they alter their production or supply of
labor.

This error in calculation results in less than perfectly
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flexible prices; in this case output responds along with price, and
delays the full adjustment in the price level.

Therefore, it is

misperceptions which cause prices to be less than perfectly flexible.
Friedman has observed that, in the early stages of an expansion,
much or most of the increase in spending will take the forms of an
increase in output rather than an increase in prices.

Observations such

as this should not obscure the direction of causation in his model:

it

is the increase in the rate of change in prices of output and of the
money wage rate of labor that cause output and employment to rise in
the event of a monetary stimulus.

Similarly, in the event of a monetary

restriction, the decrease in spending will cause a decrease in the rate
of change of prices and nominal wages, and this in turn causes output
and employment to fall.

In particular, the important point is the

direction of causation, the observation that the decrease in the rate of
change of prices may be small relative to the decline in output
notwithstanding.

More accurately, it is the price signal combined

with price misperceptions that explains why monetary events cause
cyclical fluctuations in Friedman's theory.
Keynes' model takes an entirely different focus.

The existence of

money is responsible for an economy operating at less than full
employment, but recession is not caused because agents are fooled by
unanticipated disinflation.

The distinction between relative price

signals and changes in the general price level is not crucial to Keynes'
analysis because misinterpretations of price "signals" are not important
for causing non-optimal changes in output, and in conditions of excess
supply, price signals are not necessary.
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Keynes did recognize that at

full employment a price misperception might occur as Friedman's model
predicts (1936, p. 290).
affairs.

But this would be a very temporary state of

Producers would not continue at a too-high output level for

any significant length of time;

the producers in Keynes' model are

aware of their costs and the true relative price.
At less than full employment, below which Keynes considers that
the economy is perpetually fluctuating,

agents have no problem sorting

out the relative price change from the general one.

In fact, the change

in the supply of money operates on relative prices of assets by offering
a real opportunity for profit, which agents quickly seize.

Agents build

into their calculations the expectation of price level changes, and so
are not fooled by increases or decreases in the rate of inflation.

But,

the economy works well as long as upward changes are indicated; agents
are always willing to increase the price of the goods or services they
sell.

The problem arises when effective demand is not sufficient to

maintain full employment.

Keynes' agents will not readily reduce their

prices to maintain that rate of interest which will provide the level of
effective demand that corresponds to full employment.
Are Keynes' agents fooled by the decline in spending, thinking
that their relative price has fallen?
are much more aware.

Keynes would say that his agents

They realize that demand has fallen economy-wide;

and they may realize that if all agents lowered their prices
simultaneously, full employment could be restored.

But they also

realize that their own individual action will not substantially affect
the whole economy.

If one worker were to lower his wage, his fellow

workers may not follow--certainly his creditors will not lower their
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demands from him.

If one producer were to lower his price, he does not

expect that his workers will agree to lower wages and his suppliers to
lower prices. Therefore, any lowering of wages and prices would be seen
by the agents as individually harmful, and they perceive this because
they make calculations of the effect of their actions in reference to
what others will do to arrive at the final optimal course of action.
Therefore, due to the interdependence of decisions, and the
existence of a monetary economy in which nominal values assume the
center stage because of fixed money obligations, and due to the
reluctance of agents to suffer relative declines in income, the economy
may become "constrained" by the failure of the price level to decline
adequately to maintain full employment.
problem,

Because of this coordination

the economy is always prevented from moving toward full

employment because of agents' reluctance to lower own price; the same
mechanism operates well when demand exceeds supply, and a price rise is
called for--agents are always ready to raise price.

Therefore, an

unemployment situation is always on the horizon, since the economy is
flexible only in one direction.
Monetary policy is effective even if agents anticipate it.

If

agents will not lower nominal prices to increase real balances and lower
the rate of interest, then let nominal prices remain stable and raise
the quantity of money to accomplish the same result!

Even if, as in

The General Theory, workers are aware that their real hourly rewards
may be falling, the real wage exceeds the marginal disutility of labor
as long as there exists involuntary unemployment.

So, workers are

concerned with their "balance sheet" and their relative position in
168

terms of income and are reluctant to suffer nominal losses.

Monetary

policy has but one purpose: to reduce the rate of interest to allow
"spending" for investment goods to increase and thereby to raise
effective demand.
A rise in effective demand does not have to operate through price
signals if there is excess supply.

Firms and workers both desire an

increase in employment, for both benefit.

If firms believe that an

increase in output can be sold they will be willing to increase
production at the same price, since labor will not demand a higher money
wage if there is excess supply in that market; also their other costs
will not increase immediately if there is a condition of excess supply
throughout the economy.

Further, if the productivity of labor is at

least constant in the short run, there is no reason at all to raise
prices even after production is underway until finally some
"bottlenecks" are encountered which raise costs of production.
Price changes occur in the existing asset market and the money
market since these supplies are fixed, and those prices adjust
immediately.

However, in the market for new goods which have the

additional constraint of labor market clearing, prices do not adjust due
to the coordination problem described above.

Therefore, sticky prices

may exist, due to excess supply in the case of an expansion and due to
the reluctance of agents to unilaterally lower price in the case of a
contraction.

Sticky prices in the market for new goods occur without

the necessity of a liquidity trap.

In fact, monetary policy affects

output levels without the necessity of affecting prices of new goods.
The crucial element is the existence of excess supply.
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If Keynes'

economy were at full employment, it would behave as Friedman's does in
the event of a monetary stimulus.
Since Keynes espouses a broad range of assets with relative price
signals in the existing asset market, it is also not true that Keynes
relied on a narrow range of assets as Friedman attributes to the
Keynesians.

In fact, it is not necessary to use any such assumption

once it is realized that the existence of excess supply may explain
movements in output caused by changes in the quantity of money without
the necessity of agents being deceived by price level changes.

It is

also not necessary that agents receive a price signal to tempt them to
increase output.

Additional features of this explanation are (with the

amendments of the 1939 paper) that the real wage may remain constant
throughout the cycle, that firms and workers are allowed to know the
true level of the real wage, and that it is not necessary to explain
away quantity responses before changes in prices have occurred.

At the very basis of the theories is the definition of
equilibrium, and this seems to be the point from which most of the
differences emanate.

Friedman's definition of equilibrium is that "all

anticipations are realized."

Under this requirement, it is clear that

Keynes' definition of an equilibrium state does not qualify.

Whereas

Keynes would maintain that there are any number of equilibrium
positions, Friedman admits only one.
Friedman concludes that the long run equilibrium is a hypothetical
state, but that it is important since it is one toward which the system
is constantly moving.

Even though it may never actually exist, that is

not relevant since the concept it delivers of the workings of the
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automatic adjustment process are revealing.

The level of output may be

on either side of this "natural" level, but there are "forces" which
left alone will move the level of output toward long run equilibrium.
The natural equilibrium level may not be at "full employment" in the
strict sense of a definition, however it will be at its "natural II full
employment level at which agents choose to be if they have all the
information that they need to make a decision.
Keynes' equilibrium is one about which the actual level
fluctuates, but this state is not hypothetical but actual.
normal state of employment and output.

It is the

It does not have to be at less

than full employment, but it is more often than not.

While

less-than-full employment may be an equilibrium state, over-full
employment is not.

The state of equilibrium is one that exists because

of the nature of a monetary economy that stalls adjustment due to the
existence of money as a store of wealth and the problems with
coordinating price level changes to restore demand in real terms.

It is

not subject to full automatic adjustments even in the long run.
Keynes recognized that Friedman's brand of equilibrium occupied
the foreground in the classical school, and in fact, was responsible for
their preoccupation with the long run and their lack of concern for
pressing short run problems.

But this too was one of Keynes' objectives

in attacking the foundations of economics:

long run equilibrium is a

hypothetical state that should be of little concern to economists.
The Rate of Interest
Friedman theorizes that the rate of interest on money equilibrates
the desires of savers to forego consumption with the desires of
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borrowers who seek to borrow for investment or consumption.

In the

short run the interest rate may be affected by monetary influences as it
temporarily disturbs relative price ratios, but the long run position of
the interest rate is equal to the real yield on capital at the "natural"
level of full employment.
Keynes differs substantially from this position.

The interest

rate is the result of the demand for money and the supply of money.
Investment affects the interest rate only through the effect that it has
on output and prices.

Increases in output and prices raise the demand

for money which tends to have upward influence on the rate of interest.
An increased demand for investment (increase in the MEC) would raise
interest rates indirectly through the above channel, whereas in
Friedman's model, the rate of interest would be bid up directly as the
equilibrating variable.
The rate of interest is affected by changes in the supply of money
by changing the prices of assets in both Friedman's and Keynes' models.
The influence of the interest rate on the money market though is more
direct in Keynes' model as equilibrium in the money market is restored
through changes in the rate of interest.

In Friedman's model,

the

ultimate determinant of equilibrium in the money market is the price
level.

Both agree that an interest rate is not limited to debts, and

both have a similar idea about what an interest rate represents--the
price of the asset relative to the price of the "return" it yields.

It

is lowered or raised in the same manner also, as the prices of sources
are bid up relative to the prices of services.
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The Transmission Process and Short-Run Fluctuations
The transmission process envisioned by Friedman and Keynes are
broadly similar.

An increase in the rate of growth of the money supply

through open market operations sets up a substitution process as savers
adjust their portfolios to reflect the changed bond prices and yields.
In doing so, they drive up prices of existing assets.

Even the "range''

of assets is broadly similar, though Friedman conceptually may go
further than Keynes in this area; but, Keynes maintained that his main
concern did not lie with what was called consumption and what was called
investment (or saving).

It is the case that Keynes recognized that

durable goods and even stocks of commodities could serve as assets in a
portfolio, in fact anything yielding services of any type.
As the transmission process continues, there are some notable
differences.

In Keynes' model, wealth holders increase the quantity of

money demanded as the interest rate falls.

Therefore, there is a limit

to spending occurring before interest rates are bid back up to their
original level.

Further, transmission to demand for consumption goods

is not accomplished directly through relative price inducements but
through the stimulus of higher income.

That is, Keynes' consumption

function is an important part of the process.

An increase in the output

of newly-produced durable goods (assets) requires firms to increase
employment.

The representative household now will be able to work more

hours than previously was the case, so that real labor income will rise.
This relaxation of the household's income constraint wil permit a higher
level of consumption spending.

Eventually, though, output prices will

rise, and the demand for money will increase due to real output and
price rises, causing a higher equilibrium rate of interest.
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Friedman's model has a different outcome, not because of different
assumptions about "price" but because of different assumptions about the
demand for money.

In Friedman's description of the transmission

process, wealth-holders continue to spend the "excess" balances until
their real balances are at their former level; of course this is only
possible if the lowering of the interest rate had no influence on the
demand for real balances.

Otherwise, like Keynes' wealth-holders, they

would have been satisfied with a higher level of real balances at some
point in the process.

The demand for money in Friedman's model is based

on permanent values, and agents may for a time not realize that their
permanent income has not risen and will temporarily alter the demand for
money.

As other anticipations adjust, though, the demand for money will

return to its former level causing a return to the level of real
spending that existed previously.

In Keynes' model, interest rates and

real income do affect the demand for real balances, while in Friedman's
model they may affect demand during the adjustment process, but when
agents "realize" their error, they readjust the demand for money to the
long run values of income and the interest rate, and thus force a return
to this level of output.
Keynes' transmission process continues after the rate of interest
is lowered as the multiplier effect from the increase in investment
operates on the market for consumer goods, whereas in Friedman's model
the effects of money are finished when agents have fully incorporated
the new price level into their calculations.

In Keynes model, after the

initial stimulus, the market for "money" is equilibrated via the rate of
interest, but its effects on output are still operating.
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In Friedman's

model, as soon as the money market is equilibrated by the price level,
the effects are gone.

However, in Friedman's model it takes

considerable time for anticipations to adjust, whereas in Keynes' model,
the interest rate moves quickly to restore equilibrium in the money
market.

Price rises in Keynes' model are an undesirable but inevitable

occurrence.

To mitigate the effects of rising prices on the rate of

interest, an ongoing program of monetary management must occur.
The Demand for Money
The demand for money in both Friedman's and Keynes' formal
specifications is very similar.

Both specify real income, rates of

return, the price level, and unspecified variables affecting the
liquidity of money.

While Friedman specifies uncertainty as a variable

in his demand function, Keynes considers uncertainty a "given" since
without it there would be no demand for money as an asset.

Both

consider money an asset, and both consider the "exchange" (Keynes, 1936,
p. 231) services to be the principal function of money and the "source
of its utility" (Friedman and Meiselman, 1963, p. 221).
Even though Keynes separates his demand function and Friedman does
not, Friedman admits to this separation in the basic motives.

But, he

says that wealth holders do not earmark dollars for one or the other
purpose.

Keynes says precisely the same thing.

a difference.
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Therefore, this is not

The Capital Market
Friedman does not recognize Keynes' scarcity premium which accrues
to capital because it is scarce and desirable and not readily produced.
As capital becomes more abundant in Keynes' model, the scarcity premium
falls and therefore the inducements to produce it fall.

The yield from

capital falls as more is produced.
In Friedman's model, he denies that the yield on capital falls as
more is produced.

The stock of capital has a special relation to the

yield of capital, so that if the yield changes, the stock is adjusted to
obtain the desired yield (1976a, pp. 299-309).

In this way, the yield

on capital does not depend on the stock in existence but on the demand
for the services of the capital equipment and the physical output of the
stock.
B.

Validity of Friedman's Criticisms

The Liquidity Trap
From the foregoing chapters it is clear that Keynes did recognize
the possibility of a liquidity trap, but that it was not the cause of
unemployment in the long run nor of price rigidity in the short run.

As

demonstrated earlier, output prices are sticky due to excess supply and
the existence of a monetary economy in which agents are concerned with
nominal values.

Unemployment is caused in the short run by the failure

of prices and wages to fall.

Long run unemployment, in Keynes' model,

is the result of the failure of prices and wages to be perfectly
"flexible" even in the long run.

Perhaps Keynes did not produce the

kind of long run equilibrium acceptable to pure theorists, and perhaps
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Keynes was not overly concerned with the rigor of pure theory, but
he considered that the long run, if it had to be interpreted as a "pure"
state of perfectly flexible prices, was not very useful to solve
economic problems.

He maintained

that the interest rate could remain

too high for decades, and certainly that was his cause of "long-run"
unemployment rather than the other hypothetical "extreme" situation--the
liquidity trap.

If Friedman must criticize Keynes for dependence on a

liquidity trap, he should clarify by saying that Keynes saw!!£
hypothetical long run situations if prices are flexible:
liquidity trap, the other

one the

full employment, neither of which were

issues that economists should be overly concerned with since they were
not "usual."
The short run liquidity trap that Friedman described was a
possible result of Keynes' discussions about speculators (see Appendix
C).

But, it did not impact the transmission mechanism and was unrelated

to money's role in the economy.

In fact, Keynes claims that there is no

obstacle to changing prices on short term debt that is "liquid."
Wealth Effect and Saving
Friedman himself acknowledges that absolute liquidity preference
would exist at interest rates "approaching zero," (1976a, p. 316), but
he sees this as never occurring, even theoretically, due to the wealth
effect.
sheet.

Friedman's individuals "save" to attain a desired balance
Keynes' individuals sav~ for many reasons:

to enjoy future

consumption or to build up a great fortune or just for the pure pleasure
of not spending (pp. 107-108).

In Friedman's model there is a limit or
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a "desired" balance sheet.

In Keynes' model there is not some

predetermined stock of wealth.

Saving still occurs even if assets grow

in real terms due to falling prices.

Therefore, in Friedman's model,

the "wealth" effect will be operational, but in Keynes' model, there may
be no desired balance sheet and no point at which "saving" stops
altogether.

Keynes does mention, however, the wealth effect on

consumption (1936, pp. 57, 84, 92-95, 319), and he does concede that the
propensity to consume will change as wealth increases, but he never
considers that the propensity to consume would be equal to one when
wealth reaches some level as Friedman does.
Even if one assumes that Keynes incorporates changes in the
propensity to consume in certain circumstances of increases in wealth in
his theory of adjustment to changes in demand, the next question is:
would a falling price level be up to the task of reaching this state of
wealth?

Since Keynes considered perfectly flexible wages and prices

that fell without limit to be "extreme," it is doubtful that it could
achieve this level of wealth if the same mechanism could not even
restore the money supply to the level needed to lower the interest rate
sufficiently.

Prices would have to fall even further to achieve the

"wealth" effect since wealth is less important as a determinant of
consumption but the money supply is the major determinant in the rate of
interest.

There is the additional consideration that the percent of

wealth affected in this manner would be small.
According to Friedman, the wealth effect is always operational,
even if a liquidity trap restrains a fall in the interest rate.

Keynes

considered the liquidity trap a "limiting" factor and would have not
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have considered that in this improbable circumstance the wealth effect
could have much influence either.

Though Friedman sees that the

"wealth" effect of falling prices encourages "spending," Keynes saw the
opposite tendency associated with a falling wage and price level.

In

this case, the individual would want to "wait out the decline," usually
by holding money or some highly liquid asset, inducing "saving" rather
than spending.

Only when all expectations were that the "bottom" had

been reached, would there be any impetus to spending

(1936, pp.

263-265).
C.

An Alternative Explanation of Unemployment
in the General Theory

Some explanation must be offered as to why there is unemployment
when there is an obvious route to full employment through price level
changes.

The explanation must lie in the failure of prices to move

adequately.

Friedman sees a relative price signal mechanism

characterized by price misperceptions as the only way that changes in
the quantity of money can operate to induce output changes since the
economy always starts from a position of "natural" full employment.
Friedman's interpretation of the absence of this mechanism in Keynes'
theory is the liquidity trap which prevents relative price changes from
inducing output changes.

He says that once Keynes' followers recognized

that the liquidity trap could not be justified empirically they relied
on a narrow range of assets to restrict the price changes only to those
assets recorded in financial markets, so that their mechanism had to
operate through interest rates, and thus some element of short-run price
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rigidity for goods could be theorized.

Friedman sees the only other

plausible model as his theory in which money affects a broad range of
assets through substitution in all markets, and therefore assures that
the level of output changes only in response to price changes because of
the existence of price misperceptions.
Friedman does not recognize a fourth possibility: that there may
be market clearing in the market for existing assets and money but
excess supply in the market for newly produced consumer and investment
goods.

This fourth model would allow relative price changes in the

market for existing assets (and therefore interest rate changes), and
would intensify the effectiveness of changes in the supply of money,
since money in this model would assume a greater position than a medium
of exchange--it would form the barrier to market clearing and the the
best weapon against unemployment.
In this model then, prices are flexible in the market for existing
assets but sticky in the output market and in the labor market.

The

model allows for price increases (decreases) in the market for existing
assets to increase (decrease) the demand for newly-produced assets.

If,

for example, a decrease in demand occurs under conditions of full
employment, output prices and nominal wage rates will be sticky due to
the coordination problem in a monetary economy.

Accordingly, the

decrease in spending will cause output and employment, rather than
prices, to fall.

Neither a narrow range of assets nor a liquidity trap

are necessary to explain why prices are not flexible in the short run.
In this fourth model, if the economy is in recession and
experiences an increase in spending, there will be no pressure for
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output prices and nominal wages to increase because excess supply
exists.

Firms and workers will be willing to expand output and

employment at the existing price level and the level of nominal wages,
and at the existing real wage rate.

In particular, price misperceptions

are not necessary to explain why short-run (cyclical) fluctuations in
output and employment occur.

It is the contention of this study that

this fourth model best describes the output and employment theories of
Keynes.
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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A
KEYNES ON INVESTMENT BY FIRMS
Keynes did not consider cases of "finns" making these decisions to
invest based on alternative returns to various assets.

Firms are a form

of productive activity for their owners by producing that good which is
its business.

A finn will expand to the limit of its ability to secure

financing to increase production of its own goods.

Firms cannot be

speculators in asset markets since they have no "income" which could
either be consumed or saved.
firm who are individuals.

Income accrues only to the owners of the

The desire for quick returns is not

characteristic of the behavior of investment by firms.
Whether or not firms make this decision to invest based on the
relative prices and yields of alternative assets, as certainly
individuals do, is important given the volume of investment purchases
undertaken by firms in the economy.

If, as argued above, firms are

single-mindedly directed to increasing their own business, then any
profitable opportunity to increase the scale of production would result
in increased profits for their stockholders.

A profitable opportunity

would arise when the marginal efficiency of capital exceeded the rate of
interest.

But, given this assumption about the behavior of firms, they

would already have exploited such opportunities to the maximum extent
subject to the financial constraint imposed by the prevailing rate of
interest and the debt to equity ratio of the firm.

It is only through

the relaxing of this constraint and the simultaneous lowering of the
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rate of interest that will allow firms to increase the rate of
investment.

Once this is accomplished, then firms hold no reservations

or expectations as individuals do.

They are not portfolio holders, but

they are "held" by their stockholders.
The transmission process associated with an open-market stimulus
would affect firms in the following way:

the prices of government

securities and existing assets are driven up by the transmission process
described above; since common stock is one of the assets in savers'
portfolios, its price will be driven up also.

The reason is that savers

will purchase more of the existing shares of common stock because its
earnings to price ratio (its yield) is high compared to government
bonds.

But, when the price of the stock rises, the total equity held by

stockholders will have risen in value since there are the same number of
shares with higher market prices.

This increase in equity lowers the

debt to equity ratio for the firm and effectively relaxes the existing
financial constraint.

Now the firm may borrow or issue new shares of

stock to raise funds for expansion, both methods raising the debt to
equity ratio.

Borrowing would seem to be the preferred method since the

"cost" of funds is now cheaper
alternative "yields."

due to the general lowering of all

An additional inducement, and an important one,

is that the marginal efficiency of capital has risen relative to the
interest rate for the firm as well as for the individual investor, for
at this point, the supply price of newly-produced assets has not risen.
This makes it easier for the firm to invest in new capital, at the same
time that the individual investor finds it profitable to purchase new
capital goods as a store of wealth.
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Keynes recognizes the relationship between the price of shares and
investment by firms •
• • • a high quotation for existing equities involves an increase
in the marginal efficiency of the corresponding type of capital
and therefore has the same effect (since investment depends on a
comparison between the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate
of interest) as a fall in the rate of interest (1936, footnote,
P• 151).

It is interesting to note that firms are not "unconstrained" in
their activities.

Individuals are constrained by their wealth and their

rate of saving out of income, while firms are constrained by their debt
to equity ratios.

Firms whose debt to equity ratios are high must pay a

high rate of interest to borrow, due to the high risk which lenders
assign the the borrower, and potential purchasers of new issues
investigate the debt position of firms.

Therefore, the transmission

process is critical for this situation, especially if there is an
economy-wide problem that firms are illiquid.

Firms will have a mandate

to invest in new capital equipment due to the transmission process.
This

investment will take place not due to portfolio management within

firms, but due to the special nature of firms as organizations of
production in which persons hold ownership and from which they demand a
return.

Although there are cases of firms purchasing other firms, this

is not a situation of portfolio management but a substitution on the
supply side.

If firms behaved as individuals by saving and holding a

portfolio of assets not related to their business, including equities of
other firms, they would find themselves in the strange situation of
competing with their owners for the available returns and of providing
funds for their competitors in the form of loans and equities.
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APPENDIX B
FRIEDMAN'S VIEWS ON THE EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN MONEY ON FIRMS
Firms store money as a productive tool--meeting payrolls,
purchasing supplies, and the like; therefore, the cost of holding money
to accomplish these things (which is the opportunity cost of holding
interest bearing assets) is "highly relevant" to the bu~iness enterprise
(1982, p. 41).

Another important set of variables is whatever affects

the "productivity of money balances," though Friedman and Schwartz do
not specify, important ones would be the rate of inflation and the ease
of obtaining short term loans.
The demand for money will vary from firm to firm according to the
scale of the enterprise, but this scale is a "variable that an
enterprise can determine to maximize returns, since it can acquire
additional capital through the capital market" (1982, p. 41).

The only

constraint that the firm would be under is the real return on capital as
related to the real return demanded by suppliers of wealth.

If the

return on capital were greater than the rate of interest, the firm would
acquire more of it, "demanding" a greater level of capital, and
therefore driving up the equilibrium rate of interest.

In the same

manner, if the return on capital fell, the firm would sell capital, thus
driving down the rate of interest.

In this way, the real rate of return

on capital is always equated to the rate of interest.
If a firm made wise decisions about purchasing the most productive
capital whose rate was at least equal to the rate of interest, it
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would

be able to expand to any size, provided the economy possessed adequate
capacity to produce this productive capital.

There is no financial

constraint on the ability of firms to invest.
What effect does the short term lowering of interest rates have on
"investment" by firms?

In Friedman's model, if firms "invest" whenever

the interest rate is lowered by purely monetary means, they borrow to
purchase capital goods to expand their scale of production.

When they

attempt to purchase these assets, the suppliers demand a higher price
for them since the former rate of output!!! equilibrium.

A higher

price for the asset means that the expected return on the asset will
have fallen.

In fact, if prices of assets move up uniformly, no new

investment will be possible merely because interest rates are lowered.
The transmission process equates returns on assets, real ones as well as
financial ones, so that there is no advantage to the firm in
"investing."
The lowering of interest rates cannot have an effect on investment
unless suppliers of these goods are willing to sell them at the same
prices.

If the transmission process affects output by affecting the

willingness of suppliers to increase production due to a higher price,
then unless firms miscalculate the price of the assets they are
purchasing, some other explanation must be offered as to why there is an
increase in investment by firms.
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APPENDIX C
KEYNES' VIEWS ON NEW INVESTMENT
Organized markets
Since a person may purchase existing assets or purchase new ones
with his savings, a new asset will not be produced unless the aggregate
level of savings rises. Otherwise, only transfers of wealth will take
place.

Therefore, saving must be equal to current new investment. (pp.

81-82)

It follows that unless it is attractive to purchase new wealth,

therefore ordering its production, there will only be a reshuffling of
portfolios.

This situation will not lead to an increase in the rate of

investment and will do nothing to increase output.

Insofar as wealth

owners choose existing assets over newly produced ones, investment in
new capital assets is correspondingly reduced.
Wealth owners' preferences are guided by their desires for yield
from an investment.
liquidity premium.

Part of this yield, as described above, is the
Keynes saw this desire for liquidity as operating to

reduce the market transferrence mechanism from the market for existing
assets to the market for newly produced assets.

The organized markets,

which facilitate transfers of existing assets among traders and which
facilitate the issuing of new securities, operate from both sides to
promote and at the same time discourage investment in new capital.
With the separation between ownership and management which
prevails to-day and with the development of organised investment
markets, a new factor of great importance has entered in, which
sometimes facilitates investments but sometimes adds greatly to
the instability of the system (1936, p. 150).
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The problem is caused by the fact that an investor has more
choices than previously.

He may either purchase a new capital asset to

employ in producing goods, or he may purchase an existing asset in an
organized market.

He will do so according to which form of investment

carries the higher expected return.

If he chooses to purchase an

existing asset on an organized market, and if his purchase does not
perform as expected, he has the option of selling or trading for
another.

On the other hand, if he chooses a capital asset that is not

traded, he is generally committed to the investment for a longer period.
Therefore, the existence of organized markets lends a great deal of
liquidity to the purchase of some assets, and in doing so, elevates
their yields.
But the daily revaluation of the Stock Exchange, though they are
primarily made to facilitate transfers of old investments between
one individual and another, inevitably exert a decisive influence
on the rate of current investment. For there is no sense in
building up a new enterprise at a cost greater than that at which
a similar existing enterprise can be purchased • • • (1936, p.
151).
Some problems with encouraging long term investment are solved by
the existence of organized markets:
For if there exist organized investment markets • • • an investor
can legitimately encourage himself with the idea that the only
risk he runs is that of a genuine change in the news over the
near future • • • which is unlikely to be very large (1936, PP•
152-153).
Thus investment becomes reasonably "safe" for the individual
investor over short periods • • • • Investments which are "fixed"
for the community are thus made "liquid" for the individual ( 1936,
P• 153).
Keynes details a host of reasons that investment may be curtailed
by the existence of these organized markets. The markets become a game
for speculators who play desiring quick profits.
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The game turns

investment into a speculative exercise 1n which the players attempt to
outguess each other rather than making decisions with regard to long
term returns on their investment purchases.

Since the "investors" are

not well-acquainted with the businesses they are "purchasing," the day
to day fluctuations guide their trading which are generally unrelated to
the long term potential of the firm.

These short term investors shun

assets which represent long term committments that will not turn a quick
profit.

The long term investors are discouraged from borrowing to

purchase capital assets since there exists an alternative way to earn
quicker returns at a much lower risk due to the high liquidity premium

(1936, pp. 154-156).
Keynes sees a "dilemma" which plagues modern organized investment
markets:
If individual purchases of investments were rendered illiquid,
this might seriously impede new investment so long as alternative
ways in which to hold his savings are available to the
individual. This is the dilemma. So long as it is open to the
individual to employ his wealth in hoarding or lending money,
the alternative of purchasing actual capital assets cannot be
rendered sufficiently attractive (especially to the man who does
not manage the capital assets and knows very little about them),
except by organizing markets wherein those assets can be easily
realised for money (1936, p. 160).
The transferrence from the market for existing assets to the
market for new assets is thus somewhat strained by the high liquidity
premiums that attach to traded assets, especially to already-produced
assets.

The transmission process operates on a structure of yields,

which is altered by bidding up the prices of existing assets.

The fixed

supply of existing assets forces the entire change to be borne in their
prices.

Prices of newly produced assets rise only as their production
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increases due to the existence of bottlenecks in the production process
(1936, p. 300).

When wealth holders regard this situation, they will

see that aside from the increased liquidity premium of already existing
traded assets there is an additional appreciation premium from their
purchase.

Therefore, the demand for newly produced assets must always

"lag behind" the demand for existing assets.
The price of new capital assets is governed by the conditions of
supply.

New capital assets which are traded in organized markets would

command a higher price due to their liquidity premiums.

But the

suppliers of these assets make no distinction as to whether they are
producing traded assets or not.

At prices higher than equilibrium,

suppliers would be willing to supply more new assets.

But the demand

for assets at this price is limited to the ones that are traded.
Therefore the incentive of high prices on traded assets keeps suppliers
of these assets in a condition of excess supply.

The transmission

process provides the only method by which effective demand can increase
in the market for newly produced goods.

The only method by which demand

for newly-produced goods (traded as well as non-traded) can increase is
through the increase in the price of substitute goods and a fall in the
cost of acquiring these goods.
Keynes recognized this interdependence between markets, and the
importance of whether goods are traded or non-traded. Traded goods
always command higher prices, and since they set the standard for all
newly produced goods, the inevitable result is excess supply in the
market for newly produced goods due to an equilibrium price that is too
high.
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For there is no sense in building up a new enterprise at a cost
greater than an existing enterprise can be purchased; whilst there
is an inducement to spend on a new project what may seem an
extravagant sum, if it can be floated off on the Stock Exchange
at an immediate profit. Thus, certain classes of investment are
governed by the average expectation of those who deal on the Stock
Exchange as revealed in the price of shares, rather than by the
genuine expectations of the professional entrepreneur (1936, p.
151) (emphasis added).
What did Keynes propose to do about this matter?
The only radical cure • • • would be to allow the individual no
choice between consuming his income and ordering the production of
the specific capital-asset which • • • impresses him as most
promising • • • •
• • • that would avoid the disastrous, cumulative and far-reaching
repercussions of its being open to him • • • to spend his income
neither on one nor the other (p. 161).
Long Term Rates of Interest
Another limit to new investment may be that the transferrence
between markets is limited in that long term rates of interest may
respond imperfectly to changes in short term rates.

Keynes says that

the central bank is always able to alter the price on short term
securities through its open market operations (1936, p. 197).

In this

case, the long term rates will have to follow from the substitution
process.

Since the rate of interest on short term securities is given

by the inverse of the price of these securities and the rate on long
term securities is given by the price on them, then whenever the price
of short term securities is bid up by the central bank, then savers will
search for better yields in the asset markets.

After all short term

yields are affected in this manner, savers should then turn to long term
bonds as a substitute investment.
As savers purchase more long term debt, they bid up prices on this
debt and lower its yield.

Keynes sees a problem with this transmission

process.
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If the monetary authority were prepared to deal • • • in debts of
all maturities, and • • • of varying risk, the relationship
between the complex rates of interest and the quantity of money
would be direct (1936, p. 205).
The monetary authority often tends to concentrate upon short-term
debts and to leave the price of long-term debts to be influenced
by belated and imperfect reactions from the price of short-term
debts • • • (1936, p. 206).
Where these qualifications operate, the directness of the relation
between the rate of interest and thequantity of money is
correspondingly modified (1936, p. 206).
Where • • • open market operations have been limited to the
purchase of very short-dated securities, the effect may • • • have
but little reaction on the much more important long-term rates of
interest (p. 197).
The long term rates are critical for investment in new capital
goods.

Since the nature of investment in new capital must involve a

delayed return, changes in long term rates can determine the
profitability of an investment. These are the rates which matter for
calculating the marginal efficiency of capital and are an argument in
the demand function for new capital assets.

197

VITA

Millicent Moulder Taylor was born in Longview, Texas on November
6, 1945.
there.

She lived in Nashville, Tennessee and attended public schools
She entered Vanderbilt University in 1963 and received a

Bachelor of Arts degree in January 1966, with a major in Economics.
After being employed as a systems analyst in Nashville for several
years, she moved with her family to Morristown, Tennessee in 1977, and
entered the graduate school at the University of Tennessee in September
1979.

She received the Master of Arts Degree in June 1982.
Mrs. Taylor taught economics at Tusculum College in Greeneville,

Tennessee while completing the requirements. for the Ph.D. in Economics.
The degree was awarded in December 1985.
At the present time she is employed as an economist with the
Central Intelligence Agency in Washington.

198

